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ONE WORLD or NONE
A Report to the Public on the Full Meaning
of the Atomic Bomb
Edited by DEXTER MASTERS, Editor of Science Illustrated, and
KATHARINE WAY of the Metallurgical Laboratory, University of Chicago
"Is there any scientific or military defense against the bomb?"
"How close is the danger of an atomic arms race; how can we control the bomb?"
"What would the Hiroshima bomb have done to New York City?"
"What are the immediate and long-range problems suggested by the relea~e of
nuclear energy?"
Waiting until we could -give the pu blic a definitive, authoritative analysis of
these and other problems created by the advent of the atomic bomb, we have persuaded some of the outstanding scientists associated with the project, as well as top
authorities from the political and military fields, to collaborate in writing this book.
The remarkable document they have pro duced presents a rounded discussion on the
full meaning and the terrifying dimensio ns of the bomb's threat to world survival.
It warns the public that world control of the atomic bomb is an essential of human
survival and hence the responsibility of every citizen.
Here are the facts, stated in simple, non-technical words by the men who know
them best. ONE WORLD OR NONE gi ves a step-by-step analysis of the basic problems involved in the use of atomic energy. Each authority takes up those points with
which he is most closely concerned. And the result is, for the first time in one place,
an informed picture of all ramifications of the subject.
The atomic age challenges everyone of us to wake up and adjust aUf thinking,
our laws, our ways of life so that we may make the best possible use of this new
force that has been put into our hands. ONE WORLD OR NONE will help
each man and each woman of this country to meet the challenge in the most logical,
the most com petep t manner possible.

•
DEXTER MASTERS -is editor of the forthcoming general science magazine, Science Illustrated. During
the war he was editor of the Army Air Forces secret publication Radar and a staff member of the Radiation Laboratory at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the center of United States radar re~earch.
KATHARINE WAY, nuclear physicist of the Metallurgical Laboratory at the University of Chicago,
before the war was assistant professor of physics at the University of Tennessee. She joine'd the atomic
bomb project in 1942 to work on theoretical problems connected with the Hanford plutonium plant.
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ARTHUR H. COMPTON, Chancellor of Washing.
ton II niversity, St. Louis, was awarded the Nobel
Prize in 1927 for cosmic-ray research. He directed
the Metallurgical Laboratory at Chicago where some
of the most important discoveries relating to the
atomic project were made.

Introduction
by A'R THUR H. COMPTON
life if given a chance. W 'e now have before us
the clear choice between adjusting the pattern
of our society on a world basis Sf! that wars
cannot come again, or of following the outworn tradition of national self defense, which
if carri'ed through to its logical conclusion
must result in catastrophic conflict.
T hough in broad outline the choice is clear,
the man-ner in which the outline is to be filled
in depends upon many obscure factors. These
include a knowledge of what the true possibilities of atomic energy are. These possibilities must be known before we can pass
intelligent legislation or plan for new industries. I n a military sense, what can atomic
energy do? In its application to the everyday
problems of human life, what promise does it
hold? What are the practical, possibilities of
international agreement that can make us safe
in a world of atoms?
It is to give help in answering such problems that this volume is presented. The writers
are persons who have been actively concerned
with problems of the atomic nucleus, sO,me of
them over many years. The technical aspects
. of the problems are presented in understandable as well as authoritative form by men who
have themselves been responsible for turning
atomic energy to practical use. They are
leaders in atomic engineering. Those who describe the military elf ectiveness of atomic

T was inevitable that mankind should
have atomic fire. The worldwide
growth of science and technology is the
main line of the rapid evolution of man into a
social being whose community is the world.
T he release of atomic energy is but a dramatic
step in this evolution. It is a part of our age-old
quest to use the forces of nature for shaping
the world according to our desire.

I

No group of men had the power to prevent
the coming of the atomic age. The only choice
was whether these new powers should first be
placed in the hands of the nations that were
fighting to preserve their fre ,e dom, or should
be used by some other group to arm itself with
atomic might. It was feared that the other
group might be (in enemy whos'e object would
have been to enslave the world. The intense
incentive of self-preservation was accordingly
responsibre for making available atomic
energy perhaps a decade or two earlier than
it might otherwise have come. Thus it was that
the Promethean gift was first presented to
nations that are conscious of their responsibilities to mankind for its wise use.
T he terrific blast at Hiroshima shocked the
world into a realization that catastrophe lies
ahead if war is not eliminated. This great fear
has for the time being overshadowed the hope
that atomic energy may vastly enrich human

v

individuals. It is hoped that their presentation
will help us to understand the issues involved
a.nd why certain sacrifices such as that of
national sovereignty are called for.
It is doubtful whether the world has faced
a more ·c1·itical problem than that of the
proper handling of atomic energy. Our great
hope is that this volume will help in finding a
wise solution to that problem, a solution which
will bring us lasting peace and make real to
us the clear possibility of an enriched human
life.

ene1'"gy have followed the development of the
bomb from the beginning and have had a firsthand view of its elf ects. Those who discuss its
political implications are men who have held
this problem to their hearts for years.
T he suggestions put forward with regard to
the national and international control of
atomic energy are the views of the individuals
who propose them and do not necessarily
represent the views of all of the contributors
to this book. The opinions are nevertheless the
results of mature thinking by well-informed
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whose nuclear research did much to
create the atomic age and won him the Nobel Prize
in 1922 at the age of 37, escaped from the Nazis in
his native Denmark in 1943. Coming to America,
he played a major part in the development· of the
uranium project. He has now returned to Denmark.
NIELS BOHR,

Foreword

Science and Civilization *
by NIELS BOHR

HE possibility of releasing vast amounts
of energy through atomic disintegration,
which means a veritable revolution of human resources, cannot but raise in the mind of
everyone the question of where the advance of
physical science is leading civilization. While the
increasing mastery of the forces of nature has contributed so prolifically to human welfare and holds
out even greater promises, it is evident that the
formidable power of destruction that has come
within reach of man may become a mortal menace unless human society can adjust itself to the
exigencies of the situation. Civilization is presented with a challenge more serious perhaps than
ever before, and the fate of humanity will depend
on its ability to unite in averting common dangers
and jointly to reap the benefit from the immense
opportunities which the progress of science offers.
In its origin science is .i nseparable from the collecting and ordering of experience, gained in the
struggle for existence, which enabled our ancestors
to raise mankind to its present position among the
other living beings that inhabit our earth. Even in
highly organized communities where, within the
distribution of labor, scientific study has become
an occupation by itself, the progress of science and
the advance of civilization have remained most
intimately interwoven. Of course, practical needs
are still an impetus to scientific research, but it need
hardly be stressed how often technical developments of the greatest importance for civilization
have originated from studies aimed only at augmenting our knowledge and deepening our understanding. Such endeavors know no national borders, and where one scientist has left the trail
another has taken it up, often in a distant part of
the world. For scientists have long considered
themselves a brotherhood working in the service
of common human ideals.

T

In no domain of science have these lessons received stronger emphasis than in the exploration
of the atom, which just now is bearing consequences of such overwhelming practical implications. As is well known, the roots of the idea of
atoms as the ultimate constituents of matter go
back to ancient thinkers searching for a foundation to· explain the regularity which, in spite of all
variability, is ever more clearly revealed by the
study of natural phenomena. After the Renaissance, when science entered so fertile a period,
atomic theory gradually became of the greatest
importance for the physical and chemical sciences,
although until half a century ago it was generally accepted that, owing to the coarseness of our
senses, any direct proof of the existence of atoms
would always remain beyond human scope. Aided,
however, by the refined tools of modern technique,
the development of the art of experimentation has
removed such limitation and even yielded detailed
inform~tion about the interior structure of atoms.
In particular, the discovery that almost the entire mass of the atom is concentrated in a central
nucleus proved to have the most far-reaching consequences. Not only did it become evident that
the remarkable stability of the chemical elements
is due to the immutability o"{ the atomic nucleus
when exposed to ordinary physical agencies, but a
novel field of research was opened up by the study
of the special conditions under which distintegrations of the nuclei themselves may be brought
about. Such processes, whereby the very elements
are transformed, were found to differ fundamentally in character and violence from chemical reactions, and their investigation led to a rapid succession of important discoveries through which

* This statement appea red in Th e London Times, August 11,
1945. It is publi shed here, for the fir st time in this country, by
special arrangement with Professor Bohr.
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ultimately the possibility of a large-scale release
of atomic energy came into sight. This progress
was achieved in the course of a few decades and
was due not least to most effective international
cooperation. The world community of physicists
was, so to speak, welded into a single team, rendering it more difficult than ever to disentangle
the -contributions of individual workers.
The grim realities being revealed to the world
these days will no doubt, in the minds of many,
revive the terrifying prospects forecast in fiction.
With all due admiration for such imagination, it
is, however, most essential to appreciate the contrast between these fantasies and the actual situation confronting us. Far from offering any easy
means to bring destruction forth, as it were by
witchcraft, scientific insight has made it evident
that use of nuclear disintegration for devastating
explosions demands most elaborate preparations,
involving a profound change in the atomic composition of the materials found on earth. The
astounding achievement of producing an enormous
display of power on the basis of experience gained
by the study of minute effects, perceptible only
by the most delicate instruments, has in fact, besides a most intensive research effort, required an
immense engineering enterprise, strikingly illuminating the potentialities of modern industrial
development.
Indeed, not only have we left the time far behind where each man, for self-protection, could
pick up the nearest stone, but we have even
reached the stage where the degree of security
offered to the citizens of a nation by collective
defense measures is entirely insufficient. Against
the new destructive powers no defense may be possible, and the issue centers on world-wide cooperation to prevent any use of the new sources , of
energy that does not serve mankind as a whole.
The possibility of international regulation for this
purpose should be ensured by the very magnitude
and the peculiar character of the efforts that will
be indispensable for the production of the formidable new weapon. It is obvious, however, that
no control can be effective without free access to

full scientific information and the granting of the
opportunity of international supervision of all undertakings that, unless regulated, might become a
source of disaster.
Such measures will, of course, demand the abolition of barriers hitherto considered necessary to
safeguard national interests but now standing in
the way of common security against unprecedented
dangers. Certainly the handling of the precarious
situation will demand the good will of all nations,
but it must be recognized that ,ve are dealing with
what is potentially a deadly challenge to civilization itself. A better background for meeting such
a situation could hardly be imagined than the earnest desire to seek a firm foundation for world
security, so unanimously expressed by all those
nations which only through united efforts have
been able to defend elementary human rights.
The extent of the contribution that agreement on
this vital matter would make to the removal of
obstacles to mutual confidence, and to the promotion of a harmonious relationship between nations
can hardly be exaggerated.
In the great task lying ahead, which places on
our generation the gravest responsibility toward
posterity, scientists all over the world may offer
most valuable services. Not only do the bonds
created through scientific intercourse form some
of the firmest ties between individuals from different nations, but the whole scientific community
'i\rill 'surely join in a vigorous effort to induce in
wider circles an adequate appreciation of what is
at stake and to appeal to humanity at large to
heed the warning that has been sounded. It need
not be added that every scientist who has taken
part in laying the foundation for the new development or who has been called upon to participate
in work that might have proved decisive in the
struggle to preserve a state of civilization where
human culture can freely develop is prepared to
assist, in any way open to him, in bringing about
an outcome of the present crisis of humanity that
is worthy -o f the ideals for which science through
the ages has stood.

x
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PHILIP MORRISON, now professor of physics at
Cornell University, was active on the atomic bomb
project at Chicago and Los Alamos. At the request
of the War Department, he went to Japan to investigate the effects of the Hiroshima bomb.

Chapter 1

If the Bomb Gets Out of Hand
by PHI LIP M 0 R R ISO N

E SAT in a small open wooden hut, like
a booth at a church fair, listening to the
Japanese General Staff major from Tokyo. Around us the ground was blackened. The
trees were strangely bare for September beside
the Inland Sea. The advance party of the American Army mission to study the effects of the atom
bomb had come to Hiroshima. In the rubble of
the castle grounds, the old headquarters of the
Fifth Division, the local authorities had prepared
for us a meeting with the men who had lived
through the disaster of the first atomic bomb. The
major was very young and very grave. He spoke
slowly and carefully, like a man who wants to be
properly translated and clearly understood. The
story he told is worth hearing. It is the story of
the first impact of the atomic bomb on the structure of a nation.
About a quarter-past seven on Monday morning, August 6, the Japanese early-warning radar
net had detected the approach of some enemy aircraft headed for the southern part of Honshu, and
doubtless for the ports of the Inland Sea. The
alert was given, and radio broadcasting stopped in
many cities, among them Hiroshima. The raiders
approached the coast at very high altitude. At
nearly eight o'clock the radar operators determined that the number of planes coming in was
very small-probably not more than three-and
the air raid alert was lifted. The normal broadcast warning was given to the population that it
might be advisable to go to shelter if B-29's were
actually sighted, but that no raid was expected
beyond some sort of reconnaissance. At 8: 16 the
Tokyo control operator of the Japan Broadcasting Corporation noticed that the Hiroshima station had gone off the air. He tried to use another
telephone line to re-establish his program, but it
too had failed. About twenty minutes later the
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Tokyo railroad telegraph center realized that the
l!!ain line telegraph had stopped working just
north of Hiroshima. And from some small railway stops within ten miles of that city there had
come unofficial and rather confused reports of a
terrible explosion in Hiroshima. All these events
were then reported to the air-raid defense headquarters of the General Staff. The military called
again and again the Army wireless station at the
castle in Hiroshima. There ,vas no answer. Something had happened in Hiroshima. The men at
headquarters were puzzled. They knew that no
large enemy raid could have occurred; they knew
that no sizeable store of explosives was in Hiroshima at that time.
The young major of the General Staff was
ordered in. He was instructed to fly immediately
by army plane to Hiroshima, to land, to survey the
damage, and to return to Tokyo with reliable information for the staff. It was generally felt in the
air-raid defense headquarters that nothing serious
had taken place, that the nervous days of August,
1945, in Japan had fanned up a terrible rumor
from a few sparks of truth. The major went to
the airport and took off for the southwest. After
flying for about three hours, still nearly one hundred miles from Hiroshima, he and his pilot saw
a great cloud of smoke from the south. In the
bright afternoon Hiroshima was burning. The
major's plane reached the city. They circled in
disbelief. A great scar, still burning, was all that
was left of the center of a busy city. They flew '
over the military landing strip to land, but the installations below them were smashed. The field
was deserted.
About thirty miles south of the wrecked city is
the large naval base of Kure, already battered by
carrier strikes from the American fleet. The major
landed at the Kure airfield. He was welcomed by
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the naval officers there as the first official representative of aid from Tokyo. They had seen the
explosion at Hiroshima. Truckloads of sailors
had been sent up to help the city in this strange
disaster, but terrible fires had blocked the roads,
and the men had turned back. A few refugees had
straggled out of the northern part of the town,
their clothes and skin burned, to tell near-hysterical stories of incredible violence. Great winds blew
in the streets, they said. Debris and the dead 'were
everywhere. The great explosion had been for
each survivor a bomb hitting directly on his house.
The staff major, thrown into the grimmest of responsibilities, organized some two thousand sailors into parties, which reached the city about dusk.
They were the first group of rescue workers to
enter Hiroshima.
The major took charge for several days. The
rail line was repaired, and trainloads of survivors
were shipped north. The trains came first from
Onomichi, where, about forty miles north, there
was a large naval hospital. Soon the hospital was
filled, and its movable supplies exhausted. Then
the trains bore the injured still farther north, until
there too the medical facilities were completely
used up. Some sufferers ,vere shipped twenty-four
hours by train before they came to a place where
they might be treated. Hospital units were mobilized by Tokyo to come from hundreds of miles to
set up dressing stations in Hiroshima. One bomb
and one plane had reduced a city of four hundred
thousand inhabitants to a singular position in the
war economy of Japan: Hiroshima consumed
bandages and doctors, while it produced only trainloads of the burned and the broken. Its story
brought terror to all the cities of the islands.
The experts in the science of the killing of cities
have developed a concept which well describes the
disaster of Hiroshima, the disaster which will
come to any city which feels the atomic bomb. That
is the idea of sa tura tion. Its meaning is simple:
if you strike at a man or a city, your victim defends himself. He hits you, he throws up flak,
he fights the fires, he cares for the wounded, h~
rebuilds the houses, he throws tarpaulins over the
shelterless machinery. The harder you strike, the
greater his efforts to defend himself. But if you
strike all at once with overvvhelming force, he cannot defend himself. He is stunned. The city's flak
batteries are all shooting as fast as they can; the
firemen are all at work on the flames of their

homes. Then your strike may grow larger with
impunity. He is doing his utmost, he can no longer
respond to greater damage by greater effort in
defense. The defenses are saturated.
The atomic bomb is pre-eminently the weapon
of saturation. It destroys so large an area so completely and so suddenly that the defense is overwhelmed. In Hiroshima there were thirty-three
modern fire stations; twenty-seven were made useless by the bombing. Three-quarters of the firefighting personnel were killed or severely injured.
At the same instant, hundreds, perhaps thousands,
of fires broke out in the 'wrecked area. How could
these fires be brought under control? There were
some quarter of a million people injured in a single
minute. The medical officer in charge of the public health organization was buried under his house.
His assistant was killed, and so was his assistant.
The commanding officer of the military was killed,
and his aide, and his aide's aide, and in fact every
member of his staff. Of 298 registered physicians,
only thirty were able to care for the survivors.
Of nearly twenty-four hundred nurses and orderlies, only six hundred were ready for work after
the blast. How could the injured be treated or
evacuation properly organized? The power substation which served the center, of the city was
destroyed, the railroad was cut, and the rail station smashed and burned. The telephone and
telegraph exchange was wrecked. Every hospital
but one in the city ,vas badly damaged; not one was
able to shelter its patients from the rain-even if
its shell of concrete still stood-without roof, partitions, or casements. There were whole sections
of the outer city undamaged, but the people there
were unable to give effective aid, lacking leadership, organization, supplies, and shelter. The J apanese defenses had already been proved inadequa te
under the terrible fire raids of the B-29's, which
had desolated so many of Japan's cities. But under
the atomic bomb their strained defenses came to
complete sa tura tion. At Nagasaki, the target of
the second atomic bomb, the organization of relief
was even poorer. The people had given up.
A Hiroshima official waved his hand over his
wrecked city and said: "All this from one bomb;
it is unendurable." We knew vvhat he meant. Week
after week the great flights of B·29's from the
Marianas had laid flame to the cities of all Japan.
But at least there was a ·w arning. You knew when
the government announced a great raid in prog-
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ress that, though Osaka people would face an infernal night, you in Nagoya could sleep. For the
raids of a thousand bombers could not be hidden,
and the fire raid had formed a pattern. But every
day over any city of the chain there was a chance
for a few American planes to come. These inquiring planes had been photographers or weather
forecasters or even occasionally nuisance raiders;
never before had a single plane destroyed a city.
Now, all this was changed. From any plane casually flying almost beyond the range of flak there
could come death and flame for an entire city. The
alert would have to be sounded now night and day
in every city. If the raiders were over Sapporo,
the people of Shimonoseki, a thousand miles away,
must still fear even one airplane. This is unendurable.
If war comes again, atomic war, there will not
even be the chance for alerts. A single bomb can
saturate a city the size of Indianapolis, or a whole
district of a great city, like Lower Manhattan, or
Telegraph Hill and the Marina, or Hyde Park
and the South Shore. The bombs can come by
plane or rocket in thousands, and all at once. What
measures of defense can there be? To destroy the
bombs in flight many measures will be attempted,
but they cannot be a hundred per cent effective. It
is not easy to picture what even one single bomb
will do. We saw the test shot in the New Mexico
desert, and we pored over and calcula ted the damage that a city would suffer. But on the ground at
Hiroshima and Nagasaki there lies the first convincing evidence of the damage done by the present
atomic bomh.
The streets and the buildings of Hiroshima are
unfamiliar to Americans. Even from pictures of
the damage realization is abstract and remote. A
clearer and truer understanding can be gained
from thinking of the bomb as falling on a city,
among buildings and people, which Americans
know well. The diversity of awful experience
which I saw at Hiroshima, and which I was told
ia bout by its citizens, I shall project on an American target. Please do not believe that there is
exaggera tion here; this story will be conservative,
it will allow for no increase in the effectiveness of
the bomb. It will tell of only one where, if there
is atomic "\ ar, twenty will fall. Your city, too, is
a good target.
The microwave early-warning radar tOvvers on
the Jersey coast and up past Riverside had re-
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corded the approach of the missile. It was 12 :07
when they noted the end of the signal, and the
operators wondered what the thing had been.
When the telephone circuits failed and the teletype stopped, they grew worried. When they listened to the shaky and disturbed news report from
W ABC a few minutes later, they knew what had
made the mark on the screen. One of the men
walked outside with his camera and looked north
in the bright noon sun to see the great pillar of
cloud he knew would come. The wind had been
from the northwest all day, and it is interesting to note that the radioactive cloud passed over
the same radar installation which had first remarked the missile. The recording radiation meter
at the station showed a harmless quantity of
gamma radiation, but the photographic film was
badly fogged.
The device detonated about half a mile in the
air, just above the corner of Third Avenue and
East 20th Street, near Gramercy Park. Evidently
there had been no special target chosen, just Manhattan and its people. The flash startled every
N ew Yorker out of doors from Coney Island to
Van Cortlandt Park, and in the minute it took the
sound to travel over the whole great city, millions
understood dimly what had happened.
The district near the center of the explosion was
incredible. From the river west to Seventh Avenue, anq. from south of Union Square to the middle thirties, the streets were filled with the dead
and dying. The old men sitting on the park
benches in the square never knew what had happened. They were chiefly charred black on the
side toward the bomb. Everywhere in this whole
district were men with burning clothing, women
with terrible red and blackened burns, and dead
children caught while hurrying home to lunch. The
thousands of brick and brownstone walk-ups, huddled closely to the eleva ted and packed thickly
between the rivers, were badly shaken in a few seconds. The parapets and the porches tumbled into
the streets, the glass of the windows blew some ..
times out and sometimes in, depending on the complex geometry of the old buildings. The plaster
fell on the heads of the tenants, old floors and
stairs collapsed under the terrible wind of the
blast, and only the heavy walls stood to ~ark the
homes. Closer to the center nothing much was left.
Many of the narrow streets passing between the
old five-floor brick or stone tenements were choked
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with rubble., until it was. difficult to walk down
the. street. Here and there collapsed buildings had
piled a great heap of pitiful debris, aU the wares
and effects of living, into a useless and smoldering jumble_. Everywhere there were fires, usually
licking at aJready useless wreckage, but making
heartbreakingly difficult the escape of the injured
and the slo'w work of the half-stunned rescue
parties.
The elevated str-ucture stQQd up comparatively
welL All the elevated stations from Fourteenth
almost to midtown w-ere wrecks. The steps were
gQne, the flimsy flooring and the old baroque railings lay in the street below. Only the clean steel
fr-ames were for the most part intact. In the blocks
near- Twenty-third even the main frame had gone,
and the twisted vertical columns remained above
the nightmare of steel below. The loss of life was
very large from, this alone. A tra.in had been
push~d Qf£ going at full speed north on Second
Avenue near Tw-entieth, and the. flames which
burned the whole of the district s.eemed to begin
from the wrecka.ge.. A few concrete garages and
warehouses stood up over the gaunt frames of the
elevated tracks, but the whir-lwlnd which tore
thrQugh them left the interiors wrecked... Fire usually finished the jQb.
The great buildings were not destroyed; none
had bee.n very clo.se to the blast.. But they were
not unharmed. The high Metropolitan Tower
was the WOIst damaged .. The steelwork stood unharmed near-ly to the top, though it wa.s badly
twisted where a whole ten-st0ry waH seetion had
come down into the street. The tnteriQr partitions
f-ro{Jl the sixteenth floor and up wer'e cQmpletely
g0.ll~,. and even some floors had failed, lea v-ing
a kind of half-filled honeyc0mb of a building above
the twentieth floQr. More than fifty people were
la ter said to have managed to clamber down from
the wreck.. It is known that eighteen of the radiation deaths recorded in the St. Louis hospitals
la t.er were of people who had been in the higher
floors of this building when the bDmb struck. The
people bdow the tenth flo,or were not fatally injured for the most part. Fractures and lacerations
from glass were. the principal cause of injury. A
good many hundreds of people from the south
side of the building died tWQ or three weeks after
the blast from radiation. Among them was a wellknown a.e ronautical engineer who had managed to
remain uninjured by the flash burn or the blast,

standing as he was behind a steel beam column on
the south side of the first floor, near the windows.
He bravely worked the whole day as_ one of the
rescue party for the Tower. The bad nauseous
symptoms which he underwent at six 0' dock caused
him to seek hospitalization at Philadelphia, where
he died in twelve days., woile working OJ! a report
for the Air Forces on the extent of the damage to
steel structures.
The Empire State building nearly a mile away
was strikingly little damaged. The radio structures and the external ornament of the high spire
were swept clean. The windows of course were
sha ttered and much damage was done to the light
partitions and even to the glassy exterior walls
on the higher floors. Elevator machinery was
badly damaged by a freakish falling beam and
many were trapped in immobile cars. The flash
scorched papers and window screens. and set fires
go.ing in all the offices on the side facing the blast.
These fires were brought under control in a day
or- so. For months after the blast the high tower
seemed to stand defiantly at the upper edge of the
vanished district, but the building was useless
~xcept in the very lowest floors. The tenants of
the building had not fared so well as its steel and
concrete frame;- the great dressing station established in the corridors and rooms of the first five
floor-s handled many of them, and sent many of
them to the Police Department's common graves.
The underground world of the city had been
. relatively safe. When the power failed in the
whole lower eastern Manhattan district because of
the destruction of the transformer sub-stations,
the subway power alone "vas restorable .. The Lexington gratings collapsed, and near the blast one
or two large street cave-ins had stopped traffic on
the IRT and flooded part of the tubes from broken
mains. But the greater number of subway passengers and crews escaped. A few hundred were
trampled. in a bad panic at the Thirty-fourth Street
entrance, and one train piled into the wreekage
below ground very near the aiming point. Some
people walked nOTth underground all the way to
the Bronx, not believing it safe to come up any
closer to the bornb. Men in the sub-basements
of the great buildings were horrified when they
came up to see why the lights had failed; they had
known nothing of the great blast but a ground
tremor and the dust of falling plaster.
The nearness of Bellevue Hospital to the blast
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-about half a mile-was tragic. The long brick
walls collapsed. Only a few patients here and
there survived. The doctors and nurses haJ no
time to salvage even the carefully prepared emer,gency supplies. Fire attacked the ruin, and the
:scenes which followed are indescribable. The
:knocking out of Bellevue was a hard blow to the
rescue organization of the city and delayed for
:some time the proper organization of relief.
There were many stories of uIlbelievable good
'fortune and magnificent heroism. One man, a
:glassblower apprentice, was walking along Lex:ington south to Twenty-fourth. He described the
:great flash, but he was protected from a direct
"view by the corner of a building. The blast
:knocked him down along the broad street, but no
:heavy object hit him, and he escaped without serious injury. All day and night he worked, leading
the badly injured north and pulling many people
from the wreckage. Though he was only a few
hundred yards from the point below the point of
impact, he suffered no symptoms of radiation injury. He was the only person on the streets of the
city within a ten-block radius who is known to have
survived without serious injury, and not more than
a thousand of the hospitalized but recovering victims were as close as he.
The most tragic of all the stories of the disaster
is that of the radiation casualties. They included
people from as far away as the Public Library
or the neighborhood of Police Headquarters
downtown, but most of them came from the streets
between the river and Fifth Avenue, from Tenth
or Twelfth to the early Thirties. They were all
lucky people. Most of them had had remarkable
escapes from fire, from flash burns, from falling
buildings. The people around them had never
:gotten away, but they had crawled, injured but
:alive, from the wreckage of homes or shops, from
,the elevated platforms, or from cellar stairways.
: Some had seen the great flash, felt the floor col"lapse, and picked themselves up ten minutes later
"from the rubble of their homes. Others had gotten
: free of the bus or auto they were in when it was
"thrown into a wall and had pulled out after them
,the dead and dying who had been their fellow
passengers. They were all lucky, as they said.
Some were dramatically uninjured, like the aeronautical engineer. But they all died. They died
"in the hospitals of Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Rochester, and St. Louis in the three weeks following

the bombing. They died of unstoppable internal
.h emorrhages, of wildfire infections, of slow oozing
of the blood into the flesh. Nothing seemed to
help them much, and the end was neither slow
nor very fast, but sure. They were relatively few
in number-the doctors quarreled for months
about their census, but it was certainly twenty
thousand, and it may ha ve been many more.
The people far away who lived through the
days of the aftermath suffered too. Homes and
offices were systematically and badly damaged as
far away as Fifty-seventh Street and Fulton
Market, and across both rivers. Every block had
its collapsed brick structures and its many walls
carried away, and its dozen dead. There were
not many windows intact on Manhattan Island,
and there were many thousands wearing the face
dressings that marked the target of glass splinters.
But their lives went on, the damage was slowly
repaired, and those who had no job to do there
stayed far away from the scar that had been the
Twenties. The rerouting of traffic and the repair
of the telephone and the electrical and the water
systems had its effect on the economic life of the
whole city. The damage was felt in many ways as
a drain on the recuperative power of the whole
of New York City, and the loss of one-tenth of
the people and the property of the city was enough
to lesst::n the work of the city by half. People
moved away and tried to forget.
The statistics were never very accurate. About
three hundred thousand were killed, all agreed.
At least two hundred thousand had been buried
and cremated by the crews of volunteer police and
of the Army division sent in. The others were still
in the ruins, or burned to vapor and ash. As many
again were seriously injured. They clogged the
hospitals of the East and turned many a Long
Island and New Jersey resort that summer into a
hospital town.

I

There was no one of the eight million who had
not his story to tell. The man who saw the blast
through the netting of the monkey cage in Central
Park, and bore for days on the unnatural ruddy tan
of his face the ,,,hite imprint 01 the shadow of the
netting, was famous. The amateurs who collected
radioactive souvenirs from the strong patch of
radioactivity which sickened Greenwich Villagers
for weeks were matched by those who found
scorched shadow patterns in the wallpaper and

I

I
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plasterboard of a thousand ,,,reeked homes.
New York City had thus suffered under one
bomb, and the story is unreal in only one way:
The bombs will never again, as in Japan, corne in
ones or twos. They will corne in hundreds, even
in thousands. Even if, by means as yet unknown,

we are able to stop as many as 90 per cent of
these missiles, their number will still be large. If
the bomb gets out of hand, if 'we do not learn to
live together so that science will be our help and
not our hurt; there is only one sure future. The
cities of men on earth will perish
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on e of our most distinguished
astronomers) is director of th e Harv ard College Observ atory. Dr. Shapley is th e author of numer ous
books and articles on astronomy ) and here he tells
the story of atomic transmutation in th e stars.
HARLO\V SHAPLEY,

Chapter 2

It's an Old Story with the Stars
by HARLOW SHAPLEY

T

HE historians of the next millennium
should be able to chronicle correctly the
fact that atomic energy came into man's
civilization and into his practical economy in the
first half of the t"ventieth century. But there must
be less precision in our recording that the produc..
tion of atomic energy entered the economy of the
stars in the year 3,000,000,000 B. c. Although
there is uncertainty in the date, there is no doubt
of the fact. The release and use of atomic energy
is an old story with the sun and other stars; it was
accepted as a fundamental tenet of astrophysics
two or three decades before the splitting of the
uranium a tom was accomplished willfully on one
of the sun's planets.
The story of atomic transmutation in the stars
is worth sketching in a volume on the origins,
nature, and responsibilities of the new ato:nic age.
It is worth recounting for two excellent reasons.
One is that atomic transmutation and energy
release in the stars are phenomena at the very core,
pith, and root of fundamental knowledge of the
universe. An acceptable cosmogony must be based
on the interrelation of matter and radiation, and
it . must satisfactorily account for these relation·
ships throughout all space and all time.
The second attraction of this story comes from
the curious fact that it was the fossil bones and
plant leaves in our terrestrial rocks that led us to
knowledge of the atom splitting in the stars.
This is how it came about. The astronomers
long ago began to measure the total output of
light from the sun. They knew of the great distance separating the solar surface and the earth's
surface-more than 92,000,000 miles. They
could measure directly how much radiant energy
comes in each second to each square mile of the
earth's surface. The measurements and calculations are simple. As seen from the sun, the earth
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is inconspicuous, exceedingly so; we find, in fact,
that it blocks less than one part in two billion of
the outpouring solar radiation. Since so much heat
and light get to us notwithstanding our minute apportionment, it is obvious that the sun is a stupendous producer. The rate of radiation is so great
that thoughtful astronomers of the early nineteenth century became concerned about it. Would
the sun exhaust its sources of supply and soon run
down? How could this furious energy be kept go ..
ing long enough to account for the recorded past
and provide for the hoped-for future?
The primitive supposition that the sun simply
is burning up in the fashion that coal oxidizes in
our stoves never attained scientific standing. The
better suggestion was advanced that meteors and
comets falling into the sun might provide an adequa te energy supply through friction and impact
in the solar atmosphere. Later Helmholtz and
his followers pointed to a sufficient source of solar
energy in the natural and automatically regulated
contraction of the gaseous sun. Isolated in cold
space, the sun tends to cool off from radiating
a'iVay its heat. The cooling results in a tendency
to shrink, with the atmosphere's condensing toward the sun's center. But the shrinking transforms energy of position into energy for radiation, and the sun in consequence tends to warm up.
The combination of processes results in maintaining the constancy of the outpouring radiation.
But it turns out that there is something wrong
,vith this solution. Here is where the fossils enter
and also the phenomena of radioactivity. Here,
in fact, is where the renowned element uranium
first enters the picture of atomic energy and the
fuel economy of the stars.
Geologists have long been cautious souls. They
find fossils of animals and plants in many rocks
in many lands. E vidences of great age are abun-
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dant. But how old are these deep-lying beds that
contain vestiges of extinct animals and plants?
Considerably bedeviled by the theologians of the
nineteenth century, geologists were long content
to estimate paleozoic ages in the tens and hundreds of thousands of years; later, in a modest
number of millions of years.
Then Becquerel and the Curies came upon the
scene, and with them soon came radium and the
sensational property of natural radioactivity in
radium, thorium, actinium, and uranium. The artificial splitting of the uranium atom, which now
concerns us deeply, was far in the future.. But the'
natural chipping of the uranium atom, its automatic transmutation into a somewhat lighter element through the expulsion of an alpha particle
(nucleus of the helium atom), was already recognized in 1896. And it ,vas soon deduced that this
chipping had been going on throughout all the time
that the earth has existed and perhaps longer. The
nucleus of the atom revealed its internal powers
fifty years ago ,-when its emissiolI of the intense radia cion and high-speed particles tha t come as a byproduct of natural radioactivity was first noted.
When we first treated tumors with radium, we
first used the power of the atomic nucleus. Then
it was that the children of the earth first followed
the stars of the heavens in living with atomic energy in the raw. They stepped on the threshold of
the atomic age to which the door has now been
throw"n wide open.
The particular use of uranium that is of most
interest to this part of our story lies in its utility
as a clock for measuring the age of rocks. Its continuous and inevitable decay, toward the end products of lead and helium, makes uranium especially
important as a measure of the time that has gone.
The more helium and the more lead one finds in a
uranium-bearing rock, the longer this uranium has
been operating and the older the rock.
The first measurements produced revolutionary
results. The old caution of the geologists and the
paleontologists was- dissipated by the new geochemistry. The revised time scale was found to be
comfortably long for the slow processes of geological change and biological development. It
was consistent with the evidences Qf erosion and
sedimentation. But now the astronomers were put
in a hole.
As the sun goes, we say, so go the stars. Solve
the problem of solar energy and you have ac-

counted for the radiant operation of the sidereal
universe. If contraction works for the sun, it must
work elsewhere. So the temporarily satisfactory
theory of contraction began to lose standing as a
satisfying creed. It was too limited to stand the
pressure of time. It was defeated by the archaic
ferns of the carboniferous formations, by their
newly determined antiquity, and by the geochemical evidence that the ferns and contiguous uranium
rocks demand a long, long time scale.
In other words, the sudden realization that the
earth's surface is exceedingly old made it necessary to reexamine the theories of the sources of
sunlight and especially to ponder the character of
ancient sunlight. For it is clear, even to the amateur inspector of paleozoic-life remains, that living conditions (so far as air and light are concerned) were practically the same three hundred
million years ago as now and probably also five
hundred million years ago. The fossil pickers and
the chemists working with radioactivity in the
rocks had found unknowingly something greater
than they knew.
It has been called serendipity-this faculty or
fact of accidentally finding a result of superior
significance while searching for something else. It
occurs frequently, but seldom has it led to such a
magnificent revela tion as the exposing of the secret
life of the stars. Serendipity operated while the
geochemist measured the ratio of lead to uranium
in various old strata of rocks 'and ,,,hi Ie the paleontologist pondered the structures of fossil plants.
For they found results that forced the astrophysicist, in searching vigorously again for a sufficient
explana tion of constant sunlight, to make a speculative invasion of nuclear physics and to find there
a clue to the coming of a terrestrial atomic era.
There could be no better example of the intermingling and advisable cooperation of the various highly specialized sciences.
Let us see how the clue was followed by the
scientists. In 1904, J. H. Jeans, a far-seeing cosmogonist, suggested that if in their frenzied agitation the electrons and protons of high-tempera. ture matter should coHide and exterminate each
other, there would be an effective release of energy. (This was twenty-five years before the neutron was accepted as a major constituent of the
atomic nucleus and as the equivalent of a proton
with its positive charge annihilated.) The next
year Einstein and the special theory of relativity
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provided the wonderworking rna thema tieal machinery that permitted the calculation of -just how
much energy would be released in the annihilation
of matter or in its partial annihilation; for on the
new physical principle matter and energy " rere
indeed equivalent. Grams of matter and ergs of
energy are the same entity with different make-up.
The Einstein equation states that you can, if
you know the trick, get 9 X 10 20 ergs per gram
-a tremendous output, well illustrated by Hans
Bethe's observation that 1 ounce of matter is energetically equivalent to the output for a month of
the great power plant at Boulder Dam.
The astronomers decided that the stars do know
the trick. In their hot interiors they can transform
the atoms of matter into radiant energy which
much modifies their surfaces and comes to us as
sunlight and starlight. Although the sun in this
process must lose by radiation more than four million tons.of its mass every second, its total material
is so great that it can run steadily for millions of
millions of years. The few hundred million years
of steady sunshine required by the evidences of
paleontology could now be easily provided. In
fact, the sun and the stars would not need to annihilate matter completely for their energy supply.
They could, for instance, transform only 1 per cent
o~ the mass of their atoms into radiation and
amply meet all requirements.
Apparently the stars work on this percentage
basis. The transmutation of hydrogen, the lightest element, into helium, the next lightest, with
the coincident transforma tion of a small increment
of the mass involved into radiation, is what happens in the hot interiors of stars built on the solar
model.
For some of the stars, it seems, the internal
temperatures are too low for the hydrogen-helium
synthesis to be effective, but other atomic processes
are there possible and probable. The other lightweight atoms-deuterium, lithium, beryllium, boron-are now believed to be potential collaborators in the production of energy through atomic
transmutation in stellar interiors.
In the sun's interior, where hydrogen builds into
helium, the temperature is more than twenty million degrees centigrade. The surface temperature
of the sun is only about six thousand degrees centigrade. We protoplasmic organisms can indeed be
grateful that the center is not exposed to us. We
could not endure such temperatures, which are
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comparable only with the flash of an atomic bomb.
Our existence is possible only because the outer
atmospheres of th"e sun serve as a screen and a
radiation softener.
But we should remember that atomic transmutations are at the bottom of terrestrial life. They
yield the by-product of comfortable radiation that
has been so long enduring that the earth's water,
air, and rocks could be kept warm enough for biological evolution to occur. One end result of the
a tomic processes in the sun is therefore the writing
and reading of books on the new atomic age. We
ha ve got where we are in the cosmos by the grace
of celestial atomic reactions.
Since we are personally so much indebted to the
helium synthesis and its by-product of energy for
our green leaves and for our warmhearted planet,
we ought to mention how the astrochemistry works
deep in the sun. It is not a direct process of four
high-speed hydrogen atoms merging directly into
a helium atom. Another common element, carbon,
acts as an intermediary in assembling the hydrogen
units.
There are several steps involving several transmutations before the end products of helium and
radiation are attained. The ordinary carbon atom
first captures a hydrogen nucleus and thereby becomes an isotope of nitrogen. It is heavier than
the carbon atom, of course, and is unstable. It decays into a heavy isotope of carbon through a spontaneous radioactive process. * This new carbon
atom picks up another hydrogen nucleus and becomes a heavier isotope of nitrogen. The process
goes on through additional captures and radioactive changes until the catalyzing carbon atom has
annexed four hydrogen nuclei, at which stage it
splits back into ordinary carbon and into helium.
This "carbon-stove" mechanism lias, in a sense,
burned hydrogen fuel into helium ash, and at various points in the complicated process it has released
atomic energy in the nature of very short-wave radiation. The total mass of the four hydrogen nuclei is greater than is required for one resulting
helium nucleus. The excess of matter is about 1
per cent, and it becomes radiation in accordance
with Einstein's equivalence principle. It is surplus
material that is traded in as energy-at the rate
of nine hundred million trillion ergs per gram.

* For a full account of the synthesis, see Goldberg and Aller,
/itoms, Stars, and N ebu.lae, pp. 269 ff., Philadelphia, The Blakiston Company, 1940.

IT'S AN OLD STORY WITH THE STARS

For the thousands of millions of years that the
stars have been shining, the majority have been
living on this catalytic activity of carbon that transforms the most common element in the universe,
hydrogen, into helium and other atoms ~hat are
larger and more complicated. Our current interpretation of the atomic mechanisms within stars
will no doubt be refined as further theory and
observation become available. The picture here
sketched reflects the work over a decade or two
of many astrophysicists and atomic physicists, but
the major contributor has been Dr. Hans Bethe
- a contributor also of a later chapter in this
volume.
The stellar atom processes work among the
lighter species of atoms, while the human atomsplitters of the past few years have worked among
the heaviest of the atoms at the upper end of the
ninety-two elements. And they do not stop with
No. 92; they now go several steps further. No. 93
is neptunium, named for the planet Neptune, as
uranium (No. 92) was named for Uranus, and
thorium (No. 91) was named for Jupiter (Thor).
The recently discovered plutonium ( No. 94) had
its name ready at hand-by a rather narrow margin, because the outermost known planet, Pluto,
was discovered and named only in 1930. The
newly discovered elements 95 and 96 catch the
astronomers unprepared. If eventually we do find
two other planets in the outer reaches, it is foreordained that the names assigned to them will be
the names selected for elements 95 and 96. We
are just that sentimental.
The release of atomic energy on a grand scale
among the stars is not limited to the orderly
processes that have maintained starlight steadily
throughout geologic ages. Certain peculiar phenomena of the solar corona may be attributable
in part to an atom-splitting process at or near the
surface of the sun. And it is generally accepted
that the novae, or at least the infrequent supernovae, deserve attention when the atomic-energy
problems of the universe are considered. The su-

pernovae may indicate what might happen to one,
whether star or man, who plays around carelessly
with atomic energy and lets it get out of hand.
In stellar interiors the pressures, temperatures, radiation densities, and chemical constitution are all
interrelated and all involved in the maintenance of
the steady state that characterizes most stars. The
production of energy from matter, if a star is
a steady performer, demands certain equilibrium
conditions. Otherwise something drastic may happen. Stars like the sun seem to manage very well.
They are not even amicted by discernible periodic
pulsations and variations in size or in surface temperature as are so many of the giant stars.
It appears to be otherwise, however, with the
supernovae. Something inside a star has upset the
equilibrium between production and distribution.
All the evidence points to violent and disastrous
explosion. Without previous indication that something is wrong, the star's surface begins to expand
with great velocity, and the surface temperature
rises. Within a few hours the brightness increases
so rapidly that it frequently excels, at maximum
effort, the light of one hundred million stars of the
sun's brightness.
As the explosive outburst subsides in the course
of hours or days, we find, in the few cases that
could be properly studied, wreckage of the violence. The outer part of the star has been blown
out into space in all directions. Nebulosity frequently appears. The well-known Crab Nebula in
Taurus is now recognized as the wreckage of the
supernova of July 4, A.D. 1054. The Orientals of
that time recorded an enormously bright "temporary star." It excelled in brightness all the stars in
the sky but soon faded away, not to be seen again
until the groping telescopes of seven centuries later
began to list faint nebulous objects. In the position
where the great star of 1054 had transiently glittered was an irregular nebulosity. Modern tele..
scopes show that it is a mass of gases, still expand..
ing-the result, apparently, of the mishandling by
a star of its resources in atomic energy.

EUGENE P. WIGNER, professor of physics at
Princeton, w as one of the gro up originally responsible for getting governm ent support for the atomic
bomb pr oject. H e w as concerned fro m the first w ith
the physics of chain-reacting piles and in 1942 moved
to Chicago to head th e theoretical physics w or k at the
Metallurgical Laboratory.

Chapter 3

Roots of the Atomic Age
by E U G ENE P. WIG N E R

O

NLY very few of us can design or construct a steam engine or prepare an explosive compound, and it is not the purpose of this chapter to serve as a textbook on
a tomic engineering. However, most of us are
familiar with the basic phenomena that are exploited in the steam engine and the ordinary explosives. Atomic explosives already influence
international relations more profoundly than ordinary explosives, and it is not impossible that
atomic energy may compete with our present
sources of power in a few years. Tomorrow the
basic facts about atomic power will be common
knowledge. Even today a closer acquaintance
with these facts may increase our foresight and
help us to form our opinions both on questions of
internal affairs and on those of foreign policies.
Atomic Reactions versus Ordinary Chemical
Processes. The first question that one might ask

concerns the special characteristics of atomic
power. The combustion of 1 pound of coal suffices
to raise the temperature of 700 pounds of water
by 18 degrees Fahrenheit. But "combustion" of
1 pound of uranium would produce an equal temperature rise in 2 billion pounds of water. The
same amount of energy is liberated when a pound
of uranium explodes, whereas the explosion of 1
pound of nitroglycerin liberates only enough
energy, when converted into heat, to raise the
temperature of 150 pounds of water. What is the
difference between the atomic process and our
ordinary chemical reactions that makes the former
so much more powerful?
The answer is that our ordinary chemical reactions affect the arrangement of the atoms, the
"smallest building blocks of matter," but not their
identity; atomic reactions change the identity of
atoms. The burning of coal results in a breakup of

the arrangement of the carbon atoms in the coal
and the oxygen atoms in the air, out of which a
new association of the carbon and oxygen atoms
is formed. The chemist denotes the carbon atoms
by C, the oxygen atoms by O. He would describe
the burning of coal symbolically:

-c-c-c-c

0-0
0-0
I I I I
-C-C-C-C +"0-0
0-0
I I I I
-C-C-C-C
0-0
0-0

0-0
0-0
0-0
0-0
0-0
0-0

-~

o-c-o
o-c-o
o-c-o
o-c-o
o-c-o + O-C-O
O-C-O
o-c-o
O-C-O
O-C-O
O-C-O
o-c-o

'-----y----..J

Coal

Carbon dioxide gas,
the product of
combustion

Oxygen in
aIr

Inasmuch as a chemical change such as the one
above changes only the arrangement of the atoms,
the number of atoms of a definite kind is the same
before and after the reaction. There were twelve
C atoms and twenty-four 0 atoms before the reaction, and there are twelve C atoms and twentyfour 0 atoms after the reaction. All that happens
is that the C atoms are torn out of their lattice,
the 0 atoms separated from their partners, and
new unions formed between C and 0 atoms.
The difference between a fuel such as coal and
an explosive such as nitroglycerin is that the nitroglycerin contains everything necessary for the
reaction within itself, while the fuel needs another
substance, namely air, for burning.
Atomic reactions are quite another matter.
They change the atoms themselves. Thus the
reactions which go on in an exploding atomic
bomb are expressed in this way:

U-235 ->- I

+Y

This is to say that uranium transforms into iodine
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and yttrium, a rather rare element. (It can also
break up into many other pairs of elements.) This
change of one atomic species into others is contrary to the principles of ordinary chemistry. It
is an effect that the medieval alchemists sought in
vain for several centuries and that was realized
only after their hopes were abandoned and the
futility of their efforts raised to a general principle. This principle, now superseded, is called
the principle of the immutability of elements. It
holds in chemical but not in atomic processes.
N one of this, of course, explains why the energy
changes in atomic reactions are so much greater
than energy changes in ordinary chemical reactions. Quite to the contrary, even front-line scientists puzzle as to the exact source of the atomic
energy.
Einstein's famous equation, E = mc 2 * tells us
tha t in order to obtain the energy released in the
reaction of the atomic bomb, we must subtract
from the mass of U-235 the masses of I and Y and
then multiply the remainder by the square of the
velocity of light. This is a most useful rule that
follows from a very fundamental relation. It
does not tell us, however, why the mass of U -235
is greater (0.1 per cent, which is a great deal
so far as mass differences go) than the combined
masses of I and Y. From a general standpoint,
it appears reasonable that a change that results
in so fundamental an alteration of properties as
the transformation of one element into another
(or two others) should be connected with larger
energy changes than the mere rearrangement of
elements-and we must be content with this explanation.
Einstein's equation does tell us, however, how
to calculate the energy released in any process if
the masses of the atoms participating in the reaction are known. It tells us, for instance, that the
energy released in the transformation of hydrogen into helium is about seven times greater (per
unit weight of material reacting) than the energy
released in the reaction of the atomic bomb (socalled "fission reaction"). It also tells us that
the most powerful reaction of all is the one which
has no final products. This is the so-called "annihilation reaction" :

U+

measurable scale still belongs in the dream world
of scientists.
Still other atomic reactions occur spontaneously
in the phenomenon known as radioactivity. This
phenomenon occurs in many of the heavy elements
found in nature, such as radium and thorium, and
also in some artificially created forms of elements
ordinarily stable. The iodine and yttrium, for
example, that are products of uranium fission, are
radioactive forms of ordinary stable iodine and
yttrium. Radioactive atoms eject part of their
substance and are thus changed into other elements. Sometimes the ejected particles are accompanied by a radiation known as gamma radiation,
whose rays are similar to but more energetic and
penetrating than X-rays.
The emission of the particles and rays proceeds
at a rate determined by the probability of the
occurrence of certain configurations within the
nucleus of the atom. Nor can this rate be altered
by such outside influences as heat or pressure. It
is usually described by a quantity known as the
half life, which is the time taken for half of any
given quantity of material to disintegrate. At the
end of one h~tlf life, only half of the original substance remains; at the end of two half lives only
a quarter of it is left, and so on.
There is an . .
other difference between ordinary chemical reactions and atomic reactions that deserves consideration. It is a difference connected with the phenomenon of isotopes. Isotopes are forms of the
same element: They behave so much alike in
ordinary chemical reactions that it was, for a long
time, an open question whether a mixture of two
isotopes could be separated into its constituents.
Because isotopes are forms of the same element,
they have the same chemical symbol. If one wants
to distinguish them, one adds a number, denoting
the approximate mass of the isotope, to the symbol
of the element. U-235 is an isotope of the element
uranium; U-238 is another, heavier isotope of the
same element. Because isotopes behave so much
alike in ordinary chemical reactions, it is not necessary to specify them in chemical processes. The
burning of one isotope of carbon is so similar to
the burning of the other isotope that one can speak
simply about the burning of carbon.

More will be said about these reactions later on.
But it can be noted here that their initiation on a
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Not so in atomic reactions. Isotopes differ as
much in their behavior in atomic processes as do
wholly different elements in ordinary chemical
reactions. . Thus, for instance, it is so much more
difficult to induce the reaction of the atomic bomb
in U-238 than it is to induce it in U-235 that U-238
cannot be used in atomic bombs.
So much should emphasize at once the importance and the difficulty of the process of isotope
separa tion. If one ,vants a very reactive substance,
it is usually necessary to select a particular isotope
of an element. U-235 is such a substance. And
yet to free this isotope from the other isotopes of
the same element is a very difficult job because they
all behave under ordinary conditions in a vefJ
similar way. The difficulty is the same which one
would encounter if coal occurred in nature only
mixed with some other substance, such as clay, and
if clay looked and behaved in all physical processes
so much like coal that it would be impossible to
wash it away from the coal without washing away
the coal at the same time, or to separate the two
by any other process.

phorus in nature. Even if there had been any, it
would have' burned away accidentally long before
man could have laid -his hands on it.
There is an atom called "neutron" (the "zero"
element), which can react with almost every other
element at ordinary temperatures. However,
there are under ordinary conditions no neutrons
in nature. The neutron was discovered only a
few years ago (1932) by the British physicist
Chadwick. The reason for the scarcity of neutrons is the same as the reason for the scarcity of
phosphorus: Any neutrons that might be formed
accidentally would react so soon with other elements that there are always very few of them
around-very few indeed.
This, then, is the reason that we knew so little
about atomic reactions until recently, that we succeeded only a few years ago in initiating them on
a large scale: Reactions that do not involve neutrons need extremely high temperatures for their
initiation; neutrons, on the other hand, are so
reactive that they attach themselves to other atoms
and thus cease to exist.

Why Were Atomic Reactions Not Discovered
Before? It may be asked fairly at this point why
atomic reactions remained undetected for such
a long time if they liberate such huge amounts of
energy? Why are they not more evident in every ..
day life?
If we want to burn coal, we have to warm it up
first to several hundred degrees temperature. Below this "temperature of inflammation", the combustion, if it proceeds at all, proceeds only imper..
ceptibly. It is natural that atomic processes that
furnish so much more heat and energy should
require for their initiation a great deal more pre ..
heating than coal does. Such high temperatures
as are necessary for this process can hardly be
realized on our planet with our very limited re ..
sources. Temperatures high enough for atomic
reactions prevail, however, at the center of the
stars and our sun, and the source of the sun's radia ..
tion is atomic energy. Since all our terrestrial
energy ultimately derives from the sun's radiation,
one can say that atomic energy does form the basis
of our life and our sources of energy.
There is a substance that requires very much
less preheating for infl aruma tion than does coalphosphorus. A match will burst into flame on very
little rubbing. Fire remained undiscovered for
such a long time because there is no free phos-

The Chain Reaction. Belore 1939, most physicists believed on the basis of the facts just related
that the use ot atomic energy (strictly speaking
it is nuclear energy because the changes that take
place in atomic processes affect the nucleus of the
atom) on an appreciable scale was far in the distant future. The neutrons that they succeeded in
producing with great difficulty were all absorbed
almost as soon as they were liberated, and atomic
reactions with other elements could be induced
artificially only by making use of a few very fast
"hot" particles in an otherwise cold system. These
fast particles were either the products of "radioactive substances" or were artificially generated in
complex instruments such as the cyclotron or the
Van de Graaff generator.
In 1939, two German scientists, Hahn and
Strassman, discovered an atomic reaction, which
was induced, as many other reactions are, by neutrons at ordinary temperature. The neutron that
induced the reaction was absorbed in the process,
as it is in all other processes which it induces. The
decisive difference here, however, was that this
atomic reaction also produced neutrons. It is dear
that if the number of neutrons produced in the
process is larger than the number of neutrons
absorbed in it, it becomes possible not only to keep
the reaction going at ordinary temperatures but
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also to obtain an abundant source of neutrons.
What Hahn and Strassman had discovered was
the fission process. It was mentioned back at the
beginning of this chapter although its equation
was not given fully. It is
U-235 + neutron ---+ 1+ Y + N neutrons
N denotes the number of neutrons yielded by one
fission. The I and Yare called fission "fragments"
because they are the fragments into which the
U-235 breaks up. I and Yare not the only two
elements into which the U-235 can "fission"; there
are many other pairs of elements into which it can
break up.
The important point in the above reaction is
than N is larger than one. In fact, it is about two.
This fact can be made use of in two ways if you
have a lump of U-235 or of any other fissionable
substance-that is, a substance that breaks up
when absorbing a neutron.
The Bomb. Given a lump of U-235 or another

fissionable material, you can add a neutron to it.
This will then react with the U-235, giving two
neutrons. If both of these neutrons are left to
react with the U-235~ they will produce four neutrons in the second generation. If all these react
with the U-235 there will be 8 in the third generation, 16 in the fourth, about 1,000 in the tenth,
1 million in the twentieth, 1 billion in the thirtieth
generation, etc. The processes induced by the neutrons of one generation will furnish the neutrons
of the next generation, each generation being about
twice more populous than the preceding one. This
succession of events will continue either until all
the U-235 is consumed and replaced by fission fragments and neutrons, or until the bomb has flown
apart. For the system just described is a bomb,
the atomic bomb.
The fission fragments of the reaction in the
bomb have velocities which correspond to about a
trillion degrees temperature, and the energy generated when a pound of U-235 has undergone fission is sufficient to raise the temperature of an air
sphere of more than a half mile diameter to the
boiling point of water. Actually, the destruction
caused by such an explosion may extend over a
grea ter area than that.
The life cycle of the neutron generations in a
bomb is not much longer than a billionth of a second and the whole process described above can
be over in a millionth of a second. The prime
difficulty in the construction of the bomb is to keep

together the lump of U-235 in spite of the huge
energy evolution and to see to it that all or nearly
all of the neutrons are absorbed by the U-235.
The Neutron Generator. The second way to

make use of a mass of fissionable material is to let
the number of neutrons increase only to a rather
high but predetermined level and to stop their increase once that level is reached. The increase can
be halted, for instance, by introducing into the system some foreign material that absorbs about onehalf of all the neutrons being produced. If this
is done, only one-half of all the neutrons of a generation will induce fission in the U-235. Since the
number of neutrons in any generation will be twice
greater than the number of fissions, the number of
neutrons in each generation will be the same. In
other words, the reaction will proceed at a steady
rate that may be high or low, depending on the
level at which the further increase of the neutrons
is stopped. In all practical cases, the level is so low
that it takes many weeks before ctn appreciable
fraction of the U-235 is used up. This contrasts
with the ten-millionth of a second in the bomb.
Running the chain reaction in this way will have
two effects: (1) The fission processes that go on
a t a steady rate will produce a certain amount
of heat that can be directed to useful purposes;
(2) concurrently and inseparably, neutrons will be
available to be absorbed in whatever one chooses.
to use to stop their excessive multiplication.
The second point is as important as the first
one. Most nuclei become radioactive when absorbing a neutron, and it is therefore possible to
make about one radioactive atom for every atom
of U-235 that is used up. In this way a wide
variety of radioactive atoms can be manufactured,
because the chain reaction can be controlled by
absorbing the excess neutrons with almost any of
the ninety-two known elements. The last point
illustrates the immense value of neutrons: One can
induce ari atomic process with every neutron and
make, for instance, a radioactive atom out of
almost any atom and a neutron. Another reason to
avoid wasting the U-235 in a bomb! All the neutrons that the U-235 is able to produce are uselessly lost after the explosion.
The Plutonium Factory. The two preceding sec-

tions have a very great "if" to them. In order to
make a bomb or build the neutron genera tor, you
have to have first a rather large amount of fissionable material. Of course, it is possible to make
pure U-235 by separating the two isotopes of ura-
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nium. However, if this were the only method of
producing fissionable material for the neutron generator, the neutrons would remain very expensive
indeed. The whole process can be made much
cheaper if you can use natural uranium, that is,
the mixture of U-235 and U-238.
This is indeed possible if the U-238 is used as
the substance to prevent the increase of the number of neutrons. But doing this disposes of any
choice as to the element that shall be permitted
to absorb the neutrons: It is the U-238. What
one has is not a neutron generator but a neutron
generator and neutron consumer combined. The
U-235 is the source of the neutrons, the U-238
their destination. It would seem that there is
little gain except for the energy generated by the
reaction.
However-and this is the "joker"-the product of t~e reaction of U-238 and the neutron is
a new substance, U-239, which goes over, by a
spontaneous radioactive "decay," into a new element called plutonium. And plutonium is fissionable too. As a result, it can be used either in a
bomb or in another neutron generator. The choice
of the neutron absorber, forced on us by the fact
that the U-235 is always mixed with U-238, is not
such a bad one. In fact it could hardly be better.
The plutonium factory just described is an unusual factory, indeed. It makes plutonium but
while it makes it, it also generates energy. This
is the energy of the process: U-235
neutron =
I
Y
N neutrons and of similar fission processes which furnish the neutrons.
The plutonium manufactured in the plutonium
factories in the state of Washington is, by the way,
the first new element ever manufactured by man in
sizable quantities. And the plutonium can be obtained in the factory very much cheaper than pure
U-235 can be obtained by isotope separation, to
say nothing of the energy generated in the fission
process. An almost unlimited amount of plutonium could be made within not too many years,
enough for a very large number of bombs-or for
peaceful, socially useful applications. Here we
have a choice.
Because natural uranium can be made chainreacting, it might be thought that it could be made
to explode. It cannot: the neutr on multiplication
is not sufficiently rapid in natural uranium. The
U-238 automatically controls the chain reaction,
that is, absorbs so many neutrons that the population of the successive generations hardly increases.

+

+.

+

In fact quite a few tricks are called for to provide
even a small increase in the population of successive generations or even to avoid a decrease. The
most important of these tricks is to moderate the
neutrons, to decrease their velocities from the high
value that they have when they are expelled during fission to'a fraction of that value (from 10,000
miles per second to about 1 mile per second). But
in spite of all tricks the neutron multiplication in
a system using natural uranium cannot be made
fast enough for a bomb.
Other Atomic Reactions. Our excursion into the
field of atomic physics brought us to a number of
passes from which we could see other roads leading toward the realization of other atomic reactions. Two of these were specifically mentioned:
The reaction between hydrogen isotopes (H2),
and the annihilation reaction. Both of these are
virtually capable of yielding more energy per unit
weight than does the fission reaction-the latter
reaction about a thousand times more. What
about them?
Not much. While, as we saw, the fission reaction is ready to be exploited on a large scale for
better or worse, there is at present no reason to
believe that any other atomic reaction could be
exploited in the near future. It is suggestive to
attempt to use the fission reaction to produce high
temperatures and kindle by it other reactions, just
as the fire of phosphorus is used to kindle fire in
other substances. It has even been suggested that
the atmosphere or the seas might be "set on fire"
by fission bombs. At present there is no reason to
fear this; the ignition of the atmosphere or the
seas is pure speculation and I believe bad speculation. As for the annihilation reaction, it has
hardly been observed, if at all, in the laboratory.
Of course, we must guard against overconservatism, as the people who scoffed at the idea of a uranium chain reaction can testify. It may be a sound
judgment, however, to believe that other, perhaps
biological, discoveries of equal potency for bad or
good may be made before we have to face atomic
reactions of a fundamentally different nature than
those that we can exploit now.
Should we be sorry that the side roads do not
seem to lead anywhere at the present? I do not
believe so. The amount of energy that available
sources are able to furnish is so ample that we are
not in need of other or more abundant sources.
Present sources are able to fulfill all reasonableand some unreasonable-needs for energy.
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formerly head of the mathematics
and physics department at Olivet College, joined
the Metallurgical Laboratory in Chicago in March,
1942, 'to work with the theoretical group there on
problems connected with the design of the Hanford
plutonium plant.
GALE YOUNG,

Chapter 4

The New Power
by GAL E YOU N G

T

HE world may not have been familiar
with atomic bombs prior to Hiroshima,
but it has for years been talking about
something called "atomic power." It has often
been said that man would someday "unlock the
energy of the atom," and the attainment of this
goal has been frequently described in fiction. The
Warld Set Free, written in 1914 by H. G. Wells,
is such a book. There may be some doubt, however, about the current appropriateness of its title.
So it is that atomic power finally makes its
appearance before a world that has been more
or less expecting it for a considerable length of
time. Indeed, as a look through the files of
A stounding Science Fiction or some similar magazine will show, the real scientists still have a long
way to go before they can hope to equal exploits
that are commonplace to their fictional brother
scientists. In comparison with these more fanciful accounts the real development may seem a bit
disappointing. In the destructive-bomb department the new energy appears to be a prompt and
thorough success, but , as the much heralded servant of mankind, atomic power still leaves considerable to be desired.
It is the purpose of this chapter to provide
some account of atomic energy as a source of useful power, although it is not possible to give anything like a full Hiscussion at this time. There
has been little time during the war to consider
peaceful applications in this field, and much work
will be needed before a proper perspective is
attained.
Fission as a Power Source. Several kinds of
hea vy nuclei, for instance, uranium and plutonium,
can be made to undergo the process of fission.
The fission of 1 pound of any of these substances
gives energy equal to that obtained by burning
about 1,400 tons of coal or 900 tons of gasoline,

or by exploding 13,000 tons of TNT. According
to the Einstein mass-energy rule (E = f!tc 2 ) , a
pound of matter is equivalent to the energy obtained in burning 1.5 million tons of coal. One
sees, therefore, that the fission process changes
only 1/1,100 of the available mass into energy;
evidently the production of atomic power is still
a highly imperfect business.
As explained earlier, in undergoing fission the,
nucleus of the atom splits into two pieces of comparable size that fly apart at great speed. Most
of the energy released goes into the kinetic energy
of these moving fragments, and as these are
slowed down by the material through which they
move this energy is turned into heat. These fragments carry an electrical charge, and if they could
.be stopped by an electrical field the energy could
be obtained in electrical form instead of heat;
this can be imagined in principle, but it appears
that in practice heat will be obtained.
Besides the two large fragments just discussed,
the fission explosion also emits gamma rays and
fast neutrons. Because of their lack of electrical
charge the neutrons can pass through large thicknesses of solid matter; they thus constitute another
kind of penetrating "radiation" in addition to the
gamma rays.
Since both neutrons and gamma
rays are dangerous to living tissue, both must
be shielded against in operating a fission power
source. In this respect a fission source is even
worse than a radium source; each gives out several per cent of its energy in the form of dangerous penetrating radiation, but the mixed nature
of the fission radiation makes it ha r der to cope
'w ith and requires greater shield thicknesses. For
example, lead is effective against gamma rays, but
neutrons romp through it with ease; water is good
against neutrons since it slows them down and ren·
ders them easily absorbable, but it has little stop-
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ping power for gamma rClyS. A thin lightweight
shield would be Qne of the most valuable inve.ntions in the atomic-power field j unfortunately this
just does not seem to be in the cards.
After the two fission fragments slow down, they
gather electrons around them and become the nuclei of two new atoms. These resulting nuclei are
unstable and undergo successive radioactive trans ..
formations in the course of which they emit particles and gamma rays much as does radium; this
radioactivity dies away very slowly. Thus, while
a fissi'on reactor may be free of radioactivity when
first assembled, as soon as it starts to operate the
strongly active fission fragments begin to accumulate inside it and make shielding and cooling necessary even when the reaction is not going on.
Atomic Power Plants. The fission chain reac ..

tion shows a striking critical-size effect. A small
isolated lump of material will not react, no matter
what is done to it. As the size of the lump is increased it will, assuming it is a proper kind of
material, eventually begin to react. If more material is added the reaction will continue to in..
crease; if material is removed the reaction will
decrease and die out. Evidently an operating unit
must be just the right size; if too small it will
not run at all, and if too large it tends to run
away. The reaction can be controlled by moving
a small piece of m'lteri'll into and out of the
system.
The reason for this behavior lies in the cha.in
na ture of the reaction. The explosion of one nucleus releases neutrons that move away and cause
another nucleus somewhere else to explode, and
so on. Not every neutron ejected in a fission
goes on to cause another fission. Some will be
captured uselessly and some will escape from the
system before they are captured at all. The
smaller the structure, the greater the fraction of
neutrons that escape. For the reaction to proceed at a constant rate, the structure must be just
large enough so that, of the N neutrons emitted
in a fission, N - 1 neutrons escape or are uselessly captured, while the remaining one neutron
produces another fission.
Thus a reactor will not run unless it contains a
certain amount of material. The amount of valuable fissionable material needed can be decreased
by a number of tricks, but it can never be made
very small. Therefore, any notion to the effect
that an engine can be run on a small capsule of

atomic fuel is completely without foundation.
One of the tricks for decreasing the amount of
fissionable material needed is to mix it with light
atoms, such as carbon or beryllium or hydrogen,
which slow down or moderate the fast neutrons
and make it easier for them to cause new fissions.
In some cases the difference is not merely in the
amount of material required, but is the difference
between running and not running at all. Thus, it
is impossible to make a chain reaction with natural
uranium alone, no matter ho,iV much is available;
but the reaction can be made to go with natural
uranium plus any of several existing moderator
materials. In the early day$ of the project there
were much piling up and unpiling of materials in
experimental work to determine the best ways of
arranging uranium in the moderator; this has led
to the name "piles" for chain-reacting units, even
when they are precision-engineered structures.
Atomic fuel, for instance uranium, generates
heat inside itself in a properly constructed pile
without any need for air or any other chemical
participant. If the atomic reaction proceeds at a
rapid rate t this heat must be removed or the pile
will melt. At the Hanford plutonium plants a
product of the reaction other than the heat was
wanted, so the heat was carried away by cooling
streams which emptied into the Columbia River.
If the hea t is wanted for the production of power,
it must first be removed from the pile and then
introduced into a heat engine. Apparently atomic
power wilI have to function through heat engines
of more or less standard design; there is no reason, therefore, to expect any marvels in the way
of performance.. While a few pounds of uranium
may have enough releasable energy to drive the
Queen Mary across the ocean, it is not likely to
do this via a few pounds of power plant.
Most of the existing chain reactors or piles
use natural uranium with a graphite moderator.
They consist of large graphite blocks pierced by
regularly spaced parallel holes in which somewhat smaller uranium rods are centered. Cooling
streams flow along annular channels about the
rods, picking up the heat from the rods and carrying it away. The low..power pile at Oak Ridge,
Tennessee, uses air cooling, and the higher power
piles at Hanford, Washington, use water cooling;
in both cases the cooling fluid is drawn from the
environment, passed through the pile, and dis~
carded back to the environment. In both cases
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cause both graphite and aluminum are attacked by
air at elevated temperatures. The development of
piles for high-temperature operation is one of the
main problems to be solved before useful power
can be obtained.
Passage to a closed-cycle system, as in Fig. 2,
would eliminate the stack-discharge problem and
permit the use of a nonoxidizing working sub-

the uranium rods are jacketed in aluminum to
keep the coolant from touching them, and in the
Hanford plants another layer of aluminum is used
to keep the water from the graphite.
Some arrangements that might give mechanical power output are indicated in the following
sketches. Figure 1 shows an obvious modification
of the Oak Ridge type of pile into a gas-turbine
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FIG. 1

plant. Since air becomes radioactive when exposed to neutrons, it has to be disposed of suitably, say by discharge from a tall stack; and the
ability of the stack to get rid of active air in a
safe manner may limit the power output of the
plant. Charged lines in the dra wing indicate where
the air is active; it is seen that the turbine is exposed to, and must be operable under, radioactive
conditions. For the plant to operate it is neces's ary that the pile should heat the air to quite high
temperatures; the existing piles cannot do this be-

stance such as helium; the use of helium also helps
to reduce the radioactivity in the pile circuit.
However, a heat exchanger is now needed, and
the compressor is now in the radioactive region.
The diagram shown can, of course, be elaborated
to include regenerators, compressor intercooling,
etc., to give higher efficiency.
Another possible arrangement is shown in Fig.
3, in which the pile coolant gives its heat to a more
or less standard power plant boiler. Since a liquidvapor power plant can run at considerably lower
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temperatures than a gas turbine plant, it may be
possible to get power in this arrangement without
such high temperatures in the pile.
The present Hanford plants with water cooling
operate at very low temperature. Development
of a liquid-metal coolant, such as bismuth or sodium, would permit higher temperatures, and
power might be obtained as in Fig. 3 .

It would seem, therefore, that we are not in dire
need of more energy sources.
Actually, of course, we are interested not just
in energy generally, but in energy that will work
what, when, where, and how we want it to work.
Sunlight falling all over the ground at better than
a horsepower per square yard· will not help a man
to move a rock unless he gets together a lot of

.---~~~~~

Tosfeam
or mercury
powerplanf

FIG.

Arrangements in which the pile directly vaporizes light or heavy water to make steam for a
power plant are also conceivable. Among the difficulties in this case are the need for the pile structure to withstand boiler pressures, and the adverse
effect of bubble formation upon the stability of
pile operation.
Economics and Prospects of Atomic Power.

There has been considerable speculation about the
use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. All
manner of predictions and estimates have been
heard, ranging from ridiculous optimism to perhaps undue pessimism.
Why, one may ask, is there so much excitement
about a new source of power ? We live in a world
in which power is going to waste all the time in
the form of sunlight, winds, water falls, tides,
and so on. At our present rate 0f fuel consumption, the coal supply will last a few thousand years.
This is a period considerably greater than technological civilization has existed in the past and,
if some current events are an indication, considerably greater than it can expect to exist in th
futur e. Petroleum resources are running lower,
but it appears that gasoline can be made from coal
in satisfactory fashion, or that alcohol produced
from crops each year can be used as liquid fuel.

3

equipment by means of which he can put the solar
energy to work. It would, in fact, take an unusually expensive installation of mirrors and boilers
to move a rock by means of sunshine.
Much the same is true of the other "free" energy sources; they are generally not worth the
investment required to put them to work. Only
water power among them finds any important use
in direct power production.
Fuels such as coal and gasoline are not free;
labor and equipment are needed for gathering,
processing, and transporting them, and these items
are lumped into the basic cost of the fuel. After
the fuel arrives, more effort and equipment are
involved before power is obtained in the desired
form, all of which represents a utilization cost.
An everyday example of these two kinds of cost
may be obtained by comparing the utilization cost
for the family automobile-depreciation, interest,
maintenance, insurance, repairs, license, garage
rent, etc.-with the amount spent for gasoline. In
commercial truck operation about 0.1 of the total
expense is for gasoline. Another example is given
in Table 1. It is seen that fuel is by no means the
major part of the t otal cost ; fre e coal and gasoline would be very nice, but p r obably would not
usher in any "new er a, " and \ve would still h amost of our powe r bill to pay.
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TABLE I
COST OF ELECTRICAL ENERGY TO AVERAGE URBAN CONSUlVIER*
TYPE OF OoST

Cents
Generating cost, including fuel . . . . . . . . . . . • . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fixed charges (interest, depreciation, etc.) on generating station...............................
Transmission and substation operation. . . .. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fixed charges on transmission and substation equipment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Operation cost of distribution lines from substation to consumer ... "............................
Fixed charges on distribution equipment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Administration, bookkeeping, reading meters, service calls, etc. .................................

0.33
0.29
1.45
1.80

5.28

Total cost at customer's meter. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

* From

per kw-hr.
0.47
0.78
0.16

Barnard, Ellenwood, and Hirshfeld, Heat-power Engineering, p. 1054, 1933.

bine stations except that it has a pile in place of
the burner or combustion chamber and is complica ted by r adiation and shielding problems. I t is
doubtful, therefore, that the cost and maintenance
of an atomic plant can be lower than that of an
ordinary fuel plant, and it may in fact be "'c onsiderably higher.
The United States average rate of mechanicalpower production is roughly given in Table 2.
Much of the stationary power plant output is in
electrical energy; the electrical production is about
two-thirds from fuel burning stations, and onethird from hydroelectric plants.
Atomic power is unable to compete in the important automobile field because of the large
weight (dozens of tons) of shielding required
around a pile and also because of the large cost
represented by the amount of fissionable material
needed to make a chain-reacting unit. Large locomotives could conceivably carry the necessary
weight of shielding and might be regarded as a
borderline case. Ships and stationary power stations are definite possibilities for atomic power;
the economics of fue and plant costs will, of
CDur e, need to b taken into account, as well as
the relative he lth and operating hazard involved.
verage heat outputs from mineral fuel are
indicated in Table 3. If the world total were

Cost figures on atomic fuel have not been released as yet, and no power plants have been
developed. It is not possible, therefore, to make
any meaningful estimates of how the total cost
(fuel
utilization) would compare with the cost
of other power sources.
It may be interesting to note prewar quotations
of unpurified natural uranium at about $1.80 a
pound; this is around $250 for a pound of unseparated U-235 equivalent energywise to about
$8,000 worth of coal or $30,000 worth of gasoline. If the necessary processing, such as purification or reduction to metal or isotope separation,
does not prove too expensive, uranium may be able
to compete so far as fuel cost is concerned.
With respect to utilization cost, we may recall
that an atomic power plant involves machinery
comparable to that of ordinary steam or gas tur-

+

TABLE 2
AVERAGE MECHANICAL OUTPUT RATES
POWER PLANT

Million kw.
Autos, airplanes, etc................... . .
Locomotives ... . . . ... .................
Ships in trade .... .. .. ... . . . . . . . . . ... . " .
Stationary power plants .. . .. . .. . .. . . ....

25

Total ..............................

60

7
2

TABLE 3
AVERAGE HEAT OUTPU1."' RATES

U. SJ per cent
Coal .. .. . . .... . . . . . . .. . .. . . . .. .. . . .
Petroleum .. . .. . . .. . .. ... . ..... . .. . .
Natural gas . .... .. . .... . ........ . .. .
. Total ... .. ...................... .

U. S", million kw.
500

300
100
90

World, million kw.
2,000
500
110

2,610

~

20 •

of world
25
60
90
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obtained from coal alone, about 3 billion tons per
year would be required; this would use up the
estimated coal reserves in about 2,700 years.
About 0.4 of United States fu€l use is for production of mechanical power, 0.2 for nonindustrial
heating, and 0.4 for industrial heating (only a
fraction of the energy used for production of
mechanical power is actually conVerted into
mechanical output). Thus, a considerable fraction of our fuel is used for heating rather than for
power purposes. Buildings could be heated by
atomic energy without high pile temperatures.
And atomic energy plants, to mention one pleasing
virtue, would not discharge any smoke into the
atmosphere.
A specific advantage of atomic power is the
small vveight of the fuel itself. Thus, once the
plant is installed, heating or power service may
be feasible in remote locations where transportation costs would make the use of ordinary heavy
fuels impractical. It is perhaps conceivable that
a country without coal or oil resources might be
able to maintain a power economy based on elec~
tricity generated in atomic power stations. How~
ever, considerable study by power engineers, economists, and others will be needed before we get
beyond the level of mere speculation on such
topics. Without answers to numerous such questions, the problem of atomic-energy control is apt
to continue confused; and it is to be hoped that
informa tion will soon be released so that such
studies can proceed.
Fuel weight is also of importance in mobile
units. If the weight ,f
al or _il carried by a
ShIP exceeds the weight of the shielding required
to convert to atomic power, then total weight
could be saved by so converting. Atomic-powered

ships or, if such are ever possible, atomic-powered
airplanes should be able to cover great distances
without refueling.
Another advantage of atomic power is that it
does not require oxygen and does not give off combustion gases; in some cases, this may justify considerable trouble in trying to cope with the disadvantages. We have thus the possibility of power
plants functioning in confined places, underwater
in submarines, underground, or, if various difficulties can ever be overcome, outside the earth's
atmosphere in space ships.
There is a great deal of uranium in the earth's
crust, but it is not known how much of this will be
accessible for use. The energy present in rich
uranium deposits known before the war is, as indicated in Table 4, negligible in comparison with the
TABLE 4
MISCELLANEOUS ESTIMATES
Population of earth ........•...•.... 2 billion
Population of U. S. ..•.....••.•.•... 0.13 billion
watts for U. S.
I"'..nergy rate per capIta ....••.•..•... 1,300 watts for world

,

.

!7,OOO

Metabolic rate of human body ••.... 100 watts r:stin~
lk
300 watts III bnsk wa
Total energy used by man ..•....... 3 X 10 9 kw.
Solar energy hitting earth. . . . . . . . . . .. 1.7 X 10 14 kw.
Estimated world coal resources...... 8 X 10 1 2 tons
Estimated U-235 in earth's crust ...... 2 X 10 12 tons
Sunlight equivalent of coal resources.. 15 days
Sunlight equivalent of total U -235. . .. 30,000 years
Sunlight equivalent of U -235 in known
deposits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 3 minutes

energy in known coal deposits; indeed, if these
were our total uranium resources, it would be unwise to waste them in any use for which more
abundant ordinary fuel could suffice. Doubtless
there is now quietly underway a world-wide buriedtreasure hunt such as has never been seen before.
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J. R. OPPENHEIMER before the war was professor
of physics at the University of California and there
led the most important school for theoretical physics
in the United States. During the war he was in charge
of the Los Alamos, New Mexico, laboratory. He
is now at California Institute of Technology.

Chapter 5

The New Weapon: The Turn of the Screw
by

T

HE release of atomic energy constitutes
a new force too revolutionary to consider
in the framework of old ideas. . . .
President Harry S. Truman, in his message to
Congress on Atomic Energy, October 3, 1945.

In these brave words the President of the
United States has given expression to a conviction
deep and prevalent among those who have been
thinking of what atomic weapons might mean to
the world. It is the conviction that these weapons
call for and by their existence will help to create
radical and profound changes in the politics of
the world. These words of the President have
often been quoted and for the most part by men
who believed in their validity. What is the technical basis for this belief? Why should a development that appeared in this past war to be merely
an extension and consummation of the techniques
of strategic bombing be so radical a thing in its
implications?
Certa~nly atomic 'iVeapons appeared with dramatic elements of novelty; certainly they do embody, as new sources of energy, very real changes
in the ability of man to tap and to control such
sources, very real differences in the kind of physical situation we can realize on earth. These
promethean qualities of drama and of novelty,
that touch so deeply the sentiments with which
man regards the natural world and his place in it,
ha ve no doubt added to the interest with which
a tomic weapons have been regarded. Such qualities may even play a most valuable part in preparing men to take with necessary seriousness the
gra ve problems put to them by these technical advances. But the truly radical character of atomic
weapons lies neither in the suddenness with which
they emerged from the laboratories and the secret
industries, nor in the fact that they exploit an
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energy qualitatively different in origin from all
earlier sources. It lies in their vastly greater
powers of destruction, in the vastly reduced effort
needed for such destruction. And it lies no less in
the consequent necessity for new and more effective
methods by which mankind may control the use of
its new powers.
Nothing can be effectively new in touching the
course of men's lives that is not also old. Nothing
can be effectively revolutionary that is not deeply
rooted in human experience. If, as I believe, the
release of atomic energy is in fact revolutionary,
it is surely not because its promise of rapid technological change, its realization of fantastic powers of destruction, have no analogue in our late
history. It is precisely because that history has so
well prepared us to understand ,vha t these things
may mean.
Perhaps it may add to clarity to speak briefly
of these three elements of novelty: ( 1) atomic
weapons as a new source of energy, (2) atomic
weapons as a new expression of the role of fundamental science, and (3) atomic weapons as a new
power of destruction.
As a New Source of Energy. The energy we de.;.
rive from coal and wood and oil came originally
from sunlight, which, through the mechanisms of
photosynthesis, stored this energy in organic matter. When these fuels are burned, they return
more or less to the simple stable products from
which, by sunlight, the organic matter was built
up. The energy derived from water power also
comes from sunlight, which raises water by evaporation, so that we may exploit the energy of its fall.
The energy necessary to life itself comes from the
same organic matter, created by sunlight out of
water and carbon dioxide. Of all the sources of
ner~y used on earth, only tidal power would ap-
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pear not to be a direct exploitation of the energy
r adia ted by the sun.
Solar energy is nuclear energy. Deep in the interior of the sun, where matter is very hot and
fairly dense, the nuclei of . hydrogen are slowly
reacting to form helium, reacting not directly with
each other but by a complex series of collisions
with carbon and nitrogen. These reactions, which
proceed slowly even at the high temperatures that
obtain in the center of the sun, are made possible
at all only because those temperatures, of some
twenty million degrees, are maintained. The
reason they are maintained is that the enormous
gravitational forces of the sun's mass keep the
ma terial from expanding and cooling. No proposals have ever been made for realizing such
conditions on earth or for deriving energy on earth
in a controlled and large-scale way from the conversion of hydrogen to helium and heavier nuclei.
The nuclear energy released in atomic weapons
and in controlled nuclear reactors has a very different source, which would appear to us now as
rather accidental. The nuclei of the very heavy
elements are less stable than those of elements
like iron, of moderate atomic weight. For reasons
we do not understand, there are such heavy unstable elements on earth. As 'was discovered just
before the war, the heaviest of the elements do
not need to be very highly excited to split into
two lighter nuclei. It is surely an accident; by all
we now know, that there are elements heavier than
lead in the world, and for lead no practical method
of inducing fission would seem to exist. But for
uranium the simple capture of a neutron is sufficient to cause fission. And in certain materialsnotably U-235 and plutonium-enough neutrons
are produced by such fission, with a great enough
chance that under proper circumstances they can
cause other fissions in other nuclei, so that the fission reaction will build up in a diverging chain of
successive reactions, and a good part of the energy
latent in the material actually will be released.
To our knowledge such things do not happen
except in the atomic weapons we have made and
used and, in a somewhat more complex form, in
the great reactors or piles. They do not, to our
knowledge, happen in any other part of the universe. To make them happen involves specific
human intervention in the physical world.
The interior of an exploding fission bomb is, so
far as we know, a place without parallel else-

where. It is hotter than the center of the sun;
it is filled with matter that does not normally occur
in nature and with radiations- neutrons, gamma
rays, fission fragments, electr ons-of an intensity
without precedent in human experience. The pressures are a thousand billion times atmospheric
pressure. In the crudest, simplest sense, it is quite
true that in atomic weapons man has created
novelty.
As a New Expression of the Role of Science. It
would appear to be without parallel in human history that basic knowledge about the nature of the
physical world should have been applied so rapidly to changing, in an important way, the physical
conditions of man's life. In 1938, it ,vas not known
that fission could occur. Neither the existence nor
the properties nor the methods of making plutonium had been thought of-to the best of my
knowledge-by anyone. The subsequent rapid development was made possible only by the extremities of the war and the great courage of the governments of the United States and Britain, by an
advanced technology and a united people. N evertheless it made very special demands of the scientists, who have played a more intimate, deliberate,
and conscious part in altering the conditions of
human life than ever before in our history.
The obvious consequence of this intimate participation of scientists is a quite new sense of
responsibility and concern for what they have
done and for what may come of it. This book
itself is an expression of that sense of concern.
A more subtle aspect of it, not frequently recognized but perhaps in the long term more relevant
and more constructive, is this: Scientists are, not
by the nature of what they find but by the way
in which they find it, humanists; science, by its
methods, its values, and the nature of the objectivity it seeks, is universally human. It is therefore natural for scientists to look at the new world
of atomic energy and atomic weapons in a very
broad light. And in this light the community of
experience, of effort, and of values that prevails
among scientists of different nations is comparable
in significance with the community of interest existing for the men and the women of one nation.
It is natural that they should supplement the
fraternity of the peoples of one country with the
fraternity of men of learning everywhere, with
the value that these men put upon knowledge, and
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with the attempt-which is their heritage-to
transcend the accidents of personal or national
history in discovering more of the nature of the
physical 'world.
The injection of the spirit of the scientist into
this problem of atomic ,veapons, in which it has
been clear from the first that purely national ideas
. of welfare and security would doubtless prove
inadequate, has been recognized, if not clearly
understood, by statesmen as well as by scientists.
The emphasis that has been given-in the statements of the President and in the agreed declaration of the heads of state of Britain, Canada, and
the United States-to the importance of the reestablishment of the international fraternity and
freedom of science is an evidence of this recognition. It should not be thought that this recognition
implies either that collaboration in science will
constitute a solution to the problems of the relations of nations, nor that scientists themselves
can play any disproportionate part in achieving
that solution. It is rather a recognition that in
these problems a common approach, in which
national int-erests can play only a limitedly constructive part, will be necessary if a solution is to .
be found at all. Such an approach has been characteristic of science in the past. In its application
to the problems of international relations there
is novelty.
As a New Power of Destruction. In this past
war it cost the United States about $10 a pound
to deliver explosive to an enemy target. Fiftythousand tons of explosive ,vould thus cost a billion
dollars to deliver. Although no precise estimates
of the costs of making an atomic bomb equivalent
to 50,000 tons of ordinary explosive in energy release can now be given, it seems certain that such
costs might be several hundred times less, possibly
a thousand times less. Ton for equivalent ton,
atomic explosives are vastly cheaper than ordinary
explosives. Before conclusions can be drawn from
this fact, a number of points must be looked at.
But it will turn out that the immediate conclusion is
right: Atomic explosives vastly increase the power
of destruction per dollar spent, per man-hour invested; they profoundly upset the precarious
balance between the effort necessary to destroy
and the extent of the destruction.
The area destroyed by explosive is a better
guide to its destructive power than the energy of
the explosion. For an atomic bomb the area de-

stroyed by blast increases with the two-thirds
power, not proportionately to the energy release.
So far as blast is concerned, an atomic bomb is perhaps five times less effective than the same equivalent tonnage delivered in block busters or smaller
missiles would be. But in the strikes against Hiroshima and Nagasaki the effects, especially the
anti-personnel effects, of heat were comparable to
the blast effects. These effects increase proportibnately in the area affected with the energy release of the weapon and thus become of greater
importance as the power of the weapon is increased.
In this connection it is clearly relevant to ask
what technical developments the future ~ight
have in store for the infant atomic-weapon industry. No suggestions are known to me that
,vould greatly reduce the unit size of the weapons
while keeping down the cost per unit of area
devastated or reducing it still further. On the
other hand proposals that appear sound have
been investigated in a preliminary way, and it
turns out that they would reduce the cost of
destruction per square mile probably by a factor
of ten or more; but they would involve a great
increase in the unit power of the weapons. Such
weapons would clearly be limited in application
to the destruction of very major targets, such as
grea ter New Yark.
A word may be in order concerning the specific
effect of the nuclear radiations-neutrons and
gamma rays-produced by the explosion. The
novel character of these effects, and the fact that
lethal effects kept appearing many weeks after
the strikes, attracted much attention. But these
radiations accounted, in Hiroshima and Nagasaki,
for a quite small fraction of the casualties. It is
probable that this would be true of future atomic
weapons as well, but it is not certain.
No discussion of the economics of atomic destruction can be complete ,vithout some mention
of possible countermeasures. One such countermeasure, which might have the effect of increasing
the cost of destruction by eliminating targets large
enough for the more powerful r weapons, is the
dispersal of cities and industry. M 'ore difficult
to evaluate is the effect of greatly improved methods of interception on the carrier of the atomic
weapon. This question is examined in some detail
by Dr. Ridenour in Chapter 7. It may be said
here that the present situation hardly warrants the
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belief that techniques of interception will greatly
alter the cost of atomic destruction.
Although it would seem virtually certain that
atomic weapons could be used effectively against
combat personnel, against fortifications at least
of certain types, and against naval craft, their
disproportionate power of destruction is greatest
in strategic bombardment: In destroying centers
of population, and population itself, and in destroying industry. Since the United States and
Britain in this past war were willing to engage in
mass demolition and incendiary raids against
civilian centers and did in fact use atomic weapons
against primarily civilian targets, there would
seem little valid hope that such use would not be
made in any future major war.
The many factors discussed here, and others
that cannot be discussed here, clearly make it
inappropriate and impossible to give a precise
figure for the probable cost and thus the probable
effort involved in atomic destruction. Clearly too
such costs would in the first instance depend on
the technical and military policies of nations engaging in atomic armament. But none of these
uncertainties can becloud the fact that it will cost
enormously less to destroy a square mile with
atomic weapons than with any weapons hitherto
· known to warfare. My own estimate is that the
advent of such weapons will reduce the cost, certainly by more than a factor of ten, more probably
by a factor of a hundred. * In this respect only
biological warfare would seem to offer competition for the evil that a dollar can do.
It would thus seem that the power of destruction that has come into men's hands has in fact
been qualitatively altered by atomic weapons. In
particular it is clear that the reluctance of peoples
and of many governments to divert a large part
of their wealth and effort to preparations for war
can no longer be counted on at all to insure the
absence of such preparations. It would seem that
the conscious acquisition of these new powers of
destruction calls for the equally conscious determination that they must not be used and that all
necessary steps be taken to insure that they will
not be used. Such steps, once taken, would provide
machinery adequate for the avoidance of international war.

.
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The situation, in fact, bears some analogy to
one that has recently, without technical foundation, been imagined. It has been suggested that
some future atomic weapon might initiate nuclear
reactions that would destroy the earth itself or
render it unsuitable for the continuance of life.
By all we now know, and it is not inconsiderable,
such fears are groundless. An atomic weapon will
not, by what we know, destroy physically the men
or the nation using it. Yet it seems to me that an
awareness of the consequences of atomic warfare
to all peoples of the earth, to aggressor and defender alike, can hardly be a less cogent argument
for preventing such warfare than the possibilities
outlined above. For the dangers to mankind are
in some ways quite as grave, and the inadequacy
of any compensating national advantage is, to me
at least, quite as evident.
The vastly increased powers of destruction that
atomic weapons give us have brought with them
a profound change in the balance between na tional
and international interests. The common interest
of all in the prevention of atomic warfare would
seem immensely to overshadow any purely national interest, whether of welfare or of security.
At the same time it would seem of most doubtful
value in any long term to rely on purely national
methods of defense for insuring security, as is
discussed in greatet detail in other parts of this
book. The true security of this nation, as of any
other will be found, if at all, only in the collective
efforts of all.
It is even now clear that such efforts will not be
successful if they are made only as a supplement,
or secondary insurance, to a national defense. In
fact it is clear that such collective efforts will
require, and do today require, a very real renunciation of the steps by which in the past national
security has been sought. It is clear that in a very
real sense the past patterns of national security
are inconsistent with the attainment of security
on the only level where it can now, in the atomic
age, be effective. It may be that in times to corne
it will be by this that atomic weapons are most
remembered. It is in this that they will corne to
seem "too revolutionary to consider in the framework of old ideas."
* General Arnold's estimate, page 27.
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Command.
ing General of the Army Air Forces through the
war, retired from that post in February, 1946. This
chapter is his last official public statement as head
of the Air Forces.
GENERAL OF THE ARMY

In

ARNOLD,

the Atomic Age
by General of the Army H. H. ARNOLD

" W E are aware that the only complete
protection for the civilized world
from the destructive use of scientific
knowledge lies in the prevention of 'var."
This sentence from the joint declaration issued
by President Truman, Prime Minister Atlee, and
Prime Minister King in November, 1945, is a
blunt assertion by three great nations that destruc·
tion by air power has become too cheap and easy.
This was true even before the creation of the
atomic bomb; even then, mass air raids were obliterating the great centers of mankind. The consequence of this cheapness of destruction-especially
as it has been multiplied manifold by the sudden,
extensive, pulverizing force of the atomic bombis to make the existence of civilization subject to
the good will and the good sense of the men who
control the employment of air power. The greatest need facing the world today is for international
control of the human forces that make for war.
Pending the establishment of such control, the
mission of" the Air Forces is the protection of the
United States by the employment of air power.
Under the provisions of the charter of the United
Nations, moreover, the Air Forces must hold immediately available contingents for combined international enforcement action. And to carry out this
responsibility, the Air Forces must maintain a program of preparedness giving the best possible pro·
tect:ion. Let me examine the problem as it now
confronts us.
The Economics of Air Power. The biggest
change that atomic explosives have made in the
nature of air power is to decrease the cost of destruction. Complete destruction of cities by incendiaries and high-explosive bombs had become an
accomplished fact early in the war; the name of
Coventry reminds us of that. In the course of the
war, strategic bombing advanced enormously in
effectiveness and efficiency and, in the attack on

the Japanese Empire, had become highly profitable
from a military point of view. But the atomic
bomb by comparison dwarfs all other advances.
A dollars-and-cents approach to this problem will
clarify these facts.
The B-29 program represents the high point in
the continually advancing technique of strategic
destruction by air power. By the latter part of
1945, the Twentieth Air Force was destroying
Japanese industrial cities at the rate of 1 square
mile for 3 million dollars of the war budget. This
cost includes all supporting ground organizations,
both continental and overseas. It is our best esti·
mate of the running cost. Large investments in
expansion, left uncompleted because of Japan's
surrender, have been excluded.
No official figures have been released on the
cost of the atomic bomb; but for purposes of comparison let us use, as an unofficial estimate of the
mass-production cost per bomb, the figure of about
1 million dollars which has been cited by Dr. J.
Robert Oppenheimer. The cost of delivering the
bomb, represented by the flights of the bombing
plane and several weather and reconnaissance
planes, would be about $240,000, bringing the
total cost per bomb used to about $1,240,000. The
Hiroshima bomb destroyed 4.1 square miles and
the Nagasaki bomb 1.4 square miles, giving an
average of 2.8 square miles per bomb. Hence, the
cost of destroying a square mile by this means is
less than half a million dollars. So atomic bombing is, at the least, six times more economical than
conventional bombing.
The estimated sixfold increase in economy is
based on most conservative estimates. In the case
of Nagasaki the shape of the target area was such
that much of the destructive power of the bomb
was directed at empty fields. Furthermore, thr
Nagasaki bomb was only the third to explode in all
history, and improvements will make later models
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more effective. To destroy a square mile of a modern city in the future will cost much less than half a
million dollars.
The destruction of cities is not the aim of a strategic air force. The aim is to weaken the enemy's
military strength and will to resist to the point
where he can successfully be invaded by ground
forces, as was Germany, or capitulates in the face
of certain destruction, as did Japan. In Germany
the decisive air blows were aimed at oil and transportation; and although the total value of the destruction in dollars might not have been so large
as that for cities, the effect was to paralyze the
whole German war machine and make land conquest practical.
With the decreased cost of destruction afforded
by the atomic bomb, the effort required to knock
out completely all phases of an enemy's war industry is wi thin practical reach. Once more an argument based on dollars will illustrate the point.
The Tokyo earthquake of 1923 destroyed 11,000
acres at an estimated loss of 2,750 million dollars; thus, each square mile destroyed represented
a loss of 160 million dollars to the Japanese. * The
value of a square mile of Tokyo was, if anything,
less at the time of the earthquake than at the time
of the destruction by the B-29's. Since the cost
to us of accomplishing this destruction was running at the rate of about 3 million dollars per
square mile, the B-29 attacks were profitable by
a factor of about fifty; that is, the cost to Japan.
was fifty times the cost to us. Although the figures just quoted give a reasonably true picture of
the relative war costs to the two nations, it is necessary to point out that not all of the destruction to
Japan had significance in impeding her war effort.
A large fraction of the 160 million dollars per
square mile of destruction represented personal
property and institutions not needed in war production. However, the remaining small fraction
of the damage (about one-eighth), which corresponded to strategic loss of war effort, was about
six times greater than the cost to us of producing
the damage. So far as the ultimate cost of the
war to civilization is concerned, the value of the
total destruction is of the most significance, and
the economy of air power in producing such destruction is fifty-fold, as outlined above. But with
the advent of atomic explosives, destruction will
be at least six times more economical. t Thus, in
a future ,var every dollar spent in an air offensive
is expected to do more than $300 worth of damage
to the enemy.

The numbers 50 and 300 are a tremendous argument for a world organization that will eliminate
conS ict by air power. These numbers, although
they are only rough estimates, convey in compact
form the grim fact that destruction is now too
cheap, too easy. They represent a new phase in
warfare. In the past, when one nation attacked
another on the ground, the loss to each was limited by the forces and resources engaged. Now
the limit is set only by the total resources exposed
to atomic bombs. In the past a war might consume the income of a nation for some years; in
the future it will also consume its capital. Dollars
have been used as a measure of value because they
are familiar and specific. It is hardly necessary to
stress the arguments that can be developed in
terms of lives, freedom from want, and the other
values of civilization. In every case the conclusion will be the same: destruction by air power
will be too easy. No effort spent on international
cooperation will be too great if it assures prevention of this destruction.
The Growth of Air Power. To gain perspective
on this subject, let us first consider the growing
effectiveness of air power up to the present. In
the First W orId War, air power played a negligible strategic role; its purpose was primarily tactical. In the European phase of the Second World
War, the strategic effect was decisive and crippled
the war machine to the point that ground defense
was impossible. In the Japanese phase of the
Second World War, air power w'as deCisive, and
rather than face destruction from the B-29's the
Japanese capitula ted.
The extent to which the strength of air power
mounted is shown succinctly by the bomb-tonnage
figures:
Tons by
Year

The Second World 'Var in Europe

1942
1943
1944

USAAF
6,123
154,117
938,952

The Second World War in the Pacific 1942
4,080
1943
44,683
1944 147,026
1945 1,051, 714t19463,167,316t-

* When the studies of the U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey in
Japan are completed, it w iIl be possible to use up-to-date
figure.
t See Dr. Oppenheimer's estimate, page 25.
:j: These figures, which do not include atomic bombs, include
projected tonnage for the latter part of 1945 and 1946.
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The harnessing of atomic energy and its application at the climax of the Pacific War have tended
to overshadow an important point. Even before
one of our B-29's dropped its atomic bomb on
Hiroshima, Japan's military situation was hopeless. The projected tonnages quoted could have
forced capitulation no later than 1946. Without
a ttempting to depreciate the appalling and farreaching results of the atomic bomb, we have good
reason to believe that its use primarily provided a
way out for the Japanese government. The fact
is that the Japanese could not have held out long,
because they had lost control of the air. They
'could offer effective opposition neither to our bombardment nor to our mining by air and so could
not prevent the destruction of their cities and
industries and the blockade of their shipping.

recaptured; but during the time of its use, they
operated at a good margin of profit and did damage and forced countermeasures that cost the
Allies many times as much effort as the campaign
cost the Germans.
Our increase in offensivS! air strength came
about from three factors, all of which must be
borne in mind in planning for the future.
1. Increased size. Both aircraft production and
the Army Air Forces expanded enormously. These
facts are so well known and appreciated that they
need not be discussed here.
2. Improved quality and efficiency of the instruments of air power. These were planes, electronic
equipment of all sorts, and greatest of all, explosives, including the atomic bomb. Improved quality is not obtained overnight; it comes about only
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Air power was advancing in the hands of the
Germans also, although along different lines. Prevented by Allied mastery of the air from using
piloted bombers effectively against England, they
turned to alterna tive air power weapons and developed V-I, the jet-propelled, pilotless, expendable
bomber, and V-2, the logical extension of jet propulsion to stratospheric conditions. They were
forced to abandon V-I when the French coast was

1940

1945

through persistent and extensive effort in research
and development. As a consequence of the improvement in quality, the B-29's delivered bombs
a t three times the range for half the cost per ton
compared to heavy bombers in Europe. Figure 1
shows progress in design in a more general way.
The curves corresponding to speed, range, and
bomb load for aircraft in use at the dates indicated
show a steady increase during peacetime that was
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grea tly accelerated during the war. * This acceleration reflects increased speed of getting new models
into production, as well as intensified research and
development. If our intensified research program
had preceded the wt},r, new types of combat aircraft would have saved many American lives. The
lesson from these facts is that research must continue during peacetime and cannot be slighted until the war clouds are seen to be gathering. This
will be even more true if what we face is a war
with atomic weapons.
3. Increased efficiency in using the weapons of
air power. Improvements in our training program
and in the know-how of using the weapons in combat produced great increases in combat effective-

lZ

Japan's industry than was actually done in the entire B-29 campaign. This damage amounted to
over 42 per cent of the urban industrial area of
the sixty-eight cities attacked. These cities had a
total population over 21 million-almost exactly
equal to our 12 largest American cities. This damage, I ,repeat, would have required less than one
day's effort by a force the size of the Twentieth
Air Force. The cost of the atomic bombs on a
mass-production basis, according to Dr. Oppenheimer's unofficial estimate, would be less than
200 million dollars-a very modest sum in wartime. Continuing this program for a few days or
weeks would obliterate all the industrial centers in
the Japanese Empire. A similar fate would have
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ness. The bomb density on the target for visual
bombing (Fig. 2) nearly doubled between 1943
and 1945. This was due not only to increasing
skill but also to increased mastery of the air as
German fighters were thinned down. The amount
of flying each aircraft did was more than doubled
between 1943 and 1945 (Fig. 3). This increase
was due to improvements all along the line, including maintenance, organization of large missions,
and decreasing enemy resistance.
The Future of Air Power. Before the end of
the Second World War, one B-29 dropping an
atomic bomb caused as much damage as 300 planes
would have done before. A consequence of this
fact is that the Twentieth Air Force, using atomic
bombs, could in one day's raid destroy more of

1944

1945

enveloped England had the Germans obtained
atomic explosives for their V weapons.
We have now flown a B-29 nonstop for a distance of over 8,000 miles. Ranges of 10,000 miles
for one-way trips with newer types of aircraft appear to be a possibility of the near future. The
strategic significance of these facts is at once evident when one draws the radii on a map. It means
that with relatively unimportant exceptions all of
the centers qf civilization in the northern hemisphere are within reach of destruction at the hands
of .any major nation in that hemisphere.

* Actually the intensification of research and development
after Pearl Harbor, while improving the characteristics of
previously designed types, did not lead to the introduction of
any new types in combat. All our combat types were designed
before we entered the war.
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Looking only a little farther to the future, we
must consider developments of the V-2 rocket.
By designing a rocket consisting mostly of fuel,
a speed of 3,400 miles per hour and a range of
200 miles was obtained in operations against England. This rocket weighed 14 tons and delivered
only 1 ton of explosive. T}:le Germans had under
design a longer range rocket, using a pick-'a -back
principle. A large rocket was to carry a smaller
one up to a speed of 2,500 miles per hour. At
this point the smaller one was to take off on its
own, attaining a speed of 5,800 miles per hour,
which would carry it 500 miles. The combined
rocket would weigh 110 tons and deliver 1 ton of
explosive. Designs incorporating winged rockets
predicted an increase of range to 300 miles for V-2
by finishing the trajectory in a glide and an increase
to 3,000 miles for rockets of the 100-ton class.
This phenomenal increase in range was based on
a trajectory in which the rocket would bounce out
of the lower atmosphere into the stratosphere in
a succession of jumps (like a stone skipping on
water) and end in a glide. Extensions of these
techniques to rockets of more than two stages permit increasing the range indefinitely with a progressive decrease in per cent of payload. However, the achievement of range alone is of little
strategic value unless it leads to effective and economical destruction of specific targets.
The problem of transporting explosive-or perhaps mail, materials, or even persons in peacetime
commerce-to an assigned destination cannot be
satisfactorily solved simply by aiming the rocket
initially like a projectile from a gun. Instead, it
is necessary to correct the aim and guide the rocket
during the stratospheric portion of its flight. In
the case of V-2, the guiding and control was restricted to the first 66 seconds of flight during
which the rocket climbed 12 miles. The average
error on a 200-mile shot "vas four miles-satisfactory for bombarding large cities such as London.
But the same degree of co"n trol on a 3,000-mile
shot would lead to an average error of 60 milesin other words, only one in 600 rockets would hit
a city the size of Washington.
Obtaining satisfactory accuracy first requires
finding the correction in path necess.ary to make
the rocket hit the target, and second, altering the
rocket's course to accord. Methods now in use
based on radar principles satisfy the first requirement with one mile accuracy at 100 miles and two

miles at 600 miles from the control stations. No
basic principles are known which will prevent
achieving these or greater accuracies at much
larger ranges. The problem of altering the rocket's flight will probably involve deflecting the wingless types by rocket jets during the stratospheric
portion of the flight and using conventional control surfaces for the gliding and skipping types.
The most pertinent comment about rockets that
can be made now is that research and development
,vill improve their characteristics much as aircraft
characteristics have been improved.
Very long-range rockets were not a serious
threat before the atomic bomb because of the high
ratio of the weight-and consequently the costof the vehicle compared to the explosive load.
Even a two-stage rocket would barely break even
economically-the cost of destroying a square mile
by this means being comparable with, if not larger
than, the damage done to the enemy. With an
atomic warhead, however, the cost of the carrier
is not excessive and even the expense of the most
elabora te guiding and control equipment would not
make the total product inefficient, for the destructive effect would exceed the total cost by a large
factor.
The problem of defense against V-2 was unsolved during the war, and, although interception
by ground-launched rockets was theoretically possible, the practical difficulties would take years to
overcome. The pick-a-back rocket and other offensive improvements could, on the other hand, be
developed in much less time.
Jet propulsion is another signpost to the future.
The limitations imposed by propellers will be eliminated, and ceilings will be lifted on the speed and
altitude of conventional planes and their future
developments. The most serious limitations in aircraft performance come from the phenomenon of
compressibility, which occurs when the velocity of
the aircraft approaches that of sound. This is in
part responsible for the fact that the rise in the
speed curve (Fig. 1) is less sensational than the
rise in the other curves shown. Now that jet-propelled aircraft have become a reality, the speed of
sound no longer appears as an unsurmountable
limit, and aircraft with supersonic speeds flying at
stratospheric altitudes are thought to be within
reach of a few years' development. Pilotless weapons based on such aircraft have potentialities at
least comparable with the developments of V-2.
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Future Requirements. Against this future of

increasing range, speed, and destructiveness of the
weapons of air power, adequate protection by pure
defense seems unlikely. Our defense can only
be a counteroffensive; we must be prepared to
give as good as we take or better. Should we
ever find ourselves facing an aggressor who could
destroy our industrial machine without having his
destroyed in turn, our defeat would be assured.
Thus our first defense is the ability to retaliate
even after receiving the hardest blow the enemy
can deliver. This means weapons in adequate numbers strategically distributed so that no enemy is
better situated to strike our industry than we are
to strike his.
The picture of defense by counteroffensive is a
gloomy one. A far better protection from atomic
weapons lies in developing controls and safeguards
that are strong enough to prevent their use on all
sides, for that offers the only hope for preserving
the values of our civilization. Still, it is my duty
here to trace what must be the air-force policy
of the United States in the absence of such controls-and a grim duty it is for any peace-loving
American.
Our countermeasures to anticipate and block an
aggressor's blows, so long as such blows are possible, must be developed to the utmost. Since, in
the near future, we expect that offensive air power
will outstrip defense and become adequate to accomplish almost any degree of destruction, the nation that first develops a means of protecting itself
will be the first able to initiate an atomic war without simultaneously bringing equal destruction on
itself. Thus we must make sure that no potential
aggressor outdistances us in his defense developments. And this means strategic bases for warning, detection, and interception of bombers for the
near future and later for pilotless weapons.
One passive defense of great importance consists of dispersing or burying below ground essential war industry. At present, with our industry
intact after the war, we are the least dispersed
of all major nations. In other nations, dispersal
either has already come about as a result of war
or will be incorporated in rebuilding destroyed industry. It is worth while to distinguish between
two kinds of dispersal. One kind is required to
prevent fatal disorganization by a relatively small
number of accurately placed atomic mines. This
would have to be achieved well in advance of open
@

hostility. The other is sufficient dispersal to permit us to carry the offensive back to any nation
daring to make an aggressive attack. In a world
in which atomic weapons are available, the most
threatening program that a nation could undertake
would be one of general dispersal and fortification.
Should such activities start, the world would see
the greatest digging race of all time-and the
grea test war.
However, not only must we prepare to fight an
atomic war, but-strange though it may seem at
first-we must also prepare to fight a war in which
no city may feel the blast of an atomic bomb.
The possibility of a future war without atomic
destruction of cities is not based on the belief
that the enormous devastation expected of atomic
weapons will lead to such abhorrence of them that
they will not be used. In the past no effective
·weapon of war has remained long unused, and in
fact the atomic bomb has already brought destruction on Japan.
But in the past destruction by ground forces has
been largely in one direction, and whichever side
had mastery could destroy without suffering retaliation. The anticipated cheapness of destruction
with atomic explosives, coupled with the fact that
their use with air-power weapons such as rockets
prevents adequate defense, means that in the future the aggressor who destroys his enemy's cities
may expect his own destroyed in turn. Neither
side may care to fire the first atomic shot and thus
bring destruction to its own cities and population
as well as to the enemy's. In addition, a nation
planning aggressive war in order to enrich itself
by mastering its opponent's industrial and economic wealth may withhold some atomic bombing
to avoid obliterating its contemplated loot.
There is historic precedent for withholding destruction in wars. The case of gas in Europe is an
example. It was used by neither side and the reason in Germany's case was in part, at least, that
she did not care to have gas used on her. Other
instances of non-destruction, although of a somewhat different type, are furnished by the open
cities of Paris and Rome. A related case is that
of Switzerland. While not an Axis nation, Switzerland was safe from Axis attack, partly because of
her ability to retaliate by destroying her strategic
railroad tunnels which would have greatly impeded
the flow of materials such as coal between Italy
and Germany.
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N ow the arguments given above are not intended to comfort us with the thought that, if all
na tions had atomic weapons, no nation would use
them for fear of retalia tion. All they show is that
there is a possibility of stalemate with respect to
destruction of cities by atomic bombs. Preparedness, although it must be built around atomic
weapons, therefore cannot be built around atomic
weapons alone. Proper account must be taken of
the other forces of land, sea, and air. Still another reason for maintaining a balanced armedforces program is that, after major atomic destruction is accomplished, a war might not be settled, and a conflict using atomic weapons only in
part might well continue.
It is worth while pointing out that biological
warfare, consisting of the spreading of disease,
could occupy a position similar to atomic warfare
and that the same arguments would apply to it.
For the air force to carry out its mission in the •
future, we must have
1. An up-to-the-minute air force with trained
personnel and with all the latest and most efficient
air-power weapons, quite apart from atomic weapons, quite apart from atomic explosives. Our
counteroffensive must be made by a force in being
-not a force which has to be mobilized in weeks
or even days.
2. An extensive and efficient intelligence service
to make available a maximum of warning of worsening relations or impending attack.
3. Research and development adequate to make
our equipment the foremost in the world. In this
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connection great caution must be observed that we
do not defeat the very object we are trying to
achieve by trammeling our scientists with security
regulations and thus rendering them less able to
cope with future emergencies.
4. Strong industry capable of rapid expansion
for war production.
S. An integrated national-defense organization
geared to the new concepts of total war.
6. Strategic bases.
In the foregoing analysis, I have taken the point
of view which I must take-that adequate interna ..
tional controls and safeguards have not as yet been
established, and that the air forces must therefore
be prepared to protect the nation in a future war.
How terrible that war would De is indicated by
the factual appraisal of what atomic explosives
mean in comparison with the most deadly materials men have devised before them. I have men..
tioned the possibilities that might lead aggressors
to refrain from using atomic bombs in a hypothetical future war. Let me say again that, although
they are far less economical or efficient, conventional bombs as they will be developed before that
war can come will go far enough toward wreck.
ing the world. Thus, whether we recognize that
atomic bombs will rain upon us or cling to the faint
hope that only standard high explosives will batter our cities, we must realize that the time is at
hand for the peoples of the world to admit that
their warring power is too great to be allowed to
continue. Through international collaboration we
must make an end to all wars for good and all.

N.

had charge of the development of several types of radar at the Radiation Labo ..
ratory of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
During 1944 he served in Europe as radar adviser
to General Spaatz. He returns this year to the U niversity of Pennsylvania as professor of physics.
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There Is No Defense
by LOUIS N.

T

HE subject of this chapter is the possibility of active defense against an attack
in which atomic bombs are delivered by
means such as those described in the last chapter.
As a means of getting into this, I should like to
project into the future what we learned regarding
active air defense in the war just past.
We must first consider whether it is necessary
to shoot bombs down at all in order to render
them ineffective. Is there not some specific countermeasure which would keep the bomb from exploding, or cause it to explode harmlessly at a
great distance from its target? Many authorities
and semiauthorities, including the House Naval
Affairs Committee, have made public statements
which encourage this hope.
All such statements are very dangerous because
of the mistaken complacency they can engender.
There is no such thing as a specific countermeasure
against an atomic explosive or an atomic bomb.
For that matter, there is no specific countermeasure against an old-fashioned chemical explosive
such as TNT or black powder. All explosives, in..
cluding atomic explosives, go off when set off by
their detonating mechanisms, which are always
made rather simple and tamperproof. This has
been made abundantly clear by wise and responsible authorities, but it cannot be said too often.
Many of the misleading statements about hopeful countermeasures have been made by honest
men who have no active desire to mislead. Themselves misled, they understand the problem incompletely. Their reasoning goes somewhat like this:
It is assumed that the detonator of the bomb, or
the steering mechanism of the vehicle which carries it, or some other vital device .connected with
the bomb, takes a certain form. A means is then
devised for interfering with the operation of this
device. The inventor of the countermeasure forgets entirely that if the enemy does not mak~ use
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of exactly the form of device imagined, his idea
is useless.
A specific example may make this more concrete.
As already announced, the atomic bombs dropped
on Japan were caused to explode about 1,500 feet
in the air. The fuze may have been connected
either to a barometric switch set to close at an
air pressure corresponding to the desired altitude,
or to a radar altimeter. The latter device measures altitude by sending out radio waves and measuring the time lapse before they bounce back from
the ground or sea beneath. If a hypothetical enemy used against us bombs equipped with a radar
altimeter, we 'might be able to send out interfering
radio signals which would set off the bomb at a
higher altitude than its designers intended.
We could scarcely expect to make the bomb go
off while still in the bomb bay of its carrier, or
at a very much greater altitude than that for which
the altimeter was set, for the greatest attention is
paid by ordnance experts to arming devices designed to prevent this. Such devices keep bombs
and shells in a safe condition, with the fuze mechanism entirely inoperative, until a considerable
time after they have been dropped from the carrying aircraft or fired from their guns. Mainly intended to make bombs and shells safe to handle
and not too dangerous to the gunners or air crew
who must deliver them, arming devices also serve
to defeat many schemes to produce ineffective premature explosions.
More important than the fact that a countermeasure directed against the radar altimeter could
at best be only partly effective-since the bomb
still would explode at an altitude at which damage
would result-is the strong possibility that the
enemy might be so unobliging that our countermeasure would not work at all. If he used a barometric altimeter instead of a radar altimeter, there
is nothing that we could do about it.

· J .

THERE I

Simple and direct habits of thought lead to
weapon design giving little leverage for countermeasures. The· V-I flying bomb was a good example of a weapon that did not lend itself to any
sort of countermeasure except direct interception,
and V-2 was an even better one. The V-I was
steered after launching by a magnetic compass.
It was kept at the desired altitude during its flight
by a barometric altimeter. It had an automatic
pilot and a means for causing it to execute a gentle
turn after launching, if desired, but the former
was a simple and rugged gyro device, and the turn
mechanism ran by clockwork. Fragments of radio
equipment were found in some of the V-I wreckage and gave rise to hopes that the Germans were
using radio control that could be interfered '\vith
by British countermeasures. This "vas not the case.
The radio parts came from simple transmitters,
which the Germans put into a small fraction of
the bombs so that radio-direction-finding stations
along the Channel coast could plot their paths and
thus keep track of wind conditions over England.
People talked of a great magnetic coil overlying
the Downs, which would produce enough change
in the earth's magnetic field to affect the magnetic
compass of the V-I and thus deflect the missile
from its objective. Calculations showed that no
sufficiently strong field could be produced, and anyhow the unobliging Germans had fixed V-I up so
that even a violent deflection of the compass would
put the vehicle into no more than the gentlest of
turns. There was nothing to do but to shoot the
V-I's down in the old-fashioned way, with fighters
and antiaircraft guns.
The pained disappointment this caused the countermeasures experts was nothing to that caused by
the properties of V-2. Our first detailed knowledge of V-2 came from fragments of a trial shot
that fell in Sweden. The rather well-preserved
wre'c kage yielded a good deal of radio equipment.
It was hoped that this meant radio control of
V-2, for the fighter planes and antiaircraft that
had been used against V-I were about as useful
against V-2 as trained falcons and a bow and
arrow. Radio control, which might admit of
jamming and countermeasures, seemed the only
defense possibility.
Presently V-2's began to land in London. Countermeasures men spent a good deal of hazardous
and unpleasant flying time in the vicinity of the
launching sites, hoping to pick up, identify and
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study radio control signals as a preliminary to
jamming them. But there was no radio control;
the Germans were simply firing V-2's at the target
and hoping for the best. There was no countermeasure short of winning the war, which, luckily,
was done. But there would not have been time
for that if the V-weapons had had atomic war
heads.
The public imagination is readily caught by a
comic-strip sort of ray or stream of energy that
will destroy a missile at a substantial distance from
its destination. A simple calculation shows that
the destruction of a single missile by such means
would drain all the power from the section of the
country in which the installation was located. Such
grave practical questions of the feasibility of dealing with a single projectile by this means are entirely overshadowed by the obvious impossibility
of dealing thus with a mass raid, which we must
expect a possible attacker to deliver.
In half a century of dealing with chemical explosives, no one has yet discovered how to detonate them by a ray or by any othet setup that
works without wires at a distance. It continues to
be overwhelmingly unlikely that such a discovery
will be made in behalf of atomic explosives.
In the light of everything we know about the
a tomic bomb, there is no such thing as a specific
countermeasure.
We are faced, then, with the problem of mounting an active defense against the carriers of atomic
bombs. We must detect them and follow their
paths by radar, plot their future courses with predictors, and engage them with countermissiles before they have approached near enough to their .
target to be dangerous. What are our chances
of preparing an active defense affording protection against an atomic bomb attack which may
come without warning?
Our chances of doing this are vanishingly small.
To understand why, we shall have to look into the
character of the defenses, so far as we are able
to predict them on the basis of our experience in
the past war and our knowledge of later technical
developments that did not come soon enough to
see service in the war. The problem separates
itself into four main parts- detection, identification, course prediction, and interceptiono
Detection will certainly be accomplished by radar, for there is n other t 01 that can be relied
on to operate under all conditions of visibility at
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all times. ' The best of the search radar with which
we finished the war could see a single hea vy bomber
out to a distance of 200 miles or so and covered a
region of space extending up to an aititude of
40,000 feet. Radar search equipment for atomic
defense will ha ve ~o provide coverage over the
entire upper hemisphere, for high-angle projectiles
derived from the V-2 rocket must be detected. By
the same token, it will not be enough to install
radar simply around the coasts and borders of our
country. We shall have to defend St. Louis by
near-by installations, for the arching trajectory of
a long-range rocket could bring it across the coast
at an altitude of hundreds of miles-where it
would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to
pick up-and guide it down on its inland target undetected, unless there were inland radar
installa tions.
Present techniques make a radar detection range
of about 200 miles for a missile the size of V-2
not impossible, though the supersonic streamlining
of this vehicle makes it difficult to see by radar.
Proper coverage would probably demand that
about 250 long-range search radar installations be
operated on a twenty-four-hour basis to provide
ade'q uate detection facilities. Each installation
would need perhaps five separate radars, to provide off-the-air maintenance time and to give adequate hemispheric coverage. The crew for each
installation would be about 200 men; the equipment cost of a single installation would be about
10 million dollars. We should thus have to spend
upward of 375 million dollars to make these installations and employ some 50,000 men in operating them. If we did, we should be able to detect
aircraft and air-borne missiles with considerable
reliability.
Indeed, our principal difficulty would then be a
sort of embarrassment of riches; for radar detects
friend and foe alike. In the war just past, a special radar beacon, which gave a coded reply to a
specific challenge, was originally meant to be carried in every ship and aircraft of the United
Nations. This equipment was called IFF (Identification of Friend and Foe). It was an abject operational failure. In the European Theater it gave
so many difficulties that its use was entirely abandoned after D-day in Normandy, except for small
numbers of aircraft on special missions. In the
Pacific, where aircraft densities were lower, its use
was continued; but at the times \vhen it 'w~as most

sorely needed, IFF failed to serve its intended
purpose. The main troubles with wartime IFF
arose under conditions of heavy traffic-when
there were many aircraft in the view of a single
radar set.
For our future defense we shall have to supplement our radar search and warning chain with an
IFF system 'which will work even in higher traffic
densities, will be quick and reliable in use, and that
will inherently not be subject to compromise by a
possible enemy. This last requirement present~
the utmost difficulty, since the system must be so
universally used that every potential enemy will
have full opportunity to become familiar with its
principles, its detailed design, and its prescribed
use. Despite all this, the IFF must be capable of
being employed in such a fashion that friendly.
craft can be distinguished from enemy vehicles.
The restriction of air traffic to prescribed lanes,
and the regulation of traffic \vithin those lanes,
will undoubtedly be of assistance to the radar
stations in keeping track of air activity. But even
with all the aids to identification that ingenuity is
able to provide, future air traffic will probably be
so dense that the identification problem will be a
major one.
Even so, let us conclude that an enormous national investment in radar and IFF facilities will
give us some chance of detecting atomic missiles
while they are still on.e or two hundred miles from
their target, and of recognizing that they are not
friendly. We are now faced with the problem of
destroying them before they have come danger..
ously close to the target. In the air defense of
the last war this was done either by means of
piloted fighter aircraft or by means 0-£ artillery
shells. In either case, such interception oJ the
enemy craft was preceded by a course prediction
that based the expected future path of the craft
on a know1edge of its past course. Sudi course
prediction was performed for antiaircraIt artillery by an electrical computer at the gun battery.
It was performed for the fighter either by the
pilot himself, if visibility permitted, or by 'a controller on the ground who watched the radar plots
of both enemy craft and friendly fighter.
Since the device used for course prediction depends fundamentally on the device used for interception, it will be convenient to consider the two
problems of course prediction and interception
together. What sort of vehicle will be used as a
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defensive interceptor? It seems certain that it
will be neither the piloted fighter nor the conven. tional antiaircraft artillery shell, for both of these
were already obsolete by the end of the past war.
The design of the pilot, and not of the fighter
plane, made the piloted fighter obsolete. As aircraft speeds went up, maneuverability-necessary
to meet evasive action by the target or for lastsecond adjustments in aim-decreased, for the
acceleration permissible in a turn is restricted by
the pilot's black-out at high accelerations. In
turns so sharp that the pilot is subjected to a centrifugal force larger than 6g~six times the force
of gravity at the earth's surface-his vision dims
out, and he may even lose consciousness. Turns
much sharper than this cause bursting of blood
vessels, detachment of internal organs, and death.
And, of course, the geography covered in the
course of a simple maneuver of a high-speed aircraft is immense.
A pilotless vehicle can be built to make turns
of arbitrary sharpness at any speed. It is necessary only to make the structure. strang enough so
that the acceleratiQn does not tear it apart and to
make provision fQr plenty of control force. There
are at speeds near that of sound certain aero . .
dynamic limitations that ar-e neglected here because these difficulties arise even in the problem
of level flight at very- high speeds. What is
'mportant to our argument is that limitations put
by the design of the human body on the maneuverability of a high-speed interceptor are so severe
that our expectation of high speed in attacking
vehicles will demand pilotless interceptors.
1""'he simplest type of pilotless interceptor is the
artillery shell, but this is now obsolete for the
same reason that the piloted plane is obsolete-the speeds of the target vehicles have gone too
high. The piloted fighter cannot make sharp
turns at high speed; the artillery shell cannot
make turns at all. The shell's effectiveness depends on our ability to get it as rapidly as possible from gun barrel to target, so that our prediction of where the target will be when the shell
arrives is not outdated by unanticipated maneuvers of the target during the time of flight of the
shell.
The remarkable ele-ctrical predictors used by
our antiaircraft to compute the future position of
a target on the basis. of its past course and speed
,vere and are subject to several serious limitations.

First, they assume flight in a straight line. Second,
no computer, however ingenious, can allow for a
target maneuver that is undertaken while the shell
is in flight.
But a target going 500 miles per hour, if it
should commence a 6g turn at the moment a shell
was fired (acting perhaps in response to the gun
flash), could be 14! miles away from its predicted position and going the other way if the
time of shell flight were only 13 seconds. A faster
target, or one capable of evasive action at higher
values of acceleration, could correspondingly
escape aimed fire more readily. The solution to
this difficulty clearly lies in cutting down the time
of the shell's flight, which depends on the distance
to the target and on the speed of the shell. But
even with guns made of the strongest metals we
now have, muzzle velocities are not more than a
few thousand feet per second. And the danger
range of the atomic bomb is so great that an antiaircraft battery must engage and destroy its target at long range if it is to afford any protection
at all to the vital area it is guarding and if the
antiaircraft battery is not to destroy itself with
it first successful shot.
In addition to the fact that evasive action and
incr-easing target speeds limit the effectiveness of
antiaircraft fire, we must consider the inherent
inaccurary of this gunfire even under the best cone
ditions. Errors may arise because the target i
not being followed precisely by the fire control
radar or because the target has not been followed
for a long enough time to make possible an accu..
rate prediction of its future course or because the
computer makes errors or approximations in its
prediction-or for many other reasons. It is
sufficient for our purpose to point out that in the
Second W orId War antiaircraft fire was operat..
ing just on the edge of the region where aimed
fire could not bring hits without a large portion
of luck, and V-2 carried us well into that region.
There will be no use in firing even the best imagi. .
nable antiaircraft artillery at the missiles that
might be the first harbingers of a new atomic
war.
Faced with the ohsolesrence of the piloted defensive fighter and of antiaircraft artillery, it
seems most likely that our military designers.
will develop a vehicle which is launched at high
speed in accordance with a predicted target position (like a shell), and that has motive p wer,
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flight controls, and a target-seeking mechanism
(like a piloted fighter). All this can be done. We
can conceive of a missile that might be fired from
a sort of gun, propelled by a rocket charge or
other means during later flight, and caused to
home to its target by radar or other target-seeking means. No doubt a great deal of thinking
and probably some work is going into the design
of such missiles right now.
The proximity fuze, which explodes an antiaircraft shell when it comes close enough to its tar·
get to be able to destroy it, is already in hand.
Perhaps an aton1ic warhead would also be used
on new defensive missiles to increase their radius
of effectiveness.
This completes the picture of our possible active defenses. We should have to spend a lot of
mone), and effort designing and installing a radar
chain for search and warning, but let's believe
that the resulting equipment would search and
warn. We should have to be very clever in our
design of identification equipment, but let's believe
that proper traffic control measures ,vould enable
us to tell peaceful air traffic from the missiles of a
possible enemy. We should have to spend a great
deal of ingenuity and effort in the design of a
homing antiaircraft rocket missile. Let us believe
that we could do all these things. There is much
here that we cannot now do and no one can say
with certainty that we shall eventually be able
to ' do all that we would have to do. But if we
could, would this chapter still have to be headed
There Is No Defense?
This is a perfectly good question on the basis
of what has so far been said, and it has a perfectly
good answer. The answer is that a war, or even
a new phase of a war already in progress, always
starts with a Pearl Harbor kind of attack. In a
war involving old-fashioned explosives, we have
called what happened while we were getting our
guard up a disaster, but we survived it and went
on to fight. In an atomic war the first attack, no
matter how well prepared for it we may be, will
really be a disaster. It is quite likely to end the
war, if we have a practical, ingenious, and determined enemy.
It is possible to go on and say that no defense
against any form of air attack has ever achieved
100 per cent success at any stage of experience,
but this is somewhat redundant if we are convinced by an examination of the past that a first

attack always succeeds in achieving surprise.
Pearl Harbor itself, besides giving its name to
the phenomenon of costly unpreparedness, is a
very good case in point. Even the primitive radar
equipment installed for the defense of the island
succeeded in giving warning that would have been
adequate to prepare a vigorous defense had the
defenders been alert. Noone could have wanted
more eagerly than the Army and Navy commanders then at Pearl Harbor to be alert, to avoid a
debacle, since it would-and did-blight in a
morning the careers of a lifetime. These men
were simply victims of the principle that the defense can never be ceaselessly alert everywhere
and that the offense ,c an always select the place and
time to strike.
Even when there is warning the situation remains about the same. Early in the winter of
1943-44, the British were perfectly well aware
of German preparations to attack London with
V-1. They had good information on the construc..
tion and characteristics of V-I, and they studied
carefully the various possibilities. Yet when the
flying bombs started to come in July, 1944, the
British were far from ready to meet them. In
the first days of the attack more than 35 per cent
of the V-I 's launched by the Germans struck London. Eight weeks later, with no more gun batteries available, only nine per cent of the V-l's
launched were reaching London. In an atomic
war even the nine per cent figure 'would be fatal
to London in less than a single day, but the 35 per
cent figure is the one to ponder.
By the time we deployed our antiaircraft defenses to protect Antwerp from V-I attack, we
knew all about the buzz-bomb. We knew the best
disposition for batteries and the best plans for
their operation. The gunners had had experience
in the defense of London, and knew what they had
to face. Yet the initial efficiency of the Antwerp
defense was only 57 per cent. During the next
two weeks it rose to over 90 per cent.
All through the war just past there were evidences of this same phenomenon of initial defense
inefficiency. When the Germans began their daylight air attacks on England in 1940, the RAF
had to organize its defense, which was rather
ineffective at first. The RAF defense soon became
so effective that the Germans shifted to night
bombing, but not before considerable damage had
been done to England. The technique of grouad

THERE IS NO DEFENSE

control of night fighter interception was worked
out quickly by the RAF, the German losses in
night bombing began to mount, and presently these
losses became so prohibitive that the Luftwaffe
gave up-but again considerable damage was done
to England. In an atomic war either of these campaigns of the Luftwaffe, quickly opposed and
mastered by the RAF as each was, would have
wiped out England.
We can sum up the situation regarding active
defense against airborne atomic bombs in the
following terms:
1. There is no such thing as a specific countermeasure that will prevent the explosion of an
atomic bomb or will explode such a bomb while
it is still a great distance from its target.
2. A radar detection net which could in principle provide warning of the approach of air-borne
atomic bombs is technically feasible. It would
represent a tremendous national investment and
a continuing drain on manpower.
3. The chief difficulty connected with radar
detection of missiles directed at us in a future
atomic war would be that of separating the radar
signals produced by such objects from those
caused by friendly and normal air traffic. This
calls for the development of an identification system of unparalleled effectiveness and subtlety,
together with the imposition of stringent rules
of traffic control.
.
4. Interception of missiles used for the delivery
of atomic bombs, which we can expect to travel
with supersonic speeds, will demand a totally new
development. Interception devices which are
themselves capable of these speeds and which can

seek out and home on their targets will be necessary. Such interception devices may be developed
but will require a very considerable effort and
tremendous expense. Piloted fighter aircraft and
conventional antiaircraft artillery will be entirely
useless.
5. Regardless of our state of preparedness for
an atomic bomb attack, it is likely that the initial
effectiveness of our defenses will be small. The
defense must be eternally alert everywhere, for
the offense strikes at a chosen time and place.
Personnel training in time of peace is no substitute
for wartime training when the chips are down.
We never anticipate the exact character of the
actual attack nor the defense strategy best adapted
to meet it.
6. If an atomic-bomb attack does not devastate
its target in the early days of low defense efficiency, the maximum efficiency that can be expected
of the active defenses when the defenders are
experienced is around 90 per cent. With attacks
carried out by piloted bombers, such efficiency is
murderous and would be an effective defense;
with attacks carried out using conventional chemical explosives, even with pilotless missiles, such
efficiency would raise a serious question of the
economic wisdom of the enemy continuing the
attacks. With atomic explosives, 90 per cent efficiency is definitely too low to afford adequate protection. The destructive effect of the 10 per cent
of incoming missiles penetrating the defenses
would be great enough to wipe out the target,
even though the attack were carried out on a
modest scale.
7. There is no defen~e.
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The New Technique of Private War
by E. U. CON DON

e

WER New York Harbor shook that day in
1916. Some freight cars and a barge
loaded with TNT and picric acid on their
way to the armies of the Czar of all the Russias
had blown up. The Black Tom explosion was
typical of successful ventures in sabotage, a prototype of this stealthy tactic of total war. Agents
of the German government had detonated the
shipment of high explosive by secreting small time
bombs in the loaded cars. The ill-equipped Russian army had suffered a costly defeat at the hands
of a few careful and determined men.
In Rjukan, Norway, the cheapest hydroelectric
power in the world encourages the production of
hydrogen by electrolysis of water, and the residue
from the electrolytic cells of the great Rjukan
plant is incidentally enriched in deuterium. Further treatment of these residues yields pure heavy
water, which can be useful in the production of
plutonium. When the Nazis undertook such fur-,
ther treatment of the residues, the British-prop-,
erly apprehensive of the atomic bomb in Axis
hands--took counsel with the Norwegian underground. His Majesty's Government armed and
encouraged the saboteurs in their spectacular
attacks on the heavy-water plant. Its structure
and purpose were so special, and the necessities
of its location so restrictive, that the crippling of
this one plant would seriously reduce the German
facilities for manufacturing heavy V\Tater, hence
plutonium and bombs.
These two examples exhibit the major principle
of all important war-time sabotage. The saboteur
cannot have mighty engines or tons of explosive at
his disposal; he moves by stealth and carries his
destructive means in his pockets or on his back.
In the days before the atomic bomb this left him
two choices. He could destroy a small but important target with the explosives he carried himself,
or he could touch off with this tiny charge the

,energy stored in the munitions of his enemy.
Rjukan or Black Tom-the indispensable sman
~ thing or the great concentration of unstablfl explosive. Both were vulnerable to the old-style
;.Saboteur.
Because of this, both were surrounded with
:safeguards. The small thing, being small, can be
:specially and heavily guarded. The sentry walks
:the bridge; the President is accompanied by his
guards; the cars entering Oak Ridge are searched.
The load of explosives can be guarded too, and
the munitions plant or dump is isolated both from
the abodes of men and from other concentrations
of explosively unstable chemicals. When a shipload or a trainload of explosives comes to a port,
it goes by circuitous routes to a lonely spot where
its explosion will do little harm. The disaster
lOf Port Chicago, where a shipload of naval ex:plosives detonated for reasons unknown, typifies
the unexpected explosion. Men working there
,died by the hundreds, but the site was so remote
that there was not a single civilian casualty.
In the age of atomic explosives the special agent
'has not been freed from the traditional restriction
lof his profession-his physical means must still
'be small. But no longer does this connote small
destruction. No longer must significant damage
be done by painfully gaining close access to a vulnerable target. No more must he study the habits
of the pacing guard and slip past to put the few
pounds of TNT and primacord against the generator. No longer need Guy Fawkes put the gunpowder directly under Parliament. The atomic
bomb of modest size that the agent assembles in
his hideaway will, when it goes off, t ake with it
every structure within a mile. Within the volume
of a small watermelon is stored the energy of more
than 20,000 tons of old fashioned high explosive.
The saboteur can carryon his person more destruction than the Eighth. A~:r Force could bring to
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Germany by ten raids at ma:ximum effort; ten
raids in which 200 heavy bombers and 2,000 airmen would be lost.
We must, therefore, no longer expect the special
agent to be special. In a future war and perhaps
even in the months of tense suspicion that may
precede it, the activities of the saboteur will be
important. Against him the locked door and the
armed guard no longer can prevail. A target, to
be safe, must be surrounded by a sanitary area of
at least a mile in radius, all known to contain no
suspicious man or thing. Any house can be as
dangerous to its surroundings as the greatest of
powder magazines. Twenty-thousand tons of
TNT can be kept under the counter of a candy
store.
This does not overstate the case. T 'o be sure,
the little lump of atomic explosive must be put
together with other mechanisms to make an atomic
bomb. Some chemical explosive must be used, with
a massive surrounding bubble called a "tamper."
Our government is chary of the details, but we
know that the resulting bomb will fit the bomb bay
of a B-29, and we can be sure that the structure
can be made for a total weight not far from a ton.
It can be packaged in the shape and appearance of
a filing cabinet or an upright piano.
Can it be detected at a distance by its radiations? Robert Oppenheimer, asked in Senate
hearings whether there were not some scientific
instrument that would enable the detection of the
exact box in a Washington basement that might
contain an atomic bomb, answered: "Yes, there
is such an instrument. It is a screwdriver, with
which the investigator could painstakingly open
case after case until he found the bomb." Oppenheimer was not joking. Small amounts of radiation are emitted by uranium-235 and plutonium,
but the heavy metallic tamper used to make the
bomb efficient serves well to absorb this already
weak radiation. Neutrons emitted by the atomic
explosive are especially penetrating, but the bomb
is so constructed that before detonation there are
few neutrons present, and the entire design is
devoted to preventing their escape. Encasing the
bomb in a wooden box would screen it from inspection no more remote than the next room.
We must accept the fact that in any room where
a file case can be stored, in any district of a great
city, near any key building or installation, a determined effort can secrete a bomb capable of killing

a hundred thousand people and laying waste every
ordinary structure within a mile. And we cannot
detect this bomb except by stumbling over it, by
touching it in the course of our detailed inspection
of everything within a box or case or enclosure the
size of a large radio cabinet, everywhere in every
room of every house, every office building, and
every factory of every city, and every town of
our country.
Conceive the police state that must result from
this hard fact in a world from which war has not
yet been banished! General Groves, in his testimony before the Senate committee on atomic
energy, was asked about the feasibility of international inspection and control. The general was
upset at the invasion of corporate and individual
privacy that would be involved in making sure
that no one was manufacturing atomic explosives,
in certifying that the great plants of Oak Ridge
and Hanford did not have their illegal counterparts in a country determined to violate the peace.
Apparently he did not consider the alternative.
Apparently he had not thought of the necessity
that, in the absence of adequate international inspection and control, would drive an agent of the
FBI to inspect every maiden's hope chest, every
matron's china closet, every businessman's file case,
every factory's tool cabinet, everywhere in the
United States at least once in sixty days. Here is
an invasion of privacy to worry about r
Yet such Herculean measures of internal inspection would not be enough. A bomb can be
brought in from outside the country in either of
two ways. The atomic explosive, which now can
be made only in a large, expensive, and easily-identified installation, could be smuggled in little by
little by agents, and the rest of the bomb could
be built here with the resources of a reasonably
modest shop. After all, atomic explosives are
respectable-looking metals out of which plated
cigar lighters, keys, watch cases, or shoe nails can
be fabricated. They cannot be told from other
metals except by a detailed study of their density
and their X-ray absorption. Here the police state
will be needed again. In the insecurity of a world
of national atomic armaments, every bit of metal
carried by every incoming foreign traveler will
h'lve to be inspected in a laborious and sophisticated way.
But we are not yet safe. The other way of
bringing in an atomic bomb from abroad is to
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secrete a complete atomic bomb within some ostensibly innocent item of cargo consigned to the
United States. In the hold of a ship floating idly
at the Brooklyn docks, awaiting the X-ray inspection of cargo that a fearful nation has imposed,
such a bomb could kill its hundred thousand and
wreck the harbor. Carried in a plane making its
final approach to the landing strip of a great transoceanic air ba~e, it could destroy the base, the
travelers, and a few square miles of the neighborhood. The speed and convenience of air travel
is nullified by the hard necessity of slow and careful examination of any box big enough to provide
for the overseas shipment of a typewriter. A
single box of this sort could contain an instrument
of enough power to wreck the Panama Canal.
The improved effectiveness of sabotage in the
atomic age, the newly increased concentra1:ion of
destructive energy, make possible anonymous war.
The identity of a bombmaker and the names of
the men who have planted the bomb will vanish in
microseconds in an awesome ball of atomic fire.
This opens the horrid possibility of deliberate
provocation. In a suspicious world of full-scale
atomic arm~ ments, a third nation might, by the
planting of bombs, precipitate a war between two
others which momentarily fear one another. The
treachery that is patriotism in a war is here
brought to its utmost depths; yet there is nothing
visionary in this thought. It is a grim outcome of
what we can do.
I t is not likely that a war will be decided by the
destruction wrought by atomic bombs secreted in
the ways considered here; it is not our purpose to
imply that a war can be won by sabotage or betrayal. It need not be; the rockets are too good
for that. And the organization of a sabotage network, capable of planting more than a handful of
such hidden weapons under the risk of precipitating hostilities if a single plan miscarries, is surely
grave. But here is one more uncertainty. If your
country is engaged in a race for atomic arms, will
you look equably at the great sea of roofs around
your house in the city? Anyone of them may
conceal the bomb. The beginning of a new war
will surely involve not only the launching of the
missiles, but the explosion of the mines that have

secretly been set near key targets to provide the
pinpoint accuracy that long-range weapons may
possibly lack. Government buildings will fall, the
great communications facilities will be destroyed,
ports of rail and air and sea traffic will be disabled, the crucial industrial installations will be
attacked. All this will happen whether the airborne bombs have pinpoint accuracy or not. We
may never know who did it, who planted or
smuggled or shipped the bombs. And the measures
we shall have to take in an effort to protect ourselves against this assortment of horrid possibilities will reduce international mobility in travel and
trade to that which prevailed in the age of sail and
will waste our men in guarding, snooping, and
investigation.
Our President is reported to be irked with the
necessity of having his person closely guarded,
day and night. What will some future President
feel about the necessity of never approaching
nearer than a couple of miles to his fellow man
except after the most painstaking scrutiny of the
neighborhood and the individuals it contains?
All these possibilities have been predicated on
bombs that we know how to build-on bombs our
nation is building today against an uncertain
future. Like the considerations of other chapters, the considerations here made point only to
one fact. We cannot seek national security in
armament in a world possessed of atomic arms.
Our achievement can only stimulate the ambition
and the suspicion of other nations that may be as
reluctant as ar~ we to go to war. If one nation
arms, all must; and if all nations arm in the terms
of the atomic 'world, each is so overwhelmingly
able to destroy the other that a war can almost be
regarded as a sanitary measure. Its outbreak becomes inevitable.
The conclusion seems straightforward. We cannot allow our world, beset with many real problems, with much uncertainty and distrust, to drift
into a state so fantastic that it beggars words, and
so real that you have the photographs of it in the
newspapers. An atomic-arms race must be prevented by international control of atomic energy.
The saboteur cannot be found, but the factory that
makes his bomb need never exist.
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IS

the Danger?

by FREDERICK SEITZ and HANS BETHE

NE of the views concerning our policy on
the atomic bomb that is frequently expressed is contained in the slogan, "Keep
the secret I" This immediately raises the all important pair of questions: Is there a secret? If
so, can we really keep it in the same sense that
we could keep secret our landing position on the
Normandy beachhead?
The first part of this query can be answered
immediately. At the present moment the British
and ourselves possess knowledge of certain basic
scientific facts and production techniques that are
not generally known throughout the world. These
facts and techniques relate to the design and construction of machines for producing pure light
uranium (U-235) and plutonium and of bombs
made from these materials.
Granting this reply to the first question, we
recognize at once that the reply to the second
part has tremendous significance in determining
our foreign policy. If, for instance, it is beyond
the range of possibility to keep to ourselves the
facts centering about the technology of the bomb
for more than a finite time, such as four or five
years, w"e must pay more attention to our foreign
policy than to any other factor in our national
program. Otherwise we may find ourselves alienated in a hostile world, a world in which the proximity of sudden death on a large scale is greater
than it ever was in the primordial jungle that
cradled the human tribes. But before we can answer the second question-namely, how long it
,vill take for another nation to obtain the knowledge necessary to make atomic bombs-we must
analyze the history of our own development.
The process of fission, which makes the present atomic bomb possible, was discovered in Germany in the winter of 1938-39 and first became
known in this country in January of 1939. This

O

is the starting date of our activity in the field of
bomb development that was brought to its practical culmination on July 16, 1945, when the first
bomb test succeeded. The six and a half years
from fundamental discovery to final application
can be broken in more or less clean-cut fashion
into three separate periods.
Period 1. The first period extended from J anuary, 1939, to January, 1942, that is, to about the
time when Pearl Harbor was bombed. This might
be called the period of groping. During it many
problems had to be solved: first, the purely scientific problems of devising experimental techniques
for investigating the feasibility of a chain reaction and of carrying out the requisite experimental
work; second, the problems centering about the
procurement of adequa te funds and personnel; and
third, the problem of maintaining national interest
in the issue when the facts were still very hazy and
speculative. This was the period when it was most
necessary to have men of genius and determination
behind the work. It is interesting to note that this
was also the period in which the work was carried
on by relatively small groups of men at several
universities, especially Columbia, Princeton, and
California, led by a few of the most brilliant of
our scientists. The period ended when it became
theoretically certain that the chain reaction would
work.
Period 2. This period extended from January,
1942, to about January, 1944. Activities expanded and shifted from pure research to the
construction of the first chain-reacting unit and to
the design of plants to produce fissionable material on a large scale. Contracts were made with
industrial companies to build or operate largescale plants. Pilot plants were actually built and
produced moderate amounts-a few grams-of
active materials. These plants were also used to
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gain further knowledge for the design of the largescale production plants. Three different kinds of
plants were developed, one for the production of
plutonium and two for the separation of the isotopes of uranium. The triple development was
considered necessary because it was not known
which of the methods would succeed, and succeed
in the shortest time possible. It caused much additional industrial and scientific effort as well as
added expense. In this second period, the Los
Alamos bomb laboratory was established, and the
design of the bomb was begun.
Period 3. The last period extended from J anuary, 1944, to the summer of 1945. During this
time the large plants for manufacturing bomb materials were completed and set in operation. The
development passed from the research and pilotplant stage to large-scale manufacture. The active material produced was used for experiments
to determine the size and other features of the
bomb, and the bomb design was completed. Bomb
research was handicapped by the fact that again
several lines of attack had to be followed, just as
in the development of production processes. Finally, in July, 1945, the test was made to show
the general feasibility of the bomb as well as the
soundness of the actual design.
We now reach a point at which it is possible
to formulate the problem concisely: How long
would it take for foreign countries, other than
those involved in the British Commonwealth, to
. go through each of the three stages de~cribed
above? The Axis Powers may be left out of
consideration. The most important countries are
undoubtedly Russia and France, but China or
Argentina (or a combination of South American
nations) may well be considered too. Also the
possibility exists that a highly developed small
nation like Sweden or Switzerland might make
common cause with a great power of lesser industrial development.
There is no doubt that many of these countries
have as much incentive to learn the facts about the
atomic bomb as we ever had. Whether a country
is justified in any apprehensions it may have is not
the problem; in a world of strong national sovereignties, war preparations are made for potential and often remote emergencies. There can be
no doubt that in the absence of international control of the atomic bomb, the Russians will try to
develop the bomb in the shortest possible time and

will devote a large share of their resources to this
end. France has already made public the fact that
she is starting an atomic-bomb project, with the
Sahara as the prospective testing ground and an
initial appropriation far greater than that made
in this country during the entire first period

( 1939-1941 ) .
Granting incentive, we may next ask about .availability of the scientific talent that will be needed.
The United States and Great Britain undoubtedly
contain a lion's share of the outstanding scientific
talent of the world at the present time. Moreover, this talent has had in the past six years very
good conditions under which to work. These two
facts explain why we succeeded in developing the
bomb in six and one-half years. It would be difficult to argue that any other nation or combination
of nations could have done the job faster if it had
started from the same point as we did in 1939.
On the other hand it would be equally difficult
to argue that no other country could have accomplished what we have in any period of time. In
the first place, Russia and France both have men
of outstanding ability. In the second place, it
should be recognized that during Periods 1 and
2, in which the major portion of our advance was
made, the principal work was in the hands of a
small number of people; that is, a large number
of good men is not an essential factor. It is almost
certain that the reason foreign nations did not proceed very far during the period between 1939 and
1945 (if in fact this is the case!) is because they
could not or did not devote full attention to the
matter. Russia was fighting for her life with only
a fraction of the equipment she needed; France
was occupied; Germany, which probably came closest to success, considered the war won in 1941 and
1942 and therefore did not pursue this long-range
development with vigor.
What about the availability of materials? The
initial work in this country w'as done on a modest
scale with facilities provided by universities. Facilities of this type can be found in all the nations
under discussion and many others. Pilot-plant
work, corresponding to the developments of Period 2, requires larger quantities of materials,
particularly uranium. This mineral is found in
appreciable quantity in St. J oachimethal in Czechoslovakia, and also in Russia, Sweden, and Norway,
not to speak of the large deposits in the Belgian
Congo. We may safely conclude that any nation
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engaging in the effort will have little difficulty in
procuring enough for pilot-plant work.
Considering the ubiquitous nature of uranium
it is hard to believe that a nation with the surface area of Russia, for example, could find difficulty in locating deposits of sufficient size to go
into large-scale production ultimately. This item
might be an obstacle to quantity production of
bombs in some smaller countries; however, it
would not prevent such nations from engaging in
the type of pilot-plant research that is designed
to lead to successful plants and bombs-and perhaps trading the results for a price. Moreover, if
uranium becomes a material of prime importance
to the life of a nation, it will become also more
precious than gold, and mining of very low-grade
ores will become profitable from the nat~onal point
of view. Gold is extracted commercially from
gravel containing as little as 0.3 part of gold per
million; the average uranium content of the earth~s
crust is believed to be about twenty times as large
as this, or 6 parts per million.
With respect to industrial capacity, many of the
countries mentioned are far advanced. True, the
scale of their production is not so large as ours,
but 2 billion dollars is by no means an excessive
sum for any of them in comparison with their national income in, let us say, five years. Moreover,
as we shall discuss below, it will probably be far
less expensive to repeat our development a second
time.
Some data collected by Dr. Lawrence Klein
of the University of Chicago show that in Sweden-to take one of the smallest of possible bomb ..
makers-the average annual gross output of plant
and equipment (that is, nonconsumption goods)
in the period 1925-1930 was 350 million dollars. Much of this was used for replacement of
old plant and equipment, but when the issue is
one of preparation for war, this factor can be
readily modified. During our own war-production
years, we managed to supply sufficient armaments
to the United Nations armies by not making the
customary replacements of our plant and equipment. Sweden, in the act of producing bombs,
could also consume capital in order to reach her
objective.
An all-out effort on the part of Sweden might
call for an average expenditure of 200 million dollars per year for five years. In terms of her 1925,1930 output, this would absorb 57 per cent of her

capacity to produce plant and equipment and only
10 per cent of her gross capacity to produce goods
and services of all types. These percentages are
very small as compared with those required by the
,var efforts of the United States, the Soviet Union,
Great Britain, Germany, etc. ' Such a program
would be a rather simple order for Sweden if she
really wanted atomic bombs.
Many Americans believe that the Russians, although capable of quantity production, are backward in the quality of their industries. The writers
should like to point out, as just one item bearing
on this point, that the Russians carried out an extensive tank program during the war and produced
in quantity a tank that was as good as the best German production and, in the writers' opinion, far
better than our own Sherman. This program must
have involved an effort comparable to that which
we put into the atomic bomb, from the standpoint
of both technology and production.
In coming to an estimate of the time required
for a foreign nation to produce the atomic bomb,
we must compare not only its resources with ours
but also its starting point with our starting point.
Any nation which begins working on the development of the atomic bomb at the present time starts
with far more knowledge than we possessed in
1939. The two major sources of information are,
first, knowledge that the bomb works and is suffi . .
ciently small to be easily transported by air; and
second, the Smyth report which contains some
rather specific data.
Consider first the advantages derived from
knowledge that the bomb works. Such knowledge
means that much of the groping and speculation
that was necessary during Period 1 of the three
periods discussed above is unnecessary. Thus, the
incentive for working very hard and on a large
scale from the start is provided immediately. The
greatest effort of Period 1 in our development was
devoted to obtaining scientific aid and financial
backing, and all this time ·can now be saved. Moreover, it is no longer necessary to depend upon the
vision and judgment of the men of rare genius.
Quite average scientists can appreciate the factors '
involved. Further, it becomes possible to reduce
the total time by starting all three phases of the
program at once. It is no longer necessary to
a wait the results of the first period of development
before deciding how much effort to risk on the
second and third periods.
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Consider next the Smyth report, which provides
detailed qualitative information on the general direction in which work can profitably be pushed.
With respect, for example, to the production of
plutonium, the Smyth report states that one can
expect to operate a reactor pile with the use of
natural uranium and a graphite moder'atar, even
though water, which absorbs neutr'ons and thereby
cuts efficiencY1 is allowed in the system as a coolant.
Moteover, it follows frotn the report that plutonium ptoduced during the reaction can be sepa ..
rated chemically and in sufficient purity for use in
a bomb. The report does not furnish precise information on the dimensions of the pipes and other
conduits used in the installation, nor does it describe in detail the methods used for chemical sepa ..
ration. However, men of a far lower order of
genius than those who planned the original work
could undoubtedly fill in the missing pages as long
as they are bolstered with the positive knowledge
that the entire program is feasible.
At a dinner table conversation during a recent
scientific meeting, a competent physicist who had
not been associated with any of the developmental
work on the bomb was heard to relate to another
physicist his inferences concerning the production
of plutonium and the general dimensions of the
atomic bomb, all of which he had drawn fr'om
reading the Smyth report. The agreement with
unpublished facts was remarkable. And it is safe
to say that there are at least twenty-five people in
each of the foreign countries under discussion who
could infer as much as he did from the Smyth
report.
Equally important is the information that ahy
one of three different processes will lead to suecess---the production of plutonium by the chain
reaction, the separation of uranium.. 235 by the
electromagnetic method and separation by the diffusion method. Any country starting now with
this knowledge can determine with relative ease
which of these processes is the cheapest and most
adapted to its own industrial facilities. That
means a very great saving in money, probably reducing necessary expenditures well below 1 billion
dollars. It means a substantial reduction ih industrial and scientific effort because all work tan be
concentrated on one line.
Wha t reduction in time results from all the
knowledge now available? The greatest reduction will, of course, occur in the first period of

d€velopment. This period required three years
for our own groupsf who worked for a large part
of this time without much financial support and
without the knowledge of ultimate success. Having this support and the information of the Smyth
report, it is difficult to imagine that men of the
quality of Auger and J oliot in France and Kapitza,
Landau; and Frenkel in Russia would require as
long as we to cover the same ground. Two years
could easily be sufficient for this period.
Regarding the second phase of the work, we
can say with safety that there is. now no risk in
beginning the plans for pilot-plant operation at
once. Detailed data for the production of such
units may not be available at the moment. However-if, for instance, it is decided to produce plutonium rather than to separate U-235-it is known
that uranium and graphite will have to be used in
quantity. As a result, work on the preparation
of these materials can begin at once. Here again
the Smyth report is very helpful because it indicates that a certain rather simple process for the
manufacture of uranium metal has been successfully used-a fact which took long to establish in
our own development. Similar preparatory work
can be done if one of the separation methods is
selected as the most suitable process. In either
caSe, a site can be chosen immediately for the ultimate location of the pilot units, and all necessary
preparations for servicing the units can be started.
Thus, perhaps a year after research in Period 1
has indicated the dimenSIons to be used in the pilot
units, these units can be functioning.
We cOrrie next to the question of large-scale
nianufatture. All the reasoning that has been appIled to pilot-plant production can be applied here
too. The proper sites for processing and purification of materials such as uranium and graphite can
be carried along with the corresponding work for
the pilot units. Some delay might be caused by the
development of a chemical process to separate plutonium from uranium, because such a process can
probably be found only after the pilot plants have
produced sufficient material to work with. Moreover, at this stage the high development of industry counts most, and other nations may require
more time than we did because their industry is
either in quality or in quantity behind ours. Even
so, we are probably putting the figure high if we
allow two years for this period, which is about
twice as long as the time we required. Adding this
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to the three years estimated for the completion of
periods 1 and 2, we conclude that manufacture of
plutonium or uranium-23 5 (or both) can be under
way in five years at the outside. It is clearly recognized, of course, that final manufacturing can be
carried out only by a nation that has suitable
sources of uranium.
Finally, we come to the all-important issue of
the design and construction of the bomb. The
design can start very early in the program, probably relatively earlier than in our own develop ..
ment. Basic information obtained during the first
two periods of development, through the pilotplant stage, will provide the necessary knowledge
about the bomb dimensions and methods that can
be used to detonate it. This information should
be available in about the fourth year, according to
our estimate, so that the theory of the bomb will
be clearly understood by the time the manufacturing units are beginning to yield the bqmb material.
With much of the bomb design done in advance,
it is unlikely that there will be any major delay
between manufacture of material and production
of the finished product. A year is certainly an outside limit. Altogether we have, therefore, a total
elapsed time of six years before bombs are available-slightly less than the time needed by us, in
spite of the fact that we have added a year to take
into account the supposedly lesser industrial development of other countries.
Thus we find that other nations will probably
be able to duplicate our development in about the
same time that we required. The Smyth report,
valuable mainly because it states that certain processes that would naturally occur to other scientists
were actually successful, will be a considerable help
in their program. The most importan~ fact, however, is that our entire program was successful.
Even if this bomb had not been demonstrated, it
would soon have become known that three major
factories 'w ere engaged in our program, of very
different appearance and with very different machinery, and that all continued to operate, showing
that there must be three different successful processes. Much of the most relevant information in
the Smyth report could thus have been deduced
from other evidence. The main secret was revealed, and the main incentive supplied, when the

first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima.
Many factors can enter in to reduce the required
time estimated here. For one thing, we have
adopted all along the somewhat provincial viewpoint that the nation engaging in the work will be
less effective than we have been, and this viewpoint
may be entirely unjustified. Also, it should be kept
in mind that work in one or another nation may
already be much farther along than external facts
would indicate. Finally, it must never be forgotten that men of genius in other countries may devise methods which are much superior to our own
and which would grea tly reduce the time involved;
our previous estimates have been based on the
assumption that a foreign nation would simply
copy our own pattern of attack.
To summarize, then, we are led by quite
straightforward reasoning to the conclusion that
anyone of several determined foreign nations
could duplicate our work in a period of about five
years. The skeptical or nationalistic individual
might at this point decide that such reasoning
should have little effect upon our foreign policy,
because it is possible that in five years we shall
be so far ahead of our present position that it will
not matter whether or not a foreign nation has our
present knowl~dge.
There are two very grave objections to this
viewpoint. In the first place, it is entirely possible
that a foreign nation will actually be ahead of us
in five years. In the second place, even if we have
more powerful bombs than they, our preferred
position will be greatly weakened. For it is an
unfortunate fact that present bombs are of sufficient strength, if used effectively and in sufficient
quantity, to paralyze our highly centralized industrial structure in the space of a single day. Any
store of more po,verful bombs in our arsenals
would be of little value unless we could use them
to prevent attack, and this seems to be a very
remote possibility. The existence of such bombs
might have an inhibiting effect in the sense that
the enemy would fear reprisals. However, if history provides any lesson, it is that fear of reprisal
has never prevented a war in which the chances
for quick victory are as great as they would be if
an adversary decided to strike rapidly and in full
strength with atomic bombs.
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one of A merica's most distinguished industrial scientists) was awarded the Nobel
Prize in chemistry in 1932. He is associate director
of the General Electric Research Laboratory. In
1945 he was one of a small group of U. S. scientists who attended the anniversary meeting of the
U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences.
IRVING LANGMUIR,

Chapter 10

An Atomic Arms Race and Its Alternatives
by I R V I N G LAN G M U I R

W

E now have atomic bombs and are accumulating materials that could be used for
making them. This program is going
ahead with a yearly expenditure of roughly 5 00
million dollars. It has been announced that Great
Britain is planning to produce atomic bombs. On
November 6, Molotov said, "We shall have
atomic energy, too, and many other things."
An atomic armament race has thus started that
brings insecurity to all nations. Yet everyone of
the United Nations desires future security more
than almost anything else. International control
of atomic energy and of materials used for atomic
weapons is thus of the utmost urgency. If a
method of control is not worked out, the only
alternative seems to be the development of an
atomic armament race which will undoubtedly end,
as all previous armament races have ended, in war.
Stages in an Atonlic Armament Race. I shall
attempt to analyze the successive stages in such an
. armament race. In the first stage the United
States alone will have atomic bombs and will accumulate a stockpile. Other nations will be preparing to make them. During this time we are in
a secure positlon. In the second stage one or
more other na-tions will have begun to produce
atomic bombs while the United States stockpile
may become so great that we will have e~ough
bombs to destroy practically all the cities of an
enemy country. During this period we are still
rela tively secure. During the third stage many
nations will have enough bombs to destroy practically all the cities of any enemy. During this
stage no nation is secure. Since an attack by any
nation would almost certainly be followed by
retaliation, any lasting advantage of a surprise
attack largely disappears.
If an atomic armament race continues long

enough, it is probable that discoveries will be made
by which the production cost of the bombs may be
greatly decreased, or new types of bombs may be
devised thousands of times more powerful. It has
been estimated that about 10,000 bombs of the
present type might destroy nearly all the cities of
the United States. The area covered, however,
would be about 100,000 square miles, which is
roughly 3 per cent of the area of the United
States.
During the fourth stage of the armament race,
atomic bombs or radioactive poisons distributed
over the country might destroy practically the
whole area of the country, so that no effective retaliation could be offered. The victor in such a w'ar
'would then have to dominate the whole world so
effectively that he could not be endangered by
other atomic bombs. The fourth stage in the
atomic armament race, if it is allowed to proceed
that far, will bring intolerable insecurity to most
nations, so that the nation which feels that it is
best prepared is almost forced to start a war to
avoid danger of complete destruction.
The rate at which nations can progress through
the four stages of the armament race depends not
only on the difficulties inherent in atomic-bomb
production but also, in very large part, on the
motivation: Just how much effort do the various
nations consider they can afford to make to attain
their objectives?
The incentives that would lead to the effort are
of two kinds: first, questions of prest.ige; second,
the intensity of the feeling of insecurity. Such
insecurity will probably ebb and flow according to
the international situation. The fact that iVe are
now the only nation possessing atomic bombs
means that during the early stages in the armament race other nations "viII act largely according
to their understandin~ and interpretation of
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American intentions. It is thus of particular signi1icance that in the Truman-Atlee-King declaration
of November 15, 1945, it w-as recognized that the
United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada
should "take an initiative in the matter."
Possible Atomic Developments in the USSR.
Undoubtedly, Great Britain and Canada are the
nations, outside the United States, that could first
build atomic bombs. Churchill has already said,
'''It is agreed that Britain should make atomic
bombs with the least possible delay and keep them
:in suitable safe storage."
But Russia, with her population of over 195
'm illion in an area of about 9 million square miles,
'also has enormous resources in men '(Ind materials.
During the years 1934-1940, Russia, instead of
following a policy of appeasement like that of
other nations, engaged in a vast program of miEtary preparation not for purposes of aggressian
but for defense against German aggression. . They
did this even though it meant holding the standard of living far below what would have otherwise
been possible. The military experts in 'Germany
and America greatly underestimated the Russian
military preparation, and they were taken by surprise at the power that Russia showed in driving
back the German armies from Stalingrad to Berlin. The Russians built remarkably good planes,
for many years holding the world's 'record for
long-distance flight. The efficiency of Russian
tanks compared with those of Germany and the
United States has already been pointed out ln
the preceding chapter.
. The cost of an atomic-bomb project like our
own would be smaJl indeed compared to the expenditures that Russia made in preparat10ns far fhe
recent war. Since atomic bombs are roughly ten
times cheaper than other 'w eapons in 'term of
·equal effectiveness, the over-an cost of even a
large atomic-bomb program might be much iess
than Russia would normally expect to devote to
~an army and navy of the conventional types.
The Russians give the impression of -b eing a
strong, rough, pioneering peop1e who are proud _
of their accomplishments during the rec.ent war.
Questions of prestige would, therefore, probably
playa strong part in stimulating them to 1earn to
control atomic energy. If the international situa·
tion develops in such a way that they feel increa'Sing insecurity, I believe that th
s ians might

launch a program for the development of atomic
bombs on a far greater scale than that likely to
be unq.ertaken by any other country. Russia can
mobilize her resources for such a program just as
she did in her preparations for the war with Germany, devoting 10 or even 20 per cent of her
capacity to a five- or ten-year plan. Before the
war the United States spent only about 0.04 per
cent of its national income for research in pure
science and 0.25 per cent for industrial research.
During the war total research expenditures, including the atomic bomb project, rose to perhaps 1.5
per cent.
In such an extensive project the efficiency of ,the
Russians might at first be low, but this would
increase rapidly and steadily as they progressed
with their plan, just as it has in all of their major
undertakings. They are quite used to big projects.
When I was in Russia recently, I was told of a
pilot plant, costing nearly 100 million dollars and
nearing completion, for the continuous operation
of a large blast furnace using oxygen instead of
air. Experimental runs that were made before this
plant was designed proved that a blast furnace of
a given size gave about five times the output when
oxygen was substituted for air. A 2-billion-dollar
project was under consideration for converting the
whole steel industry of Russia, which would result
in a large saving in the cost of steel and iron.
If an armament race continues, I believe the
Russians may- reach stage two (that is, they will
have begun to produce bombs) within about -three
yea\fs. Thereafter, however, there is a d-el1nite
possibility that Russia may accumulate atomic
bombs far faster than we do, so that they m:ay get
to stages three ,or £our even before we do. The
advantages they have in such a race aTe
1. They have a large populatIOn; it can be reglmented and i willing to sacrifice living standara-s
fc:rr a long-range defense program.
2. They have a r.emarkable system of incentives,
which is :rapidly increasing the efficiency of fheir
industrial production.
3. They have no unemployment.
4. They have no strikes.
5. TQey have a deep appreciation of pure and a.pplied science and have placed a high priority on
it.
6. They have already planned a far more extensive
program in science than is contemplated by any
other nation.
/
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Russian Scientists. The rapidity with which a
large-scale atomic-bomb project could develop in
Russia, given incentives of the kind mentioned
above and failing control mechanisms, would ulti-.
mately depend upon her ability to train scientists.
It has recently been stated that there are now in
Russia 790 universities and that the number of
students has been increasing steadily in spite of the
war. They believe that their educational methods
have improved very greatly. I was told, for
example, that they discovered during the war that
they could train skilled workers for industry in a
far shorter time than was previously thought
possible.
Even so, many people have believed that Russia
has not a sufficient number of scientists nor the
educational facilities for the training of scientists
and has not sufficient skilled labor to build atomic
bombs within a reasonable time. General Groves,
for example, in his testimony before the Atomic
Energy Committee of the Senate, thought it might
take Russia as long as twenty to sixty years to
build atomic bombs.
I had an opportunity to become familiar with
some branches of scientific development in Russia
by attending the meetings in Moscow and Leningrad in June, 1945, held in ·commemoration of the
220th anniversary of the founding of the Academy
of Sciences of the U.S.S.R.
The plenary meetings of the Academy, which
were held in large opera houses with about 3,000
people present, were devoted to general papers on
the history of science in Russia and in other countries and on selected subjects of wide general interest. More than 100 foreign scientists had been
invited to attend these meetings. Most of our
time during the eighteen days in Moscow an~
Leningrad was spent in conferring with scientists
in some of the seventy-eight institutes of the Acad~
emy. I visited several institutes, particularly in
the fields of chemistry and physics. I found that
the Russian scientists talked freely about their
work and showed me through their laboratories. I
was much impr essed by the friendliness of all of
these men and by their wholehearted devotion to
science. They were all clearly working on prob.
lems that had been planned by scientists without
undue political control. In fact, they had been
able during the war to carryon scientific work of
a kind that would have been impossible in the
United States. A great deal of the work was of

long-range character, often planned to lay sound
foundations for postwar industrial developments.
They had been able to defer men from active mili·
tary service for such work.
Among the men whom I met, there was clearly
a desire for a long period of peace and security.
Their plans indica ted that they hoped and believed
that this would be possible. During the years
from 1934-1940 there had been a great feeling
of insecurity, for they said they all felt the danger
of German aggression. In June, 1945, they showed
great relief at having reached the end of this
period of insecurity: The ,var against the axis
powers had been won. They were planning to
repair the damage in the devastated areas but
expected at the same time to lay the foundations
for a future standard of living as high as or
higher than that in the United States. Science,
pure and applied, was to playa dominant role in
this program. The building of the Academy of
Sciences had recently been renovated and im-·
proved, but I was shown plans for a new building
at least five or ten times larger than the present
one.
The social position of scientists in Russia, as
well as the provision of summer homes, automobiles, etc., are held out as incentives for men to
become leaders. At the meeting of the Academy
abo~t 1,400 honors were given; for example, 13
scientists received the Hero of Socialist Labor,
the highest honor; 196 received the Order of
Lenin, which only a few weeks ago was given to
Molotov. An article entitled "Science Serves the
People," which appeared in the Moscow News at
this time, contained the following:
... Never before has the scientist been accorded such
attention by the state and such esteem by society
as in the Soviet Union . • .
. . . The state provides the maximum amenities for
rf and facilities for work to the scientist and assures
a comfortable life to his family after his death . . .

I t is extraordinary that this meeting of the
Academy was held only about a month after the
end of the war in Europe. The lavishness of the
entertainment-for example, a banquet for 1,1001
people in the Kremlin with Stalin in attendanceand Molotov as toastmaster-showed the importance the Russians attach to science. In all the
speeches great emphasis was laid on the international character of science. It was stated that
s ientists the world over had always cooperated
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with one another, national antagonisms playing
no role. Hope was expressed that in other fields
nations might learn to cooperate in a similar way.
The use of the atomic bombs in August against
Japan must have come as a great shock. Most of
the Russians probably felt that the security that
they thought they had reached was suddenly
ended, and they were brought to a state of insecurity like that of the years 1934-1940. I believe
that the difficulty in reaching international agreements with Russia before the Moscow conference
was caused by a natural reaction arising from their
disappointment regarding future security.
,¥e can better understand Russian doubts about
our policy of holding atomic bombs as a "sacred
trust" by asking ourselves: What would American public opinion no,,, be if we had had no atomicenergy development, but if near the end of the
war, atomic bombs had been dropped on Berlin
by the Russians without adequate consultation?
Would our insecurity be entirely relieved if the
Russian government, a few months later, had
announced that it held an increasing stockpile of
a tomic bombs as a sacred trust?
The declaration of November 15 holds out the hope that
through the United Nations Organization there
may be established "an atmosphere of reciprocal
confidence in which political agreements and cooperation will flourish".
A basis for cooperation and for ultimate world
control of the atomic bomb may be sought by considering, first, matters of common agreement:
No nation desires world conquest, each desires
security, freedom from unemployment, better conditions for labor, and, in general, a higher standard of living for its people. Many other points
of agreement can be found.
There are serious difficulties in world control.
We must take into account that Russia and the
United States do not understand each other very
well. We don't like their form of government
and they don't like ours. They don't like our
strikes and unemployment, and we don't like their
control of the press and public opinion. They find
many statements in our newspapers that they know
are false, but apparently we wish to believe these
statements. The Russian newspapers attribute
everything they don't like ab ut Alnerica to the
control by capitalists, plutocrats, or the bourBasis of Agreement with Russia.

geolsle~

They say that they have the only true
democracy, but we say they have no democracy at
all. Under such conditions it is hard to allay fears
.o r distrust.
Nations differ fundamentally in their forms of
government. They can agree, however, to recognize the right of each to its own form of government within its own borders. Disagreements have
arisen of late regarding the governments established in conquered and liberated countries.
General policies for the United States have been
proposed in the Four Freedoms and in the Atlantic Charter. The first of the Four Freedoms given
by President Roosevelt in January, 1941, is "freedom of speech and expression ... everywhere in
the world." In the Atlantic Charter proposed by
President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill
there are eight articles. The second article states
tha tour nations "desire to see no territorial
changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned." The
third declares that they "respect the right of all
people to choose the form of government under
which they will live, " and they wish "to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those
who have been forcibly deprived of them."
There is a general American belief, which
makes it hard for other nations to cooperate with
us, that world problems can be solved by slogans
or idealized principles even when 'these are really
not applicable to concrete situations. The troubles
caused by applying some of our ideals to other
nations can be understood by considering the differences in meanings attached to democracy and
the freedom of the press in the United States and
in Russia.
In referring to democracy the Russians are apt
to use a standard phraseology. A good example
is given by the following quotation from an article entitled "Soviet Democracy," by Professor V.
Baushko, published in the Soviet News, November
3,1945:
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There can be no consistent democracy in bourgeois
countries-not even in those of them whose constitutions proclaim these rights. Wherever society is
divided between the exploit~d and the exploiters,
there can be no equality•••. There can be no freedom of speech, press or association for the toilers if
print shops and paper and even meeting halls belong
to the bourgeoisie. . ..
In the USSR, on the other hand, all governmental
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power belongs to the people, exploitation of man by
man has been done away with, there are no classes
of exploiters, democratic rights and liberties are
guaranteed by the Socialist economy .•. racial and
class hatred has been eradicated and supplanted by
friendship in relations of the peoples, while scienc'e
and culture have been placed at the service of the
people.

We believe that in the Balkan states and in
Japan the peoples should have dem~cratic forms
of government, and Russia seems to agree to this.
However, in Japan we pattern the proposed
democracy after our own, but we do not agree
that Russia should pattern the governments of
the conquered and liberated Balkan States in
accordance with her conception of democracy. If
we are to get along with other nations that have
different ideals, we cannot insist that our concepts
of freedom and democracy shall prevail everywhere. Such matters involve compromise and
wise statesmanship. They are not to be settled
by means of slogans.
The freedom of the press is another point in
which ,ve differ from Russia. The following is a
quotation from Molotov's report of November
6, 1945, on the occasion of the twenty-eighth anni.
versary of the October Revolution:
The strength of the Soviet system lies in its closeness to the people. As distinct from parliamentary
democracy, Soviet democracy is truly popular in
character. Therefore, the Soviet state, as a state
of a new type, has tasks which are not inherent in
states of the old type. Thus, the duties of the Soviet
state include the political education of the Soviet
people in the spirit of safeguarding the interests of
world peace, in the spirit of establishing friendship
and cooperation among the peoples, which . . • calls
for the exposure of all attempts to prepare a new
aggression and the regeneration of fascism. • • •
Under the Soviet Constitution it is a crime to preach
hatred among nations, antisemitism, etc., just as
praising of crime, robbery, and violence against man
is forbidden in our press. Such "restrictions" are
as natural under Soviet democracy as things quite
opposite are unfortunately natural for some other
states. In some countries freedom of speech and
press are still interpreted in such a way that mercenary servants of fascism do not even have to don
masks in order to carryon unbridled propaganda for
aggres ion and fascism . . . .

It is clear that the Russians have a radically
different concept of the freedom of the press from

that which is current in America. We certainly
cannot demand, in accord with the first of the
Four Freedoms, that our kind of freedom of the
press shall exist "everywhere in the world." The
Russians would see no reason why their ideas
on this subject should not apply to the Balkan
states if ours are to prevail in Japan.
Americans often have no confidence in the Russian press because it is government controlled, but
we fail to recognize that a great deal of distorted
news is introduced into our papers even by propaganda agencies with malicious intent. A good
example was the statement in our papers, reiterated by Secretary Stettinius at the San Francisco
Conference, that sixteen Poles representing the
Polish government in London had been invited
to Russia for a conference and had then been
arrested and were being held for trial. This sta tement was later denied by Stettinius. Ambassador
Harriman in Moscow told us that the sixteen
Poles had not been invited to Moscow for a conference but were arrested in Poland for distributing arms for use against the Russians. I attended
some of the sessions of the trial of the sixteen
Poles. I believe that they had a fair trial. Many
of them were acquitted. The maximum penalty
was ten years' imprisonment. The defendants
were proud of their actions against Russia, and
one of them said that he was willing to fight
against Russia if necessary to help Poland acquire
an outlet to the Black Sea. I have never found
anyone in America who had heard the denial of
the original false story. It was probably published inconspicuously. Such unfairness produces
a bad effect on our relationships with Russia.
It is highly desirable that there sh-ould be frank
discussions between the Russian government and
the American government regarding the troublesome effects caused by differences between our concepts of democracy and freedom of the press. One
cause for the lack of mutual understanding between the United States and Russia is the fact that
so few people of each nation travel in the other.
It was pointed out recently by Edgar Snow that
there are only 260. Americans in Russia ,and about
2,000 people carrying Russian passports in the
United States. The facilitation of travel between
the two countries would help greatly. It is encouraging to find that Molotov in his address
of November 6 recognized the desirability of this
intercourse. He said, "Acquaintance with the life
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of other nations would certainly be a benefit to our
people and would broaden their outlook."
Removal of restrictions on the circulatlon of
American newspapers and periodicals in Russia
and Russian articles in the United States will make
for much better relations. We must remember
that in our country anyone who talks too much
about Russia or approves of Russian practices is
liable to be "investigated" by the House Commit..
tee on Un-American Activities. A very hopeful
sign was Russia's recent invitation to newspaper
correspondents to visit all parts of Russian ..occupied terri tory.
One of the recommendations made in the N 0vember 16 declaration was that we should exchange scientists and scientific information among
nations. Russia started such action in June, 1945,
by inviting about 120 foreign scientists to Russia
and giving them full information regarding scientific work.
Russia publishes a majority of its important
scientific papers in English as well as in Russian.
They have started to teach English to all school
children in Russia and even in Siberia. Russians
are inveterate readers and, if they can read English books and journals, a big step toward better
understanding will be reached.
Problems of Inspection. An interchange of scien-

tists would also pave the way for effective methods
of inspection, which will probably be needed for an
effective world control. Dr. Szilard ,vrites about
this in detail in a later chapter, but I should like
to note some particular aspects of it here.
I believe that if there is a sincere desire for
security on the part of all nations, there will be a
universal insistence on an effective inspection system. This could involve the inspection of sources
of uranium, and, of course, the inspection of factories making materials used for atomic energy.
It was pointed Qut by Bernard Brodie (The
Atomic Bomb and American Security, published

,by the Yale Institute of International Studies,
1945) and again emphasized strongly by Dr. U rey
in his testimony before the Senate Committee on
Atomic Energy that inspection would be very
much facilitated if large-scale plants for making
U-235 or plutonium for power purposes did not
exist.
The greatest peacetime benefits to be derived
from our new knowledge of nuclear reactions will
probably come from its indirect effect in speeding
up progress in science leading to great discoveries
in biology, chemistry, and physics. These benefits
can probably be obtained by small-scale production of radioactive substances by one or two piles.
Large-scale use of atomic power would involve
the production of materials that could be quickly
converted to use in the atomic bombs. This would
present very serious inspection problems. The
commercial use of atomic power as a substitute for
coal and oil will fOI many years be a rna tter of
trivial importance as compared to the dangers
that might result in the existence of atomic bombs.
It would, therefore, be desirable to destroy all
atomic bombs, all large plants for making them,
and all reserves of elements of U-235 and plutonium if these should prove serious stumbling
blocks in reaching effective world control and
necessary inspection.
It has been proposed that stockpiles of atomic
bombs should be turned over to the Security Council of the United Nations Organization. It is hard
to conceive that a reserve of atomic bombs would
serve any useful purpose. The atomic bomb is not
a police weapon.
If a step.by..step process finally brings the envisioned effective control of atomic weapons, world
confidence will grow and a mechan' sm will then
exist by which other weapons may be outlawed or
controlled. We may some day come to regard
the atomic bomb as the discovery that made it
possible for mankind to bring an end to all war.
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Chapter 11

How Does It All Add Up?
By HAROLD C. UREY

D

URING the nineteenth century the elements and techniques of mass production
were developed. They have been improved and exploited for peaceful purposes during
this century and especially in this country, until
toda y nearly everything we use is produced by
mass methods. Without these methods the high
standard of living in the United States would be
impossible, and with them a high standard of living is possible in all countries of the world that
ha ve reasonable resources. During the present
century many scientific and engineering discoveries
have been made that contribute to ·this high standard of living.
Also, unfortunately, mass-production methods
and scientific discoveries have been used for purposes of war. In order to apply these methods
and discoveries to a given purpose, we must have
an opportunity to practice them. The First World
War gave the first opportunity for adaptation of
mass production to purposes of war. But it was
only an elementary course in the art of mass de ..
struction. The Second W or ld War gave the
opportunity for the advanced course, and by the
end of it the lessons were thoroughly learned.
Today we have the scientific knowledge, the en·
gineering talent and experience, and the industrial
know-how to make war on a real mass-production
basis. Another war would differ from this past
one in the same degree as a modern automobile
differs from the Model T Ford, or perhaps a horse
and wagon. Another war ,vould be so successful
from the point of view of destruction that little
of the physical and human bases of our civilization
would be left. For our scientific and mass tech·
niques now include the atomic bomb and probably
other weapons not yet come to the attention of the
general public.
The particular weapons that concern us here

include the airplane, the pilotless flying bomb
(V-I), the rocket bomb (V-2), and the atomic
bomb. It is possible that other methods suitable
for delivering the atomic bomb may be partially
developed and as yet unknown to the public. Still
other methods may be developed in the future.
Only the B-29 bomber was used in this war fot
the delivery of the atomic bomb, but the combination of these two weapons made conditions intolerable to Japan. In the future these weapons, produced on a mass-production basis, will make war
intolerable to all peoples of the world. This does
not mean that war will not come. It does mean
that the war will probably not be of long duration
because of the vast destruction that will be quickly
and decisively accomplished.
Let us review the facts in regard to the atomic
bomb as we see them today and as the preceding
chapters of this book have laid them before us.
The atomic' bomb, because of its overwhelming
increase in effectiveness, which makes all defenses
known or foreseeable nearly useless and completely
ineffective, is not best regarded as just another
weapon. In the past many new weapons have been
invented, and in many cases they have added
greatly to the effectiveness of the attack as compared to the defense. But our present defenses
against atomic bombs are about as effective as a
Roman army armed with spears, javelins, and
shields would be against a modern army equipped
with machine guns. Within a few years the atomic
bomb carried by modern airplanes has increased
the advantage of attack by about as much as was
accomplished in a thousand years in the past.
These weapons can destroy all defenses that we
can devise at the present time.
Dr. Ridenour, in Chapter 7, has reviewed in
detail this question of defense against the ~tomic
bomb. Still, many people believe that there will
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always be a defense for every weapon. There will
always be an exception to such glib rules. But is
the statement true in any sense that is of interest
to us? Is there a defense against bullets? Per,haps, but they killed many men in this past war.
Is there a defense against submarines? Yes, defi·
nitely. But they destroyed a large fraction of
the world's shipping during this past war. Is
there a defense against airplanes? Certainly defenses are known, but only the United States
among the major combatants of the Second World
War escaped serious damage or nearly complete
destruction of its cities. Similar answers to similar
questions could be made with respect to tanks,
naval vessels, and other weapons great and small.
Weapons disappear from war if they are superseded by more effective weapons, but so long as
they are used in war they produce actual damage
in spite of defenses and in a rather definite proportion to their ability to inflict damage. When
more destructive weapons than atomic bombs are
developed, atomic bombs will not be used; but
so long as they are used, they will continue to
destroy many square miles of cities for each bomb
exploded. Perhaps a question points the argument. Can any of us imagine a defense so effective that, sometime in the future, a country such as
the United States would decide not to manufacture atomic bombs because defenses against them
made their manufacture inadvisable for purely
military reasons? I think not. If atomic bombs
are not made in the future, it will be for other
reasons than the effectiveness of defense. No military defense exists, and none can be devised.
Atomic bombs are able to destroy the cities of the
world and they will do so, if used in another war.
This thesis assumes that atomic bombs can be
made in sufficient numbers and at costs sufficiently
low to be used effectively in another war. Unfortunately both assumptions are correct. Our mass..
production methods, which give us our high standard of living, our automobiles, power phints,
chemical products, electrical devices, etc., make'
possible the production of atomic bombs in large
numbers and at low cost. In fact, war will be
cheaper in the future so far as the production and
use of weapons are concerned and far more expensive from the point of view of destruction accomplished. Even small countries can make these
bombs in numbers if they are such utter fools as
to engage in the lethal business. They will not,

because they know that they would be completely
destroyed if bombs were used. It is only powerful
industrialized countries that may not realize that
before this weapon all countries are small and
weak. Before the past war small countries realized that they must get along with their neighbors.
The cheapness of the atomic weapon relative to
its destructive power makes it necessary that all
countries get along with each other.
The question is asked: Can other countries be ..
sides England and the United States produce these
bombs? And the answer is: Of course they can.
What weapon ever devised by man remained the
sole possession of the country of origin? The
production of atomic bombs was a tricky, intricate
business, but so is the production of tanks, airplanes, and other major weapons 0 f war. The
United States is the greatest industrial power at
the present time and could and did make these
weapons faster than any other country. But it is
nonsense for us to assume that other countries cannot learn all the details of their production and, in
fact, improve on the methods. If the people of the
United States or England believe otherwise, they
engage in the most dangerous of delusions.
How long will it take other countries to devise
these weapons? Estimates vary. Most 'scientific
and technical men who helped to produce the
bombs guess between five and ten years; a few
think less and some think more. Drs. Seitz and
Bethe give convincing reasons for their estimate
of six years or less in Chapter 9. It is to be
hoped that the time will be large rather than
small, since that would give more time for a solution of the whole problem.
Some have suggested that the United States
would be safe if it were to keep ahead of other
countries in the development and production of
atomic weapons. It is not certain that this country
could succeed in this a ttempt over any great length
of time and certainly not for all time, for others
will surely come abreast of us-and perhaps in
less time than we think. But let us look more
closely at the suggestion. Supposing that the
United States remains ahead of other countries
in number or effectiveness of bombs, what good
does it do us? Do e plan to attack other countries at a favorable moment? Following such an
attack, it would be necessary to occupy the countries with our armies in order to prevent the manufacture of bombs in the future. Some 7 per cent
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of the world's population would have to keep its
feet on the necks of the rest of the world's peoples.
It does not seem likely that we would choose this
role voluntarily, with a full understanding of its
responsibility and hardships let alone other ·considera tions.
La ter, ,vhen other countries secure enough
atomic bombs to destroy the cities and other appropriate targets of this country, we would be in a
position to destroy their cities, and it 'would do us
no good whatever to have bombs enough to destroy those targets more than once. Extra bombs
would be useless once sufficient numbers were
available to destroy all large military targets of
any possible enemy. If our hypothetical enemy had
sufficient bombs to destroy our military targets,
in what way could we keep ahead of this enemy?
Atomic bombs are different. Enough can be made
to destroy completely all possible targets and kill
the inhabitants of all major cities of any country.
I t is then impossible to destroy them twice or to
kill people twice. Eventually, therefore, we cannot hope to keep ahead of other countries in an
atomic war.
We turn to defensive measures again and specifically to the dispersal of cities and going underground. This appears to be the only effective
defense that anyone has proposed as yet, and it is
only a palliative, only a way of moderating the
effects of an attack. The cost of such dispersal
would be high, on the order of the cost of the
Second World War to us, for the actual translocation of dwellings, industries, and transportation
facilities. Dispersal would also impair the efficiency of our industrial system, since industries are
usually placed where they are because of economic
advantages, such as natural transportation facilities and availability of power or raw materials.
In many manufacturing processes concentration is
often of great advantage; for many industries it
IS necessary.
The psychological problems associated with the
dispersal of cities would be great. Many of us,
and perhaps most of us, for one reason or another
like the places and conditions under which we live,
though you and I may not understand why others
do so. Dispersal would affect each of us in a very
direct manner. Agreement to carry through such
a program would never be unanimous, and possibly the decision in regard to it would rest on a
mere rna jority, with a determined minority vigor-

ously opposed to it. Proposals have been made
that dispersal could and should be achieved in fifteen years; this seems too short a time, though in
the face of the threat under which we all may live,
we may decide to carry it through. It would probably require a dictatorship for its execution. And
in the end it would not be a definite and decisive
defense, for if somewhat larger bombs were
secured a determined enemy could destroy our
economy and our people just the same. The
atomic bomb is a very effective and inexpensive
weapon and will probably become more effective
and less expensive with time.
Perhaps critical plants could be placed underground, but to what purpose? This would not
prevent the destruction of the people above
ground, and if military plants and installations
cannot protect the citizens of a country, what are
they for and why prevent their destruction? If
the Navy, Army, Air Forces, and atomic bombs
cannot protect the citizens of a country and their
property, who cares whether or not the military
forces can protect themselves?
This book is concerned primarily with the military threat of atomic energy rather than with its
peacetime uses, but such possible uses have a bearing on the military applications. Radioactive materials for medical uses can be secured without
large plants containing large amounts of fissionable materials, for example, U-235 or plutonium.
However, atomic power plants must necessarily
contain sufficient of these materials to make bombs.
Undetected diversion of these materials for use
in bombs might be comparatively easy, since all
chemical plants lose some material and losses vary
from plant to plant. Records could be falsified
comparatively easily, if those operating the plants
were determined on such falsification. A much
more extensive inspection system would be needed
to prevent diversion of material in operating
plants than would be necessary to prevent the
construction of these plants. The possibility of
diversion would not be conducive to confidence on
the part of the peoples of the world. And since
confidence in. the operation of world control of
. atomic bombs is so vitally important, everything
should be done to promote it first. If proper
controls could be secured and confidence established, the operation of power plants could then
be considered.
Let us cons.ider briefly what wo.u ld be IQst if no.
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large-scale power plants were operated in any
country until world control had been established
on such a basis that reasonable confidence could
be assured. Chapter IV revie'ws this situation in
detail, and from that discussion we cannot truth..
fully contend that the immediate use of atomic
power is of very great economic importance. In
any case, atomic power would first and most logically be used in locations where there are no other
sources of energy-for example, in northern Canada, the Amazon River Basin, and other such
places where oil and coal are not found. Ships
might use atomic power to avoid refueling and
the storage of fuel, but this will probably not be
economical for some time.
Naval vessels might be more likely consumers
of atomic energy than other ships, since the economic factor is not important. However, if we
plan to build and operate such naval vessels, we
are deciding to prepare for further wars. To be
logical we should then oecide to make bigger and
better atomic bombs, for others will use these
bombs if we threaten to use naval vessels or other
implements of war against them. If atomic power
is developed for naval vessels, the world will inevitably slip back into the atomic-bomb armament
race and the whole problem moves back to the use
of, and defense against, these bombs. Control
of atomic bombs must inevitably lead to the control of all weapons of war. It is foolish to think
of controlling only atomic-bomb manufacture and
then to let wars start and continue with other
weapons until atomic-bomb plants can be put into
operation in order to finish the wars. Nothing
less than the total abolition of war will prevent
their use. In particular the use of atomic power
for naval vessels would complicate the control
of the military use of atomic energy and, it is
hardly necessary to add, almost certainly prevent
that degree of confidence so necessary for control.
The postponement of the use of atomic energy
for large power plants would make for 'easier con..
trol of the atomic bomb. It is a small price to
pay for the accomplishment of this most desirable
end. I t would not be necessary to postpone the
use of radioactive materials at the same time.
Freedom versus an Atomic Armament R~ce.

The citizens of the United States are justly proud
of the personal freedom they enjoy. It has been
celebra ted in song and speech from the beginning

of the republic. It is referred to in the first sentence of our Declaration of Independence. It has
been continuously lauded in public addresses
throughout the land on all public occasion·s. It
has always been imperfect, with violations of its
principles at some time in the lives of most individuals and, in some sections of the population,
throughout their lives. But our personal freedom, considering the number of people in the
country and the length of time over which it has
existed, represents a very large fraction of all
such freedom that has existed in the whole history
of mankind.
There are many circumstances that have led to
this condition. The traditions of the early pioneers who settled the country should be remembered. Politically freedom began with the English Magna Charta. But in this country people
have attained freedom mostly sooner and to a
greater extent than have their blood brothers of
Europe. In very large degree this has been due
to safety from external aggression provided by
the broad expanse of the Atlantic Ocean, behind
which we have been able to solve our internal
problems without being crushed by a foreign power even during a long and disabling Civil War.
With improvements in transportation and particularly with the discovery and development of
air transportation, isolation due to our water defense has disappeared. Today it no longer exists.
Twice in this century this country has believed
that it was forced to defend itself and its vital
interests by sending its sons to fight in Europe and,
in this past war, in Asia as well. The same has
been true of other similarly situated countries,
such as Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.
With the advent of modern airplanes, and now
atomic bombs, all natural defenses of all countries
of the world have disappeared. Rivers, mountains, and oceans are of no value as defenses now
and never will be again. With the obliteration of
these defenses, the freedom of this country will
be seriously threatened, and, in fact, the threat
has already begun. From our beginnings we have
known the extent of our armed forces. Today we
and our elected representatives do not know the
extent of these forces. Atomic bombs are being
manufactured in an amount unknown to us, and
these bombs represent an armament equivalent to
a Navy, a large Army, or a large Air Force. Even
Congress does not know the extent of this power,
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wbich represents a threat to other countries and
has an important effect on the relations of this
country to other countries.
If an atomic armament rate continues-it is
already going on-the citizens of the country will
know less and less in regard to vital questions of
this kind and finally must accept decisions in re ..
gard to public affairs blindly and from a few men
in power. Not knowing the size of its armament.,
the people of the country must trust men in Washington with important decisions previously made
through their elected representatives. Men on
horseback will rapidly appear on the public scene.
Note the attempt to secure the passage of the
May-Johnson Bill without proper hearings in
Congress. Here was a bill originating in the War
Department, which proposed to transfer all COlltrol over atomic energy to a few men who would
be safeguarded in their acts from all scrutiny by
the public through security provisions backed by
the most drastic penalties. If that bill or any
similar bill passes Congress and is signed by the
President, the first abdication of the sovereign
rights of the people of the United States will have
occurred. The May-Johnson Bill was actually
similar in intent and effect to the transfer of power
from the German Reichstag to Hitler, though, of
course, it would not have so completely destroyed
representative government in one act. Many
people did not realize the broad and tragic meaning of this bill. It was a definite beginning of the
end of our representative government and of the
Bill of Rights of our Constitution.
Wl;y have these things occurred? The answer
is fear. The atomic bomb is such a grave threat
to all men in all countries that frantic and desperate means of handling the problem have been
proposed. If the armament race continues, more
and more such things will occur . We become
afraid, and we destroy the freedom of science. We
fear other countries and conceal the number of
our atomic bombs. We fear that bombs will be
smuggled into our cities and that we will have to
introduce secret police to detect such bombs. We
fear attacks on our cities and may disperse them
regardless of the desires of the people of those
cities and of the people of the countryside to which
they are moved. We fear sudden attack from
without and will transfer the right to declare war
from Congress to a single man, and that man, who ..
ever he may be, will be affected by that power. He

will become a dictator. Absolute power corrupt
absolutely.
The same trend will occur in all countries of
the world, and the end will be deadly fear every..
where. But of all the countries of the world, the
most industrialized countries will be the most vulnerable and the most likely to be attacked by
atomic bombs~ These weapons stopped the Second
World War, and at the same time they ended the
defenses of the United States. They also threaten
our liberties.
But why shudder before these fears? Should
we not vigorously grasp the situation and take •
the offensive? The United States might ally with
itself as many countries of the world as possible
and lead them to conquest of the remainder. In
such an undertaking this country would have to
supply most of the men and materials. It is a
very great effort that would be required, with
much sacrifice. Assuming the will to do it, and
ultimate success, this nation would become the
most hated country on earth, and the hatred would
last for a century and perhaps more. Throughout
all that time constant vigilance would be required
to prevent rebellion in conquered lands. Our
people would become brutalized, as the conquering
always have. It is not a pleasant solution, and,
our traditions being what they are, it would be
impossible to secure the will and determination
required of our people to carry the program
through to the end. Though all proposals for the
solution of the atomic bomb are difficult, I believe
that this is the most impossible of all.
The advent of the atomic bomb has caused endless confusion in the thinking of men, and the confusion spreads to more people as they come to
realize all the implications of this weapon. What
do the facts add up to ?
The people of the world have in their hands a
weapon of transcending size and destructiveness.
The knowledge of the existence of this weapon and
the methods of its production can never be lost.
It can never again be returned to the realm of the
unknown. Bombs can be made in large numbers
-and cheaply. There is no defense against them.
They can destroy physically beyond our ability to
comprehend. Fear of them will destroy our liberties. To take the offensive and attempt to dominate the world would wreck our whole lives and
those of generations to come.
Civilizations have risen and fallen repeatedly
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in the history of the world. We all recall such
examples as the Babylonian Empire, the ancient
Egyptian civilization, the Roman Empire; and,
on this hemisphere, the empires of the Incas and
the Mayans. It is to be expected that the future
will see rises and falls, too. Modern technological
war as developed by the European civilization of
which we are a part may cause its complete disintegration. A world war in which atomic weapons

are used might very well weaken all of our countries and peoples to such an extent that they would
not be able to survive in the future. And not only
may our own culture be destroyed by these weapons of mass destruction, but all civilizations as they
exist in the world Tllay be retarded and weakened
for centuries to come.
It all adds up to the most dangerous situation
that humanity has ever faced in all history.

Note

-The authors of the different chapters in the first part of this book have tried
to set forth the facts about the atomic bomb and to describe the grave situation in
which these facts have placed us. How can the menace of the bomb be removed?
This is a question not only for physical scientists but for all the people of the
world. The statesmen, the experts in inte rnational affairs, in government, in political economy, in all the social sciences must speak out, and their proposals must
be discussed and weighed in a great public debate.
The problem of how to avert atomic disaster is still very new. We can hardly
expect that more than tentative solutions can be brought forth at this time, or that
even these will be detailed and concrete. In the following chapters some general
approaches to the problem are presented. They will be found to differ with each
other and on some points to be diametrically opposed. But they can serve as starting points for fruitful discussion and debate. The points of view set forth are not
necessarily subscribed to by the other au thors. It is fair to say, however, that all
the authors are united in desiring "one world" and that all urge fair and careful
consideration of the proposals made here for achieving it.-THE EDITORS.
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Can W e Avert an Arms Race
by an Inspection System?
by

C

ONFLICTS in interest between great
powers can be expected to arise in the
future as they have arisen in the past, and
there is no world authority in existence that can
adjudicate the case and enforce the decision if the
powers are unable to settle their differences. In
the absence of a world authority, conflicting interests could perhaps still be adjusted on an equitable
basis by direct negotia tion if there were universally
accepted principles of law and justice to which the
parties could appeal. But as yet there is no such
universal acceptance of general principles. Instead
negotiations take place in the shadow of the military might that the great powers can muster. In
this situation the great powers are inevitably
driven to power politics and so long as such is the
state of the world the danger of war will exist.
Against this background the existence of atomic
bombs creates a new hazard for war. If two countries-and let the hvo most powerful, the United
States and Russia, serve as examples-accumulate
large stockpiles of atomic bombs, war is likely to
break out, even though neither country has wanted
to go to war.
How far can we go towards averting the danger of such an arms race under present conditions
-that is, without assuming changes in the general
organization of peace that we now have under the
United Nations Organization?
If the United States and Russia were to agree
to an arrangement ruling out both stockpiles and
manufacture of atomic bombs within the territory
of either country, it appears very likely that such
an arrangement would be acceptable to all other
major powers of the world and could be extended
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to them, or at least to all nations whose voluntary
collaboration would be necessary.
If the United States, Russia, and other nations
actually set up such an arrangement, ap. atomic
arms race could be postponed and probably
averted, provided that it is possible to rule out
secret violations. Until there is a world authority
capable of enforcing observance among the great
powers, it will probably be just as well to let the
powers retain the legal right to abrogate their
arrangement at any time.
The arrangement itself should provide for
rights of inspection to be exercised by an international agency attached to the United Nations
Organization. There are a number of ways in
which inspection could be made effective, and,
while nOfH; of the methods may be infallible, all
the methods applied together could make violations a very hazardous undertaking.
Inspection of Ores. Aerial surveys, which during

the war proved to be very effective, would go a
long way toward revealing the presence of mining
activities as well as other undisclosed industrial
activities. Once uranium mining operations were
located, it would be possible to keep track of the
mined ores and to follow the uranium from the
mine to its destination. If the uranium were obtained from a low-grade ore, mining operations
could be detected from the air with a high degree
of probability. Nor could the operations be easily
camouflaged against infrared photography.
The mining of high-grade uranium ore, in the
event that such deposits were discovered, might be
somewhat easier to conceal because of the smaller
quantity of ore that would have to be mined. But
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if this mInIng were carried out in remote and
sparsely populated areas, it could still be detected
by means of aerial surveys, even though the quantity of ore involved were small. The international
agency under whose auspices this survey would be
carried out would have to possess the right to issue
warrants for searches; then, if necessary, inspectors armed with such warrants could check on the
ground any suspicious activities detected from the
aIr.
Mining operations in populous areas, on the
other hand, would hardly escape the attention of
those who lived and worked in the areas and would
therefore scarcely remain a secret for any length
of time.
A general geological survey of the world's uranium deposits-which ought to be extended to
deposits containing only 1-10 to 1-100 per cent of
uranium-would enable us to determine in detail
just what measures to adopt for adequate inspection of the mining of uranium in the various parts
of the world.
Inspection of Industrial Installations. The detec-

tion of secret plants producing U-235 or plutonium
presents little difficulty. Plants producing U -235
require such a large supply of power (in the form
of either coal, oil, or electricity) that their location is betrayed, particularly if production is concentrated in not highly industrialized regions. If
they are dispersed in more densely populated regions, their existence will be known to large numbers of people and will therefore not remain concealed for long.
Because of the heat liberated in the process, plutonium-producing plants can be detected
either by the water supply which must be available
for cooling, or by some alternate cooling method
which would make them easily discernible because
of certain peculiar structures involved.
The discovery of any of these plants would be
easy during the period of construction. It would
be particularly easy within the next few years, since
early developments in this field are characterized
by more conspicuous installations than those that
may follow later.
Inspection of Specialized Personnel. We have

so far discussed only more or less mechanical
methods of inspection. The over-all aim of preventing an arms race requires, however, that
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we check not only the manufacture of atomic
bombs but also other methods of aggressive warfare, some f 'which are potentially almost as
terrible as those based on the liberation of atomic
energy. Such an over-all check, particularly if it is
supposed to extend to unforeseen techniques of
mass extermination, calls for novel, less mechanical
methods of inspection. Knowledge of the movements and activities of all scientists, engineers, and
technically skilled personnel would permit the detection of any dangerous activity as soon as it
reaches the stage of construction ' and before it
could reach the stage of production. This would
be the primary aim of the inspection of personnel.
The inspecting agents must, of course, have scientific knowledge. But college graduates with a
fair knowledge of science or engineering, supplemented by a training course of perhaps a few
months' duration in certain special fields of knowledge and in the inspection methods they would
have to apply, could do the job. They would have
to acquire during their college years command of
the language of the country to which they go later
as inspectors.
Each of these inspectors would have to keep in
constant touch with about thirty scientists and engineers in the area assigned to him. If anyone of
them wanted to conceal some specific fact he
could, of course, do so; but it would be very
difficult for him to conceal the fact that he was
concealing something. A highly industrialized
country ,vith as many as 100,000 scientists and
engineers who could be used for "high-class" war
work would, under these assumptions, require
about 3,000 resident agents of the international
agency at anyone time. Considering the world as
a whole and assuming that the average lifetime of
an engineer in his profession is about thirty years,
it would take just about one year's crop of college
graduates in engineering the world over, serving
for one year as inspectors, to supply one inspector
for every thirty inspected persons. Keeping an upto-da te register for scientists and engineers would
naturally be a part of the orderly administration
of an inspection service of this type.
Many college graduates might welcome the opportunity to serve for a year after graduation as
inspectors in some foreign country, to broaden
their knowledge and gather experience in a technical field of their own choosing. Clearly the psychological conditions for successful inspection of
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this type would be greatly improved if the inspectors were more than police agents-that is, if their
function were to spread as well as to receive information. Many of them could engage in a moderate
amount of teaching. They could teach their own
language or certain specialized subjects in which
their own country was more advanced than the
host country and convey some knowledge of their
native country to their students, many of whom
might have to serve there later as inspectors.
The Citizen as Inspector. So far as the great

powers are concerned, the problem with which we
are faced will be the more easily solved the less we
think of inspection in the narrow sense of the term.
In dealing with the threat of the atomic bomb,
we are dealing with the unprecedented. Atomic
bombs are the product of human imagination applied to the behavior of inanimate matter, and we
cannot cope with the problems that their existence
created unless we are willing to apply our imagination to the problems of human behavior. These
attempts to solve our problems may strike us at
first sight as odd, just because they are unprecedented. At this juncture, 'iVe must be willing to
experiment with problems of human relationships
involved in the problem of inspection.
In order to discuss a concrete and well-defined
problem, we may again single out the United
States and Russia and discuss the possibility of
regarding native .scientists and engineers of the
two countries, rather than foreign inspectors, as
the chief guardians of the arrangement.
Scientists and engineers are not isolated from
the community in which they live. They have the
same loyalties as other members of the community, and their first loyalty may well be to their
own country. Just how that loyalty is interpreted
will vary, however, with the circumstances. Let us
assume that the United States and Russia have arrived at an arrangement which prohibits the manufacture of atomic bombs but which leaves both
countries the right to abrogate the arrangement at
any time. Let us further assume that after this
arrangement ,h as been ratified and become the law
of the land, the President of the United States
calls upon all scientists and engineers in this country, asking them to pledge themselves to report to
an international agency any secret violations committed on the territory of the United States. Let
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us assume further that the Espionage Act has been
modified so that it no longer covers information
of a purely scientific or technical nature, whether
or not it might relate to the national defense. In
circumstances like these there is little doubt that
most scientists and engineers in the United States
would respond to the President's appeal.
Can we expect Russian scientists to respond
similarly? My kno,vledge of Russian scientists is
very much less direct, and my answer to this question must therefore be based on the fundamental
conviction tha t differences between men in general,
and scientists in particular, are matters of degree.
I do not believe tha t there are essential differences
between Russian and American scientists.
Here it may be desirable to define more closely
the conditions under which such a system can be
expected to work to command the confidence of all
nations. Clearly it would be greatly strengthened
by creating international institutions that would
establish close collaboration between the scientists
and engineers of different countries. The field of
atomic energy would be just one of those fields in
which large-scale fnterprises based on collaboration could be established. Within the framework
of such collaboration it would be possible to arrange for every scientist or engineer to spend, in
the course of his work, some time during the year
outside of his native country, with his family along.
Institutions of this sort could serve a double
purpose. First, they would keep alive in the scientists and engineers the already existing higher
loyalties shared by all educated men, which transcend the narrowly interpreted loyalties to one's
own nation. Second, the frequent and regular occasions at which scientists and engineers
would find themselves outside the jurisdiction of
their own nation would provide them with an opportunity to report their own government's secret
violations of the arrangement to the appropriate
international authority without endangering their
lives or the safety of their families. They could be
effectively guaranteed immunity, assuming they
were willing to remain outside the jurisdiction of
their native country. If they did so, they would
have to be guaranteed the right to choose their
residence abroad, and an appropriate source of
income would have to be provided for them.
Naturally, no scientist or engineer would find
it an easy decision to become an exile. But after
all, under a sensible inspection system, secret vio-
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lations of the arrangement would have to be regarded as very unlikely occurences, something like
a major catastrophe on the road leading to abrogation, to an arms race, and to war. Viewing it
in this light, the scientists and engineers would
be inclined to look upon the necessity of reporting
a secret violation on the part of their own nation
as a personal misfortune-a misfortune small com"pared to the disaster that the violation of the
arrangement itself would forebode for the world.
The fact that scientists and engineers "would be
in a position to report violations without risking
their lives would help to alleviate suspicion that
they knew of secret violations but were keeping
silent for fear of their lives. However exaggerated this kind of suspicion might be, it could
become dangerous in times of political stress, inasmuch as it might lead to a bona fide abrogation of
the arrangement by one of the major powers.
A country thinking in terms of power politics
might be tempted to abrogate, or to threaten to
abrogate if by doing so it could greatly shift the
balance of power in its own favor. This " ",ould
be the temptation either if it could quickly outproduce its potential enemy or if it were much
less vulnerable to bombs than its potential enemy.
The desire to abrogate from this motive would be
weaker if it would take a long time from abrogation until bombs could be made available in sub'stantial quantities. That time might be anywhere
-from six months to three years, depending on
"vvhether atomic power \nstallations for peacetime
purposes were in existence at the time of abrogation and depending upon the restrictions that
"m ight have been imposed upon these installations.
:Renouncing for the next ten to fifteen years any
large-scale use of atomic energy for purposes of
producing electrical power might, therefore, tend
to remove incentives to abrogation. This would
be a very much smaller sacrifice for the United
States than for other countries that are in greater
need of electrical power and much poorer in
na tural resources.
Need for a Long-range Prograln. We cannot
'e xpect, however, to hold up indefinitely the peacetime uses of atomic power for the sake of security,
and we shall have to go as soon as possible beyond
such temporary expedients.
An arrangement of the type that we have discussed would remove the threat of an arms race
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and would be of great value because under it war
would hreak out only if one of the m-a jor powers
actually decided to risk a war by abrogation. If
we eliminate not only atomic bombs but also the
development of other aggressive methods of warfare, and particularly eliminate stocks of longrange aggressive weapons, such as long-range
bombers, large fleets of warships, and landing
craft, the risk of war between the great powers
will appear to be remote and a tolerably wellworking peace system under the United Nations
Organization, as at present constituted, might be
expected to function for a while. We cannot hope,
however, to safeguard peace forever under such
an arrangement.
We may have removed for the time being the
danger of one kind of war-the war that arises
more or less automatically out of an armed peace
in which the great powers maneuver according to
the laws of power politics. The First World vVar
may perhaps be cited as an example of this kind
of war which could be averted under such an
arrangement, but the Second World War, in which
Germany deliberately set out to conquer, does not
fall into this class. Under the arrangement discussed in this chapter, there would remain a definite danger in anyone year, of war's breaking out.
The breathi~g spell that we might secure by
averting an arms race would give us the opportunity to establish a world community. Unless
we made use of it for this purpose, we would have
done nothing but -postpone the next world war,
which will be all the more terrible the later it
comes. The issue that vve have to face is not
whether we can create a world government before
this century is over. That appears to be very
likely. The issue that we have to face is whether
we can have such a world government without
going through a third world war. What matters
is to create at once conditions in which the ultimate
establishment of a world government will appear
as inevitable to most men as war appears inevitable
at present to many.
Clearly the crucial point in this transition will
be reached when a world government will in fact
operate in the area of security or police functions.
When that point is reached, the right to abrogate
will cease and secession will become both illegal
and in fact impossible.
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go beyond the scope of this chapter. I have
mentioned it because I doubt that the danger of
an arms race can be successfully averted unless
the problem of creating a breathing spell and the
problem of establishing a world community-that
is, the short-range and the long-range programsare attacked simultaneously. For, if we wish to
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avert an arms race, we will have to give up our
own atomic bombs and scrap our own manufacturing facilities before we can have a foolproof peace
system. We shall have to take risks, and we shall
ha ve to derive the courage to take risks from the
conviction that we are on our way toward the solution of the problem of permanent peace.
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Chapter 13

International Control of Atomic Energy
By

In particular it was intended and is understood
that the matter of safeguards will apply to the recommendation of the commission (to be established by
the General Assembly of the United Nations) in relation to every phase of the subject and at every
stage. Indeed, at the root of the whole matter lies
the problem of providing the necessary safeguards.

C

T us now examine the problem, as it was defined by the three foreign min.isters, of how
to achieve "control of atomIC energy ...
for peaceful purposes." *
My task is to inquire into the prospects of solving this problem, given our present knowledge of
politics, government, and law. For at t.he outset
we have to recognize that our progress In the art
of mass destruction has not been accompanied by
new discoveries in political science or in statecraft.
We have not learned how to release hitherto inaccessible intellectual and moral energies and to
direct them to constructive ends. To start with we
have only the political science of the preatomic
age. And while we may assume that the terrifying character of modern total war will make men
somewhat more willing to support political inquiry
and experiment, nothing can now be proposed that
is not an application of knowledge that already
exists.
Nevertheless I shall contend, and I hope to demonstrate, that the political principles of the solution are known. Whether mankind in our generation will apply them is another question. It is of
the utmost importance, to be sure, but it is a question that we cannot begin to examine until we have
eluGidated the theory of the solution. For the practical difficulty, which is how to persuade men to
accept a solution, cannot be approached until we
see clearly what it is that they must be persuaded
to accept.
All will agree, I believe, that the crux of the
immediate problem is how to provide "for effective safeguards by way of inspection and other
means to protect complying sta tes against the hazards of violations and evasions."t For as Secretary Byrnes said on his return froln Moscow :
* Communique

on the Moscow Conference of the Three Foreign
Mini ters, December 27, 1945.

tId., VII, V, D.
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It is evident that international rules will be only
as good as the safeguards against their violation
and evasion are effective. The fundamental problem, in short, is how to enforce the international
agreements that the governments may decide to
sign. For agreements are not likely to be observed
if men do not have reason to believe that they will
be enforced. The stakes are the life and death of
n~tional states and of masses of their inhabitants:
No nation could afford the risk of being a complying state unless all states capable of producing
these weapons were assuredly complying states as
well.
Declarations and resolutions that are unrelated
to the means for enforcing them may, and often
do, serve a great purpose. They may edify, teach,
inspire, and illuminate the possibilities of the future. But they are not law-even if everyone has
subscribed to them-and here and now we are concerned with the making of international agreements that will have the force and effect of world
law. The prospects of enforcement are the controlling considerations: we can draw up only such
rules as we have reason to believe we can enforce.
Indeed, the very question of whether there shall
be an international policy at all, rather than a national one alone, depends on what faith and credit
we can put in the enforcement of international
agreements.
There are few in any country who now believe
that war itself or any of the important weapons of
war can be regulated or outlawed by the ordinary
treaties among sovereign states. During the years
between 1919 and 1939 many treaties were signed
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and ratified. * The sovereign states promised to
maintain peace, to outlaw war as an instrument of
national policy, to limit their armaments; they
gave and received bilateral and multilateral guaranties of mutual protection and nonaggression.
These treaties did not prevent nor did they mitigate the fury and the horror of the Second vVorld
War of the twentieth century. They were not observed by the aggressor states nor enforced successfully by the complying states. No reliance can
no,v be placed, nor indeed will it be, on more
treaties of the same kind. No matter how solemn
the language of the new treaties, or how specific
and comprehensive the substance and the procedure, no one ,vill put his trust in them.
But it is just as evident that there is no way to
begin to deal with our problem except by international treaties of some sort. We should merely be
begging the question if we did not recognize that
no world-wide proposal can be adopted except by
a treaty that the sovereign states of our epoch will
ratify. We have, therefore, to inquire into the
exact reasons why treaties of the old sort are defective; if the diagnosis is correct, it should lead
us to the remedy.
As we have known them in our time, nearly all
international agreements and almost all international law have been enforceable only in so far
as sovereign states would and could coerce other
sovereign states. They have provided no other
method of enforcement except that the complying
states should in the end be ready and willing to
wage war against transgressor states. This has
been true, as the words themselves indicate, even
of measures that have been called "short of war"
-of diplomatic nonintercourse, embargo, and
blockade. The milder penalties were counted upon
to be deterrent only because each measure short of
war was to be less and less short of war. They
were regarded as a series of measures that might
begin with the withdrawal of an ambassador and
could end in total "'.var. The effectiveness of any
sanction depends upon the fact that it is a warning

* For example, the Covenant of the League of Nations; the
Wa hington Conference Treaties Limiting Naval Armaments,
Relating to the Use of Submarines and Noxious Gases in Warfare; the Nine Power Treaty on the Far East in 1922; the
Locarno Treaties of 1925; the series of Conventions of Arbitration and Conciliation between Germany and the Netherlands
in 1926, Denmark, 1926, and Luxembourg, 1929; the KelloggBriand Pact, 1928; German-Polish Nonaggres ' ion Pact, 1934;
Austro-German Agreement, 1936; Munich Agreement, 1938,
Nonaggression Treaty between Germany and Denmark, 1939;
and between Germany and U.S.S.R., 1939.

and token of severer penalties to come. The world
has seen this in the case of Japan in Manchuria, of
Italy in Abyssinia, of Germany in Austria, of Spain
and Argentin'J. during the Second World War:
the initial sanctions were not deterrent because
the complying states were not ready or willing to
apply the final sanction of going to war.
The enforcement of international agreement by
sovereign states against sovereign states is known
as the method of collective security. We cannot
rely-indeed no nation does or will rely-upon
international agreements of this kind. Why not?
Because the remedy is as bad as the disease: the
peaceable nations have to be willing to wage total
war in order to prevent total war. The remedy is
so crude, so expensive, and usually so repulsive,
that it will not be applied by the very peoples ,vho
are supposed to apply it, namely by the peace-loving peoples.
We must be clear about this, 'f or much hangs
upon it. It is often said that the mere threat of
collective force will deter any state from taking
the steps that lead to war. That might be true if
the threat is known to be genuine-if it is not a
gesture and a bluff. There must be no doubt in the
minds of the rulers of the transgressor states that
the others are ~nobilized, equipped, and trained,
and it must be certain that there will be no hesitation and debate about the willingness of the lawabiding peoples to wage total war. To state these
conditions is to know how improbable it is that
they will be met in times of peace. For in the early
stages of any campaign of conquest, the issues are
certain to be remote and in themselves of no great
importance to the nation that must carry the main
burden of collective security.
e may recall the
seizure of Manchuria in 1931-1932, Ethiopia in
1935, the Spanish civil war in 1936, the reoccupation of the Rhineland in 1936, the episode of the
Panay in 1937. It is in these early stages of aggression that collective security would have to be effective if war is to be prevented. But that is just when
it is least effective: the peace-loving states cannot be counted upon to be ready and willing to
'wage total war over what appear to be in themselves minor, remote, and unclear disputes. Their
unreadiness and unwillingness will be patent to the
aggressor, and therefore their collective threats
,vill be discounted as a collective bluff.
The threat of total collective war can be a deterrent only if it is evident that the threat will be car-
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ried out. But it will be carried out only as the very
last resort. It is in fact not a way of enforcing
international agreements. It is a measure of ultimate desperation that will be used only when reliance upon agreements is gone, the peace of the
world has already been irretrievably shattered,
and the peace-loving nations are compelled to unite
in order to fight a war of survival.
When the issue is less than the survival of the
great nations, the method of collective security will
not be used because it is just as terrifying to the
policeman as it is to the lawbreakers. It punishes
the law-enforcing states, at least until they have
paid the awful price of victory, as much as the lawbreaking states. Therefore, it cannot be used as
a method of ordinary and continuing enforcement,
for example, as a means of insuring the inspection
of laboratories and plants working with fissionable
materials. There would be little surgery if the surgeon had to amputate his own arm when he was
called upon to amputate his patient's leg. There
would be little enforcement of law in our cities if
in order to arrest burglars, murderers, and violators of the traffic ordinances tIle police had to
start a fight in which the courthouse, the jail, and
their own homes were likely to be demolished.
M en will not burn down the barn in order to
roast a pig: the method of collective security is,
I repeat, too crude, too expensive, and too unreliable for general and regular use.
It proposes to achieve peace through law by calling upon great masses of innocent people to stand
ready to exterminate great masses of innocent people. No world order can be founded upon such a
principle. It cannot command the support of civilized men, least of all of democratic men who respect the individual and consider it the very essence
of justice to distinguish between the guilty and the
innocent, the responsible and the irresponsible.
Our own experience with the method of collective security has proved how right was Hamilton
in saying that when "every breach of the laws must
involve a state of war and military execution must
become the only instrument of civil obedience,"
no "prudent man (would) choose to commit his
happiness to it."*
At the beginning of this chapter I said that the
essential political principle is known by which our
problem can be solved. There is no mystery about
it, and indeed it becomes self-evident once we real-

ize clearly why collective security is such a bad
method of enforcing laws and agreements. The
principle is to make individuals, not sovereign
states, the objects of the international agreements;
it is to have laws operate upon individuals.
This principle is not altogether novel even in
the international affairs of our era when national
sovereignty has been so absolute, and its doctrines
have been expounded so dogmatically and so
pedantically. t It is the principle that men have
had to invoke and apply "whenever they have
sought to enlarge the area of lawful order."t
The authors of the American Constitution invoked it in order to remedy the lawlessness and
disorder of the Confederacy of 1781. They
espoused and elucidated the principle in the F ederalist.# If anything in the field of political science
can be called a pr oven discovery, it is that a system of law will not produce order if it operates
only upon states, and that the enforcement of law
becomes possible only as the laws operate upon
individuals. For then the enforcement of the law
may not encounter "the organized and unified
opposition which is evoked" when the attempt is
made to regulate or coerce sta tes that command
the allegiance and obedience of masses of people.
Hamilton argues that if there is to be a "superintending power"-which is. what we are committed to establishing when we seek "effective safeguards" against ·w eapons of mass destructionthen "we must resolve to incorporate into our
plan those ingredients which may be considered
as forming the character istic difference betw'een a
league and a government; we must extend the
authority of the Union (in this case of the superintending power of the United Nations) to the
persons of the citizens" of the United Nations.
In examining the bearing of this principle upon
• Federalist Papers, No .. 15.

t Cf. Hans Kelsen, Peace Through Law, University of North
Carolina Press, pp. 71 et seq., for instances of individual responsibility established by general international law or treatynamely, rules forbidding piracy, breach of blockade and contraband, illegitimate warfare; also Article III of the abortive
Treaty of Washington, 1922, on submarine warfare and Article
II of the International Conv ention fo r the Protection of Submarine Telegraph Cables, 1884.
Other interesting and suggestive instance s are: Treaty for
the Suppression of the African Slave Trade, 1862; International Conv ention for the Suppression of the T r affic in Women
and Children, 1921; International Conv ention for the Suppression of the Circulation of and T r affic in Obscene Publications,
1923; and the International Convention fo r the Suppression of
Counterfeiting Currency, 1929.
:j: Report of the Committee on International Law of the Association of the Bar of the city of New York, June, 1944 (John
Foster Dulles, chairman ) .
# Nos. 15-20 and No. 27.
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the problems of the world today, we must not be
diverted or confused by the connotations of the
word "government." The word suggests the apparatus of a world flag, a world executive, a world
legislature, a world judicial system, a world army,
world policemen, detectives, inspectors, and tax
collectors. None, some, or all of these instruments
of government may be desirable or feasible; the
point I wish to insist upon is that we need not
and that we should not consider them now. For
the principle that world laws and agreements
shall operate upon individuals can be applied constructively at once without a priori commitment
to create the particular institutions of a world
government.
The principle is most suitable to the problem
that the three foreign ministers agreed to lay before the Commission for the Control of Atomic
Energy that they have asked the General Assembly of the United Nations to establish. The problem . is how to provide "effective safeguards ...
against the hazards of violations and evasions"
of agreements that would call for "the exchange
of basic scientific information for peaceful ends,"
for the "control of atomic energy to the extent
necessary to insure its use only for peaceful purposes," and "for the elimination from national
armaments of atomic weapons and other major
weapons of mass destruction."
It is manifest that these rules will deal with the
activities of countless individuals in all countries.
Scientists, technicians, industrialists, administrative officials, inspectors, judges, legislators, military commanders, diplomats, and the rulers of
states must comply with the rules. They must enforce the rules. They must be accountable for violating or evading them. They must be protected
against being forced to violate or evade them.
If mankind is to rely upon obedience to the law
by such a multitude of individuals, the rules agreed
upon must become the supreme law in all lands,
and all previous and subsequent national law must
conform to the world law. A nation which refuses
to accept this had better not be invited to sign the
tr~aty. For it will be pretending to subscribe to
rules that its own laws do not support. Thus, by
invoking this principle we can establish at the outset a clear criterion as to whether there is in fact
any good prospect that the safeguards will be
eWective. We can stipulate that no state shall be

held to have ratified the treaty until by domestic
legislation it has expressly made the rules of the
treaty the national law within its jurisdiction.
But that is not all. Since the treaty would re.
quire that the laws governing atomic energy be
essentially the same throughout the world, the
United Nations could hold that any individual person was entitled to the protection of that law and
was liable under it in any jurisdiction of any of
the member states. Then no one who viola ted the
law could claim the protection of his own government. He would be an outlaw, like a pirate, who
could be indicted, arrested, tried and punished in
any of the United Nations. If his defense was that
he had acted under the order of superior officials
of his own government, it would not be an unfriendly act but an established right to ask that
government for explanation and investigation. If
the government refused, then, of course, it would
be in rebellion against the United Nations, and the
hard question-which can arise in any civil society
-would be posed as to whether they would resort
to war to suppress the rebellion. If it came to that,
the rulers of the rebellious state would be liable
to indictment as war criminals and, if ever they
were caught, to trial and punishment.
Any individual scientist, industrialist, administrator, or official who wished to obey the law could,
if his government were seeking to coerce him,
claim the protection of the United Nations. If he
escaped, they would give him asylum. If he were
put in a concentration camp, the United Nations
could demand an explanation and a fair hearing of
his case if any friend or relative managed to convey
the news of his case to any agent of any government of the United Nations.
Noone would owe allegiance to his own state
when that meant that he had to violate the world
law. It would not be unpatriotic, in fact quite the
contrary, for any man to expose officials who were
conspiring to violate what would be the law of the
world and the law of their own country. He could
expose them with a good conscience just as he
would expose them if in the United States they
were conspiring against the Bill of Rights, or for
that matter to rob the Treasury. They would be
the traitors, the usurpers, the disloyalists, the
criminals, and lawbreakers. He would be the la wabiding citizen of his country and of the world,
and, if he took risks in order to uphold the law
he would have behind him the power of all law-
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abiding states and the explicit and avowed conscience of mankind.
While this principle can be applied progressively
to enlarge the area of order under world law, it is
especially suited to the specific problem of how to
provide effective safeguards against violation and
evasion of international agreements about atomic
energy. These agreements have not been worked
out as this chapter goes to the printer. But their
general character and purpose have been sufficiently forecast by the Truman-Atlee-King Declaration of November 15, 1945, and the Moscow
communique, and I am assuming tha t our main concern is with how they are to be observed and
enforced.
The proposed agreements will be designed to
limit the· development and use of atomic energy
to peaceable ends and purposes. This must mean
that at no stage in the process from pure research
and the mining of ores to the manufacture of
weapons can secrecy be permitted which would enable a government or a faction of conspirators to
use atomic energy for ends that were prohibited by
the agreement. The disclosure and the inspection
must be adequate to make it highly improbable that
complying states will be made the victims of sinister surprise and sneak attack. Enough must be
known so that the complying states can be forewarned in time to take preventive and defensive
measures. This need not mean that everyone must
.be taught how to make atomic bombs in the kitchen
sink. But it must mean that no government can
even start to prepare itself to make atomic bombs
except with the consent of the other governments
and in accord with the international rules they have
agreed upon.
It follows, therefore, that treaties must be designed directly to nullify the sovereign right and to
destroy the actual power of 3.ny government to
make a state secret of the development of atomic
energy. A state secret is kept by means of national
laws and regulations establishing censorship, definitions of treason and of espionage, and secrecy is
enforced by restrictions upon all who share the secret and penalties upon all who might ferret it out.
If, then, members of the United Nations are to
agree to the mutual right of inspection, they must
agree that in these matters the sovereign right to
enforce a state secret is no longer absolute. The
apparatus of censorship, treason, and espionage is,
as respects the terms agreed upon, null and void.

Even in time of war among well-nigh absolute
sovereign states, the enforcement of complete secrecy is exceedingly difficult and in large degree
imperfect. The kind of agreement that we are
discussing would make it much more difficult, espe- '
cially in peacetime. It would make secrecy by government officials unlawful and would make it la'wful, and also righteous, honorable, and not too
imprudent, for anyone to expose violations of the
rules and to inform the inspectors.
Dr. Szilard examines the details of the problem
of inspection in Chapter 12. It may be added here
that, under agreements of the type we are examining, the prohibitions that would prevent effective
inspection are outlawed, and therefore the inhibitions of individuals arising out of patriotism or
fear of prosecution are greatly reduced. It would
cease to be a crime against the state to help the
inspectors: it would have become a crime to obstruct them. Individuals who wished to observe
and to enforce the ,vorld law on this subject would
have the support, once they had managed to invoke
it, of the combined power and influence of all the
complying states. We need not suppose that the
complying sta tes will rely wholly upon United N ations inspectors wearing badges to identify them;
they will maintain also diplomatic and consular
agents, intelligence services, and there will be
spread all over the ,vorld journalists, businessmen,
tourists, missionaries, and students. It would still
be theoretically possible, but it would be much
more difficult, for another Hitler to lock up an
anti-Hitlerite or to have him disappear surreptitiously, without some word of it being sent by the
man's family or friends to some agent or even
a mere citizen of a complying state.
There is every reason to think that the international family of scientific men would become the
foremost supporters of the international agreements we are discussing. These agreements would
recognize, legalize, and protect the established traditions of scientific men: the agreements would
authorize them, invite them, and induce them, to
do the very things that they need to do and must
want to do. Because atomic energy cannot be developed without them, they occupy a strategically
controlling position. They are, therefore, the naturally appointed guardians of any system of inter·
national control. They would be most expertly
qualified to draw conclusions from the reports that
would come in not only from the formal inspectors
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but from all other services of intelligence and
informa tion.
Our agreements will be soun d law not only because their purpose is good but because they enable
the many scientists and technicians to serve their
own interests and professional ideals. It is easier
to administer laws like these ,vhich release multitudes of men than laws which restrict them. Agreements of this type would use the liberty of the individual to regulate the absolutism of the national
state.
All this will become possible if w'e found the
treaties we propose to ratify upon the basic principle that they prescribe rights and duties not only
for states but for individuals. But if we do not
introduce this ingredient, as Hamilton called it,
then the agreements will not be laws. 'T hey will
be declarations only. For observance will depend
upon the faithful performance by all sovereign
states, and enforcement upon the willingness and
readiness of some states to wage total war in the
name of collective security.
Yet our conclusions, however cogent, would
have no practical importance if they were merely
a theoretical demonstration that atomic weapons
can best be regula ted in a certain way . We should
then have just another plan for the limitation of
armaments, and we know from the experience of
1919 to 1939 that partial disarmament does not
prevent war and may indeed prove to be a snare
and a delusion for those very nations that put their
trust in it. In the end we must be concerned not
with atomic "var but wi th ,var, since we know perfectly well that the best possible system for regulating bombs will be swept away if there is another
great ·war. If there is another war of the giant
powers, atomic and even more deadly and malignant weapons* will-"ve must assume-be used.
For even if they are not in stock when the war
breaks out, they ,,,ill be manufactured before it
is concluded.
Therefore, in juaging specific plans to control
atomic energy, we must examine their bearing upon
the formation of a world-wide order of peace. We
must see how the principle, ,vhich I have been contending is suitable to the control of atomic energy,
affects the United Nations as a world society and
the United Nations Organization that they have
just esta!1Jrished. Consistency is ess.ential: there
cannat lie a. system of world.law: thatjs unique., £o_r

atomic energy and a different and conflicting system for the maintenance of peace.
Ther e is, however, no conflict. On the contrary,
the method we have been discussing for regulating
atomic energy is a concrete application of the fundamental principle to which the United Nations
are already committed by implication and by their
acts. I realize that many ardent and faithful supporters of the old League and of the new organization think otherwise. Yet it is demonstrable, I
think, that the United Nations have in fact rejected the method of collective security, and in so
far as they have adopted any method of enforcing
agreements and laws, it is to found the international order upon laws that govern individuals.
The charter of the United Nations organization
does not explicitly reject the idea that peace is to
be kept by authorizing a universal war against
transgressor states. The charter does indeed say
it is one of the "purposes" of the United N ations to take "collective measures • . . for the
suppression of ... breaches of the peace, "t and
it empowers the Security Councilt "to take such
action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and
security."
But, as everyone knows, all this is nullified by
the rule of unanimity, usually called the privilege of veto, among the five great powers.# The
method of collective security cannot be used lawfully against anyone of the great military powers
without its consent. This is equivalent, of course,
to saying that it can never be used. For no nation
will ever conceivably authorize the rest of the
world to wage total war against itself. Moreover,
the rule of unanimity protects all other states
against collective coercion unless, perchance, there
is some state so small, so isola ted, and so unimportant that it is not the ally or client of anyone
of the great powers.
Thus the United Nations, when they framed the
charter of their organization, renounced in practice though not in theory the method of collective
security. There are many who deem this a reactionary event in international affairs and argue
that every effort must be made to ·abolish the. veto
* Cf. Navy Departme.nt :rf!p~Tt on ,research in biological ;·warfare, January 4, 1946.:.

t Charter of the ~Unifed( Nations, Chapter I , Attic1e 1,. Section 1.
:j: Id., ChapteHVII, Article 42 . .
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Id. 1 Cha p!e.cV, .Artkle .2Z, ,Section 3.
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and to establish the principle of collective security.
They will have, I believe, to reconsider their position. In 1919 the United States rejected the Covenant because it would not submit to or participate
in a commitment to wage war to make peace.
Neither against Japan in 1931 nor even against
Italy in 1936 were the members of the League of
Nations willing to fulfill their commitment. In
1945 the Soviet Union most positively, and the
United States most probably, would not have ratified the charter if it had in fact authorized the
method of collective security.
Since the great powers nave in fact rejected collective security, it does not follow that they are
international anarchists. The great powers may
be right not because they are great powers but
because they are so directly responsible and so
immediately involved in the consequences that they
are compelled to see the true nature of collective
security. They may have rejected it not because
they are wrong-minded but because the method is
wrong-because it is in truth too crude, too expensive, too unreliable, and also too unjust, to be used
generally and continually for the enforcement of
international conventions.
In any event it is the fact that without a revolutionary revision of the charter the method of
collective security cannot be used to control atomic
weapons or for any other purpose. Those who
argue that the veto must be abolished if there is
to be any sanction behind agreements and laws
are taking a position that is tantamount to renouncing all hope of an order of law in the world.
If there is no other method of enforcement, then
there is no method of enforcement, and we find
ourselves in a world condemned to the unending
anarchy of sovereign states.
But as a matter of fact if we look beyond the
San Francisco Charter to the United Nations as
a living world society, we see that during the past
quarter of a century, as they have rejected the
method of collective security, they have also been
committing themselves deeply to the other method
that we have been discussing, that is, to holding
individuals accountable for breaches of the peace
and for the violation of treaties and of internationallaw.
The commitment is now solemn, deep, and publicly declared. It is sealed by the fact that all the
United Nations have participated in the arrest,
the indictment, the trial, and the punishment of

war criminals. Noone has protested, and by
their words and their acts all are committed to the
doctrine enunciated by Mr. Justice Jackson in
his opening address at the Nuremberg trial that
"the forces of law and order be made equal to the
task of dealing with such international lawlessness as I have recited here" by taking "the ulti ..
mate step," which is "to make statesmen respon.
sible to law." With the assent of his British,
Soviet, and French colleagues Mr. Justice Jackson
completed the commitment: " ... and let me make
it clear that while this law is first applied against
German aggressors, the law includes, and if it is
to serve a useful purpose it must condemn, aggression by any other nation, including those which
now sit here in judgment."
We shall have misunderstood the real principles
that govern the United Nations if we do not see
that as they have rejected the principle of collective security by adopting the veto, they have embraced the principle that "crimes are always committed by persons" and that "only sanctions which
reach individuals can peacefully ana effectively be
enforced." The commitments of the Nuremberg
trial are no sudden improvisation out of thin air:
they have their roots in the history of our epoch,
and they have been evolved during the two World
Wars. Though they are, like all common law in
its beginnings, empiric and uncodified, they are no
less authoritative than the Charter. The fundamental law of the United Nations is not confined
to the Charter, and in construing the text of the
Charter we must take fully into account the law
that they have promulgated at Nuremberg.
Here the United Nations have recognized, in
the words of Mr. Justice Jackson's opening statement, "individual responsibility on the part of
those who commit acts defined as crimes, or who
incite others to do so, or who join a common plan
with other persons, groups, or organizations to
bring about their commission. The principle of
individual responsibility for piracy and brigandage, which have long been recognized as crimes
punishable under international law, is old and well
established. That is what illegal warfare is. This
principle of personal liability is a necessary as
well as logical one if international law is to render
real help to the maintenance of peace. An international law which operates only on states can be
enforced only by war because the most practicable
method of coercing a state is warfare."
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We can now see in retrospect that during the
Second World War there was consummated a
revolutionary development in human relations.
It has pushed mankind across the boundary lines
of what was until recently the modern age, when .
men lived in a congeries of unqualifiedly sovereign
states and their dependencies; the first but essential formations of the world state have begun.
They are not merely being proposed and advocated. This event was not ,caused, though its
evolution may now be accelerated, by the portent
of the atomic bomb. For the decisive change
occurred before the explosions at Los Alamos,
Hiroshima, and Nagasaki.
Like all great historic events it was not originally the product of a conscious design but of a
series of necessary decisions taken for empiric
reasons. The United Nations became an alliance
because they were all, though separately and at
different times, the victims of aggression. They
were compelled to unite in order to wage a war
of survival. They were moved to make their
union permanent by the knowledge that in no other
way could they hope to consolidate the peace they
had paid such a price to win. But when they
came to write the charter of their union at Dumbarton Oaks and at San Francisco, they found it
impossible to construct an international order on
the principle of collective security. As sovereign
states they could not participate in a world order
within which sovereign states were authorized
and obliged to wage war against sovereign states.
This did not mean, as many men have thought,
that the United Nations are stalled on the way
to a world order. It meant, on the contr'lry, an
admission on their part that out of sovereign
states alone a world order cannot be formed.
Though that was not the intention, nor was its
significance appreciated when it happened, what
was in fact blocked by the rule of unanimity was
the effort to advance along a way that did not and
could not take the United Nations into a world
order of law.
But simultaneously, though separately, they
were moved to open up the way that can lead to
a world order. The impelling cause here was in
the first instance their attempt by warnings and
threats to stop the massacres and atrocities that
were an integral part, not merely incidents, of the
Nazi doctrine and practical conduct of war. These

warnings were not heeded. Then the impelling
motive of the Allies became the need to inflict
retribution upon and to exact some rough measure
of justice from those who were most clearly
responsible for the monstrous evils of the war.
The Allies united in applying the principle that
not the anonymous collective entity of the state
but the responsible officials of the state may be
held personally accountable for the violations of
treaties, of the conventions of war, and of the
covenants of international law.
With the Nuremberg trial itself, which is not
concluded as these lines are written, we are not
concerned. Our conclusions are unaffected by
the questions that have still to be determined,
whether any or all of the defendants are justly
and legally guilty on all the counts in the indictment. They could all be innocent, or they could
plead successfully that the law under which they
are being prosecuted is in their case ex post facto.
None the less this would be the law of the United
Nations henceforth unless we intend to deny the
authority of law' to what they have all declared,
sealed, signed, and ratified, and repeatedly
affirmed, by the official action of their lawful governments.
N or can it be said that this principle of personal liability is a new doctrine and alien to the
conscience of civilized men. I believe it could be
shown that it is the traditional and orthodox doctrine and that the theory of the absolute sovereign
state that is subject to no higher law, and is itself
the source of the highest law of its people, is an
aberration and heresy, which has flourished,
though even then never without protest, during
the closing decades of the nineteenth and the opening decades of the twentieth century.
To President Wilson belongs the distinction of
having been the first head of a great state to attack
the foundations and premises of this heresy. He
did just that on April 6, 1917, when in asking
Congress to recognize that the United States was
a t war with the Imperial German government, he
said that we should fight not against the German
people but against "their rulers." I t does not
rna tter how many or how few Germans he or anyone else adjudged to be guilty and responsible:
once it was declared that in a war not all the
inhabitants of an enemy state are collectively indistinguishable, the doctrine of the absolute sovereign state had been breached.
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The principle that Wilson advoc'a ted in his message was carried over into the Treaty of Ver·
sailles when the Allies and Associated Powers did
"publicly arraign William II of Hohenzollern,
formerly German Emperor, for a supreme offense
against international morality and the sanctity of
trea ti eSt "
But in 1919 the nations were reluctant as a matter of doctrine and unprepared for reasons of
expediency to act on the principle.
In 1945 they did act on it. They did so only
after explicit, repeated, and formal declarations
that they would act on it. Thus on January 13,
1942, twenty-eight months before the defeat of
Germany, an Allied conference of nine occupied
countries of Europe placed "among their principal war aims the punishment, through the channels of organized justice, of those guilty and
responsible for these crimes, whether they have
ordered them, perpetrated them, or in any way
participated in them." This declaration had the
approval of the United Kingdom, the British Dominions, the U.S.S.R., China, India, and the
United States, all of them participating as observers. They themselves subsequently and repeatedly
made a similar commitment, and from these declarations stems the prosecution of the war criminals.
While the United Nations had begun empirically, seeking first to deter the enemy officials and
"those who have hitherto not imbrued their hands
with innocent blood,"* and then to exact retribution, the evolution of their doctrine and practice
took them far beyond the case of the criminals
of this war. At the Nuremberg process they
bound themselves to the general principle that not
only these German aggressors but all future aggressors shall be accountable to the same law. By
this engagement the United Nations adopted the
elements that form "the characteristic difference
between a worlq. league and a world state."
As we look back upon ,vhat has happened, we
see what can happen. The United Nations Organization is not another League of Nations, rendered impotent by the veto. It is the constituent
association of a world state already directed to
establishing a universal order in which law, designed to maintain the peace, operates upon individual persons.

* Declaration by President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill,
and Premier Stalin, issued at the Tripartite Conference at
Moscow, November 1, 1943.

Noone can prove how fast and how far mankind "lNill now go to form the world state, or what
will be the legislative, executive, and judicial organs of the world state. We may indeed fail
altogether and be doomed to the desolation of
utter anarchy. Nothing that could ,happen will
surely happen. But what we can prove-and it
is a momentous conclusion-is that the potential..
ity of the ,,,orld state is inherent in the United
Nations. When I say that it is inherent, I mean
that this is the end and the logic according to
which the United Nations must evolve if they are
to evolve at all towards an enduring world order.
The world state is inherent in the United Nations
as an oak tree is in an acorn. Not all acorns become oak trees; many fall on stony ground or are
devoured by the beasts of the wilderness. But if
an acorn matures, it will not become a ,vhale or
an orchid. It can become only an oak. That is
the potentiality inherent in its organism. In this
sense, not another League of Nations but a world
state, in the exact meaning of the term, is inherent
and potential in the embryonic organism of the
United Nations.
The recognition of this truth will be in itself
an event that ,,,ill affect the course of events. For
when an idea that enlists men's hopes is seen to be
consistent with their acts, it evokes and organizes
their energies. It is not then an abstraction or an
essence. It is a dynamic force in their conduct.
There are the ideas that shake the world and
change it.
The project of the world state is now such an
idea. It was not always such an idea, though for
some two thousand years in the Western 'world,
at least since the Stoic philosophers were teaching,
men have been able to transcend their tribal inheritance and to imagine the ideal of the universal
state. But for long ages they were able to imagine
also many other things they could not achievethat, for example, men could fly and that no
human person should be a chattel slave. Much
had to happen, much had to be experienced and
discovered, before the abolition of slavery or the
art of flying could become realizable ideas. So it
has been with the ideal of the union of mankind
under universal law. Much has had to happen,
much experienced, discovered, and learned, before
the leading peoples of the world could arrive at
the point where the formation of the world state

• 74·

INTERN ATION AL CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY

was not only what many of them desired but what
in fact they were engaged in creating.
N ow the ancient ideal has become an idea, indispensable in fact, to which men have been compelled to turn: there is no other way they can
exact justice for the crimes of the war, no other
way they can establish effective safeguards against
the misuse of the weapons of mass destruction, no
other way they can hope to make international
agreements enforceable. The solution of the most
urgent practical problems and the advance towards
a wider and greater order of peace among men
depend upon the same fundamental idea. We
need not hesitate to recognize it and to proclaim
it and to employ it as the creative principle of the
coming order of mankind.
Not our powers of persuasion but the inevitability of the truth will convert men's minds and
enlist their support. We need not suppose that
all the nations and all the peoples in them will
become suddenly unanimous and incandescent with
enthusiasm to found the 'world state. Some must
be convinced before many can be convinced, and
under any predictable conditions the affairs of the
world will long be determined by the rivalries, the
combinations, and an uneasy equilibrium among
the sovereign and powerful states. But in this
condition of the ,;vorld, a new event may and can,
and could be made to intervene. That event would
be the decision of the American people to make
the formation of the world state the principal
objective of their own foreign policy.
This can be made to happen. For the American people, who have learned that they cannot live
in isolation, have no taste and no aptitude for the
career of a world power among world powers, and
no faith that good can come of it. Intuitively and
by tradition they believe that security and serenity
and great achievements require a universal order

of equal laws and can never be had in a mere equilibrium of sovereign states. It would conform,
therefore, with American ideals and with Alnerican interests to dedicate the power and influence
of the U ni ted States to sponsoring and pressing
for the formation of a world state.
If that were the dynamic core of the foreign
policy of the United States, the influence of this
decision upon mankind would be enormous. The
United States is at the zenith of its power and for
the time being at least is the sole possessor of the
most devastating weapons ever manufactured on
earth. There is no doubt that if at this moment
in history the United States raised the standard,
'many nations would immediately rally to it and
in all the other nations more and more of the
people.
N ever was there such an opportunity for any
people as is ours, though briefly if we do not seize
it. We can use the preeminence of our military
power so that an ideal for all mankind, not the
United States of America as a national state, may
dominate and conquer the world. The issues of
territory and of resources and all the other knotty
problems of settling the war and of making peace
will still have to be dealt with. The struggle of
civilized men with the primitive, the stubborn, the
malign, and the stupid, within each of us and all
about us, will not end. But how different would
be the assumptions and the expectations of diplomacy if, as a great power, in the company of other
nations who would surely be with us, we were committed to the formation of a world order of universal law! Merely to have begun upon this
enterprise, though the first steps be small and
difficult, would be to introduce into all the calculations and judgments of international affairs a
new orientation, and into men's lives a compelling
purpose.

winner of the Nobel Prize in
1921 and perhaps the greatest of all living physicists,
started the government's work on the uranium project with his letter to President Roosevelt in the fall
of 1939, in which he outlined the possibilities.
ALBERT EINSTEIN,

Chapter 14

The Way Out
by ALBERT EINSTEIN

T

HE construction of the atom bomb has
brought about the effect that all the people
living in cities are threatened, everywhere
'a nd constantly, with sudden destruction. There is
no doubt that this condition has to be abolished if
man is to prove himself worthy, a t least to some
extent, of the self-chosen name of homo sapiens.
However, there still exist widely divergent opinions concerning the degree to which traditional
social and political forms, historically developed,
will have to be sacrificed in order to achieve the
desired security.
After the First World War, we were confronted with a paradoxical situation regarding the
solution of international conflicts. An international
court of justice had been established for a peaceful
solution of these conflicts on the basis of international law. Furthermore, a political instrument
for securing peace by means of international negotiation in a sort of ~orld parliament had been created in the form of the League of Nations. The
nations united in the League had further outlawed
as criminal the method of solving conflicts by
means of war.
Thus the nations were imbued with an illusion
of security that led inevitably to bitter disappointment. For the best court of justice is meaningless
unless it is backed by the authority and power to
execute its decisions, and exactly the same thing is
true of a world parliament. An individual state
with sufficient military and economic power can
easily resort to violence and voluntarily destroy
the entire structure of supranational security built
on nothing but words and documents. Moral authority alone is an inadequate means of securing
the peace.
The United Nations Organization is now in the
process of being tested. It may eventually emerge
as the agency of "security without illusion" that
we so badly need. But it has not as yet gone beyond the area of moral authority as, in my opinion,
it must.

]

Our situation is rendered more acute by other
circumstances, only two of which will be presented
here. So long as the individual state, despite its
official condemnation of war, has to consider the
possibility of engaging in war, it must influence and
educate its citizens-and its youth in particularin such a way that they can easily be converted into
efficient soldiers in the event of war. Therefore
it is compelled not only to cultivate a technicalmilitary training and type of thinking but also
to implant a spirit of national vanity in its people in order . to secure their inner readiness for
the outbreak of war. Of course, this kind of
education counteracts all endeavors .to establish
moral authority for any supranational security
organization.
The danger of war in our time is further heightened by another technical factor. Modern weapons, in particular the atom bomb, have led to a
considerable advantage in the means of offense or
attack over those of defense. And this could well
bring about the result that even responsible statesmen might find themselves compelled to wage a
preventive war.
In view of these evident facts there is, in my
opinion, only one way out.
It is necessary that conditions be established that
guarantee the individual state the right to solve its
conflicts with other states on a legal basis and
under international jurisdiction.
I t is necessary that the individual state be prevented from making war by a supranational organization supported by a military power that is
exclusively under its control.
Only when these two conditions have been fully
met can we have some assurance that we shall not
vanish into the atmosphere, dissolved into atoms,
one of these days.
From the viewpoint of the political mentality
prevailing at present, it may seem illusory, even
fantastic, to hope for the realization of such conditions within a period of a few years. Yet their
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realization cannot wait for a gradual historical
development to take its course. For, so long as
we do not achieve supranational military security,
the above-mentioned factors can always and forcibly lead us into war. Even more than the will
for power, the fear of sudden attack will prove
to be disastrous for us if w~ do not openly and
decisively meet the problem of depriving national
spheres of power of their military strength, turning such power over to a supranational authority.
With due consideration for the difficulties involved in this task, I have no doubt about one
point. We shall be able to solve the problem when
it will be clearly evident to all that there is no
other, no cheaper way out of the present situation.
N ow I feel it my obligation to say something
about the individual steps which might lead to a
solution of the security problem.
1. Mutual inspection by the leading military
powers of methods and installations used for the
production of offensive weapons, combined with an
interchange of pertinent technical and scientific discoveries, would diminish fear and distrust, at least
for the time being. In the breathing spell thus provided we would have to prepare more thorough
measures. For this preliminary step should be
taken with conscious awareness that tIie ultimate
goal is the denationalization of military power
altogether.
This first step is necessary to make any successive moves possible. However, we should be wary
of believing that its execution would immediately
result in security. There still would remain the
possibility of an armament race with regard to a
possible future war, and there always exists the
temptation to resort once more, by "underground"
methods, to the military secret, that is, keeping
secret the knowledge about methods and means
of and actual preparations for warfare. Real
security is tied to the denationalization of military
power.
2. This oenationalization can be prepared
through a steadily increasing interchange of military and scientific-technical personnel among the
armies of the different nations. The interchange
should follow a carefully elaborated plan, aimed
at converting the national armies systematically
into a supranational military force. A national

army, one might say, is the last place where national feeling , may be expected to weaken. Even
so, the na tionalism can be progressively immunized
at a rate proportionate at least to the building of
the supranational army; and the whole process
can be facilitated by integrating it with the recruiting and training of the latter. The process of
interchanging personnel would further lessen the
danger of surprise attacks and in itself would lay
the psychological foundation for internationalization of military resources'.
Simultaneously the strongest military powers
could draft the working papers for a supranational
security organization and for an arbitration committee, as well as the legal basis for, and the precise stipulation of, obligations, competencies, and
restrictions of the latter with respect to the individual nations. They could further decide upon the
terms of election for establishing and maintaining
these bodies.
When an agreement on these points shall have
been reached, a guarantee against wars of world,vide dimensions can be assured.
3. The above-named bodies can now begin to
function. The vestiges of national armies can
then be either disbanded or placed under the high
command of the supranational authority.
4. After the cooperation of the nations of highest military importance has been secured, the attempt should be made to incorporate, if possible,
all nations into the supranational organization,
provided that it is their voluntary decision to join.
This outline may perhaps create the impression
that the presently prevailing military powers are
to be assigned too dominant a role. I have tried,
however, to present the problem with a view to a
sufficiently swift realization that will allow us to
avoid difficulties greater than those already inherent in the nature of such a task. It may be simpler,
of course, to reach preliminary agreement among
the strongest military powers than among all
nations, big and small, Jor a body of representatives of all nations is a hopelessly clumsy instrument for the speedy achievement of even preliminary results. Even so, the task confronting us
requires of all concerned the utmost sagacity and
tolerance, which can be achieved only through
awareness of the harsh necessity we have to face.
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Al1terican scientists, acutely aware of their responsibilities for making
known the full implications of their scientific developn'lents, have been
mobilizing ever since the end of the war. I n October scientists from the"
atomic project joined forces, and in December the Federation of American
Scientists, open to all scientists and engineers, was formed. Member associations acrpss the country are encouraging qualified scientific and political
discussion such as that presented in this book.

Survival is at Stake
by THE FEDERATION OF AMERICAN (ATOMIC) SCIENTISTS

T

HIS is an unusual book. It has bee:. written by many persons. It.is repetitive at
times and there is disagr(ement in its
pages, as there is disagreement elsewhere, among
scientists and non-scientists, in this country and in
other countries. It is a serious and a dangerous
circumstance that on this most vital of issues there
is not yet the strongest agreement on the basic pattern of the precise solution. The fact that there
is not, seven months after the bomb became a
reality, tells better than anything else ho,,, critical
is our problem. For it means that the atomic arms
race viThich can mean our doom is in full swing.
The arms race must be stopped. This book was
put together with the sole objective of helping to
stop it. This book cannot do what most needs to
be done, which is to state the solution. Yet the
book has a unity and achieves a purpose even so: .
it states the problem before us, in full and on
sound authority and in one place. Each in his
own way, the authors have recognized the nature
of the problem and have thereby provided standards by which any proposed solution must be
judged.
And this is more than half the battle. There is
more to fear from confusion than from disagreement, more from irrelevance than from incompleteness. The many-sided nature of the problem
of nuclear energy must be clear from the very content of the book. But just as clear is the common
framework within ,vhich its authors have written:
11" The problem has brought us to one of the great
crises of history.
~ The problem has moved onto the political plane
and will remain there. Science will devise no
aefense to make the danger go away.
11" The problem is a world problem. There can be
no merely national solutions.
We of the Federation of American Scientists
here undertake to discuss some of the terms of

solution, to , point some ways to action. But before this we wish to give emphasis to one point
which has not been emphasized enough.
If the terror of the bomb is great, and properly
grea t, the hope for man in the release of nuclear
energy is even greater. The fruit of that science
which follows in the proud tradition of Galileo,
the outcome of that complex organization of
society which has made possible the city of New
York and the Hanford plutonium plant, is the
large-scale release of nuclear energy. We cannot
now see more than the faint shadow of what such
a new force can mean for man. But it is our faith
as scientists and our experience as citizens of the
twentieth century that it will mean much. It will
grow and develop. It will lead a life of its own.
No influence that we have seen in our times can
prevent this.
Yet it is the eloquent and unanswerable argument of this book that such a growth will bring
death to the society that produced it if we do not
adapt ourselves to it. This is the dilemma that
the release of nuclear energy has brought to a
world torn already by a horrible war. The nations
can have atomic energy, and much more. But they
cannot have it in a world where war may come.
There is one way to bring about the needed
change, for there is a unique solution. The nations
must collaborate for the development of the new
force. They cannot, in fact, do otherwise and
live. The new energy is, if you like, our common
enemy; it must be made our common ally. And it
can be done. You have seen how unique are the
properti es of uranium, ho,v novel the techniques
of its control and exploitation. In this fresh field
we can proceed better, or at all, the less we are
hampered by the old nationalistic conflicts which
now divide the world. Too often the controls and
safeguards against the misuse of nuclear energy
have been discussed as something private and
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static, apart from its development. Yet it is clear
that its development, planned internationally, will
simplify and make natural those controls which a
haphazard national handling would leave uncertain. Out of the success of such collaboration,
moreover, will emerge a greater success. The
common possession of atomic energy and the prevention of atomic 'war will lead us to the end of
war itself. That is in the seed of the solution.
What specific properties will the solution exhibit? If we cannot yet outline them in a few
pages, "\Ive can list for you a few tests by which the
genuineness of programs and proposals from
whatever source may be assayed.
. First of all, our country, the United States, has
a peculiar responsibility. We first used the bomb;
we alone manufacture it. We are committed no
less by the declarations of our leaders than by the
existence of the Oak Ridge plants to assume the
initia tive in devising measures for the control of
nuclear energy. No program, is sound unless it
recognizes the special duti es of the United States,
unless it is built upon the principle that our insight
and our patience rltust be greater than that of all
the others. The bombs are 111,arked ((Made in the '
U.S ..L1.)}
Second, the year 1946 has a special importance
-and the next year, and perhaps the next. Solutions do not grow in a few months, but they must
be planted. The time to start is now. The chance
for the successful end of the dilemma is greatest
while the problem is yet new, while the development of nuclear energy and of the bombs which
are its first fruits is still novel and still not widespread. If uncontrolled growth and development
are permitted for nuclear energy, we will have
lost a unique opportunity. No program, for solution which does not contain steps to be taken at
once has recognized the nature of the problem.
There is not much ti1ne.
Third, the solution cannot be simply a formal
one, although it will certainly bring new rights and
new laws. It must be embodied; it must involve
an institution, which can spend hard cash and
employ earnest and intelligent men. The final
form of any agency proposed will be impossible to
state, but there must be a beginning. And the initial plan must provide- for growth and development in the institution just as the problem will
grow and develop. Here, above all, the dead
hand of rote must be kept away. Technical and

organiza tional proposals must allow flexibility or
they cannot aid us. Proposals which, on the one
hand, imply no material change and require no
working staff cannot succeed/ proposals which, on
the other hand, seek to partition among bureaus
the problems of a decade hence cannot succeed
either. The problem is a problem of living men
and a developing phenomenon. The solution cannot be wholly written on paper.
There is one more indispensable ingredient but
it is not found in this book. It lies in you. The
Federation of American Scientists represents men
who saw both a hope and a threat in the bomb they
worked so long to help create. They have known
the facts, they have seen and studied them for
years, while still everything was secret. Now the
facts are out. They are visible in the rusted rubble
of Hiroshima. They are here, in this book, in
your hands. Unless these facts become real to
you, unless you learn from them as we have learned
from them-that we all must act-there will be
no answer ever to our problem. Never have
people had the opportunity and the responsibility
,vhich the citizens of the United States have today.
vVe must learn how to use them, for after an
atomic war no good 'will and intelligence will be
needed to bring a permanent peace to the survivors. They will get it in the jumbled stones of
their cities.
vVha t can you do?
For one thing, now that you have read this book,
discuss it with your friends-don't lay it aside. A
great decision rests on how well you and your
elected representatives understand and act on the
facts and proposals presented in these pages.
Continue your education for survival by being
well informed. Ask for the releases and reports
on what is happening as prepared by the scientists
and issued by the National Committee on Atomic
Information. *
Make sure that your Senators and Congressmen
know that you are aware of the unprecedented
gravity of the problem. Urge them to act with
courage and vision in solving the problem of the
atomic bomb within the framework of the new
ideas that, as this book shows, are necessary to
the solution.
Time is short. And survival is at stake.

* The address is 1621 K Street, N.vV., Washington 6, D. C.
Where possible, reque st material through clubs, unions, or other
organizations to which you may belong.
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" O N E WORLD OR NONE" is an
,
illuminating, powerful, ' threatening and hopeful statement
which will clarify a lot of confused thinking about atomic energy. It is a highly
compressed volume containing a wealth
of facts and viewpoints in eighteen articles
the majority of them by scientists Wh~
have taken leading parts in producin~
and using the atomic bomb. It presents
varied, -but well planned~ discussions of the
world problem resulting from the us. ot
the bomb, almost all of them leading to
the conclusion that the scientists handed
the statesmen, as an ~ nseparable part of
the bomb, a problem t.hat can be solTed
only through the abolishment of war and
the development of a unified order of
world control.
Scientis t~ are trained to think straight,
to assess facts accurately and present
them briefly. to draw sound conclusions
and state them clearly without·regard to
whom they help, hurt or hinder. As a
l'esult, "One World or None" is a volume
easy to read, has the benefit of brilliance
associated with brevity, and earlls reader
acceptance by the unquestionable sincerity and scholarsh1p of its authors, five
of who'Tn are Nobel Prize winners.

SCientists. unfortunately, have not as
yet learned how to penetrate the miasma
ot a political environment. The volume
is. nevertheless, a beacon in the fog of
confusion generated in the minds of the
people by the propaganda of an obsolescent statecraft.
The men who infiicted the atomic b'omb
on the world seek in "One World or None"
to present It as a devil's blessing, a weapon
for achieving universal peac'e on the plain
ground that it is too terrible to use. This
is the viewpoint of the scientists. That
this viewpoint 1s not held by the. war
makers is indicated by the single chapter
by a military man who hails it, on the
basis of its destructive and death deali:::;;
powers, as the cheapest means for conducting a war and for making a quick,
bargain price victory possible.
Dr. Arthur H. Compton, who headed the
University of Chicago bomb project, now
ChancelIor of Washing.ton University,
crystallizes the pattern for the book in a
brief introduction in which he states that
"catastrophe lies ahead if war is not
eliminated."
Dr. Niels Bohr, the Danish physicist,
Who pioneered in the problem of electron
orbits, expresses. in the foreword. a hope

"Baby p,lay With Nice Ball?"
A cartoon by David Low, from The Nation

that scientists may assist in achieving "an
outcome of the present crisis of humanity
that is worthy of the ideals for which
science throughout the ages has stood."
Each of the eleven chapters in the first
part of the book discusses 8. particular
aspect of the world atomic bomb problem
and, thanks to careful work by the editors.
almost all duplication has been eliminated.
Dr. Philip Morrison, professor of physiCS
at Cornell University and investigator at
Hiroshima, presents the heart sickening
picture of death and destruction in that
city and transfen; it to tbe New'York
scene wi't h frightening results. He discusses the possibility that atomic energy
may get out of hand.
Dr. Harlow Shapley. director of Hllrva.rd
College Observatory, tells how stars shine
by an atomic energy process. Dr. Eugene
P. \vigner, professor of physics at Princeton University, describes the uranium
process, and Dr. Gale Young, head of the
department of mathematics and physiCS
at Olivet College, outlines some of the
applications and limitationz of the process.
Dr. J. R. Oppenheimer, director of the
atomic bomb laboratory at Los Alamos,
and professor of physics at the University
of Cal1fornia, objectively, but somewhat
regretfully. evaluates the atomic energy
weapons, while General H. H. Arnold.
Chief of the United states Air Staff.
almost enthusiastically describes the great.

bargain they have proven to the military
forces for producing vast destruction at
low cost.
Dr. Louis N. Ridenour, who developed
radar devices and is professor of physics
at the University of PennsylVania, searches
for a defense against the atomic bomb
and, with disappointment, reports he finds
none. Dr. E. U. Condon, formerly associate director of the Westinghouse Laboratortes and now director of the National.
Bureau of Standards, declares, with seeming complacency-due perhaps to a recently acquired Washington attitudethat it is impossible to detect hidden
atomic bombs and finds saboteurs hiding
under every bed and in every filing cabll\et.
The time requIred for other nations to
prodqce atomic bombs and the results of
an atomic armament race are discussed
from several viewpoints by Dr. Frederick
S9itz jr., head of the department of
physics, Carnegie Institute of Technology,
who worked on plutonium production;
Dr, Hans Bethe, IX'ofessor of physics, Cornel! University, who directed theoretical
physics at Los Alamos; Dr. Irving Langmuir, associate director of the Generai
Electric Laboratories, and Dr. Harold ,C.
Urey, professor of physics, University of
Chicago, who worked on the uranium gas
diffusion process.
The second part of the book contains
four chapters. Dr. Leo Szilard, physiCist
with the University ' of Chicago project,

accepts the idea of international inspec4
tions to prevent use of the bomb. Waltel'
Lippmann surveys the effectiveneSs of
present and past international organizations. Dr. Albert Einstein, father of the
relatlvity theory, finds some hopes in the
internationalization of atomic energy
knowledge and of military forces, the latter to be achieved by exchange of officers
as u.niversities now exchange professors.
A concluding chapter, signed by the
Federation of American (Atomic) Scientists, summarizes the preceding contributions, noting the fact that the scientists
have stated a problem and In the absence,
of a solution have indicated a very
definite goal. This article closes on a note
of hopefulness: "The nations can have
atomic energy and much more. But they
cannot have it in a. world where war may'
come."
"One World or None" is a document of
historical significance. In it the scientists
are, like Lutber, tacking their thesis on
• the door of state departments and parlia-'
ments throl1ghout the world. The effects
should be of greater magnitude in their
'larger. more modern and more highly
energized world. The language of the
sicentists is conservative, very conservative. The potency of their words may.
with danger to those who make the mistake, be underrated because they differ so
from the rabble-rousing language of thi
(Continued on page two)
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